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Executive Summary 
The political economy of developing countries is characterized by the clientelist 
organization of politics. This perspective gives us a theoretical model of a clientelist 
political settlement as a framework for analysing the interaction between politics and 
economics in developing countries. We look at the emergence of Bangladesh out of 
two violent partitions in 1947 and 1971 through this lens to address a number of 
puzzles. Why did these particular nationalisms emerge when they did when there was 
no prior history of Bengali Muslim nationalism in this area before the 1930s? Why 
did the achievement of the most religiously and ethnically homogenous state in South 
Asia not result in stability in 1971? And what is the source of the persistent failure of 
modern Bangladeshi political parties to achieve credible elections?  
 
The interaction between a clientelist organization of politics and changing economic 
opportunities and challenges provide a coherent and systematic set of answers to these 
and other questions. While the organization of clientelist politics had many standard 
features in East Bengal, a number of specific characteristics forced clientelist factions 
to unite against intransigent dominant classes unwilling to make distributive 
compromises in time. Some of the contemporary ‘no-compromise’ attitudes of 
Bangladeshi political factions can be directly traced to this historical experience. This 
analysis directs attention away from good governance reforms as a way of addressing 
political crises in Bangladesh. Many good governance goals are not implementable in 
a clientelist political settlement. The reform experiment in Bangladesh over 2007-
2009 confirms the futility of attempting to implement this agenda in countries like 
Bangladesh.  
 
A more limited and yet difficult set of challenges are identified. The first is to 
establish a shared understanding between political coalitions that live-and-let-live 
compromises are the only way forward in the competitive clientelism that has 
emerged. The significant differences between present problems and past experiences 
of mass movements need to be widely understood by the political players themselves. 
Here the dissemination of arguments and analysis is important. Secondly, the 
prospects for sustaining growth depend on the enforcement capabilities of agencies 
that can assist with the adoption and learning of new technologies. The experience of 
Bangladesh with its garments industry shows that these processes can be assisted even 
in the context of a clientelist political settlement.  
 
Finally, the analysis of clientelism and nationalism has implications for some critical 
issues in regional relations. Bangladesh sits at the heart of a potential geo-political 
flashpoint that involves India, China and separatist states in India’s North-East. The 
partition of Bengal and the intensification of Hindu-Muslim animosity spurred India 
to build the longest fence in the world around Bangladesh to prevent ‘Bangladeshi 
infiltration’ into India. At the same time, India desperately wants transit routes 
through Bangladesh to access its North-East. One implication of our analysis and the 
history of nationalism in Bangladesh is that the concession of Indian rights to travel 
through a fenced-in Bangladesh while Bangladeshis remain subject to strict Indian 
immigration controls is exactly the type of asymmetry in rights that resulted in 
significant nationalist reactions in the past. The analysis tells us that it would be 
dangerous to ignore the likely responses of political organizers in Bangladesh and a 
new form of nationalist backlash can easily emerge as a result of this political agenda. 
This would be seriously detrimental to both India and Bangladesh.   
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Bangladesh: Partitions, Nationalisms and 
Legacies for State-Building 
 
Mushtaq H. Khan  
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Bangladesh was created out of two violent partitions. The first in 1947 partitioned 
Bengal into a largely Muslim east, which became East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), 
and a largely Hindu west, which became the state of West Bengal in India (first map 
in Figure 1). When the Pakistan state failed to meet the aspirations of East Pakistani 
elites, a second violent partition in 1971 led to the secession of East Pakistan, which 
became Bangladesh (second map in Figure 1).  
 
Sources: National Maritime Museum, http://www.portcities.org.uk/london/server/show/conMediaFile.
4845/Map-of-Bangladesh-and-West-Bengal.html and http://princefino.files.wordpress.com/2008/12/
east-and-west-pakistan.jpg 
 
The outcome was a country with significantly greater linguistic and religious 
homogeneity compared to the other major subcontinental countries. Yet far from 
creating a stable state and a society with a clear sense of national identity, Bangladesh 
continues to be riven by conflict and dissent over what constitutes the fundamentals of 
its nationhood. While some forms of ethnic and communal conflict have indeed 
become muted as a result of the physical absence of some obvious “others”, there is 
no evidence that overall political stability has increased. New political disputes over 
nationhood have simply replaced old ones.  
 
While these sequential partitions created a Muslim Bengali state, there had been no 
significant history of political movements that had imagined such a nation before 
Figure 1 Bengal’s partition of 1947 and Pakistan’s partition of 1971 
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1947. Rather, both partitions were driven by conflicts between established and 
upwardly mobile elites attempting to solve distributive conflicts through patron-client 
mobilizations. In 1947, the conflict was primarily between an upwardly mobile 
Muslim Bengali elite based on the rich and middle peasantry and more established 
Hindu Bengali elites consisting of landlords, bureaucrats and professionals. 
Demography favoured the Muslims who constituted the majority in Bengal but they 
were economically less prosperous. They had no intention of partitioning their 
province and the mobilizations led by Bengali Muslim faction leaders from the rich 
peasant classes in the 1930s were entirely about achieving a bigger share of power 
and resources through the electoral process. The failure of these two competing sets of 
elites to agree on a distribution of power and privilege that was satisfactory to both 
sides was not foreordained. But failure led to the violent partition of Bengal in 1947.  
 
The conflict of 1971 was also about the distribution of power and privilege, this time 
between the elites of East and West Pakistan. The fact that the partition of Bengal in 
1947 was not the result of a long political mobilization which had struggled for the 
creation of Pakistan meant that the Muslims of Bengal, Punjab, and the other areas 
constituting Pakistan had not created a consistent or shared national ideology that pre-
dated the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland. Yet when Pakistan was born, 
many Bengali Muslim elites tried for a long time to make Pakistan work in their 
interest. But with economic, military and political power firmly based in the West, 
upwardly mobile Bengali Muslims again felt hemmed in even within East Pakistan. 
They now faced a new dominant group: the West Pakistani military and bureaucratic 
elite based in Karachi a thousand miles away. The new state nurtured an emerging 
capitalist class based almost entirely in the West. But once again demography 
favoured the Bengalis in East Pakistan who were more numerous than all of West 
Pakistan’s population put together. This resulted in constitutional crises from the 
outset as democracy threatened to reflect a distribution of political power that was out 
of line with the distribution of economic and military power. After twenty three years 
of failed constitutional experiments to marry democracy with the protection of the 
economic and political privileges of elites based in the West, the crisis came to a head 
with the elections of 1970. The Western elites refused to accept the results of an 
election that put East Pakistanis in charge of all of Pakistan. In the violent crisis that 
ensued, East Pakistan split off in 1971 in a second and even bloodier partition to 
become Bangladesh.  
 
The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 did not achieve internal peace. Instead, there 
was more violence, an attempted imposition of a one-party state, the assassinations of 
two heads of state, long periods of military rule and finally in 2000, the emergence of 
a vulnerable democracy. Even by the standards of developing countries, its emerging 
democracy was characterized by high levels of political corruption and insufficient 
attention to institution-building or developmental policy. Nevertheless, despite its 
apparently dysfunctional governance, Bangladesh emerged in the 1980s as a relatively 
high-growth developing country with a significant base in manufacturing based on the 
garments and textile industries.  
 
What drove the successive national movements in Bangladesh, and why have none of 
the answers provided economic and political stability? The claim that the inhabitants 
of this part of India had always imagined a Muslim Bengali nation is an argument that 
is difficult to sustain. Muslim representatives in the Bengal Legislative Assembly in 
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the 1930s had wanted greater autonomy for Bengal, or even an independent Bengal 
that included both East and West, but not the East Pakistan that actually emerged. 
When East Pakistan was born, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the Bengali 
exclusion from the centres of power in Pakistan, but many key Bengali politicians, 
like Suhrawardy and Muhammad Ali Bogra served as prime ministers of Pakistan and 
were at the forefront of constitutional discussions in the 1950s that attempted to make 
Pakistan a workable proposition. The military takeover of 1958 suspended these 
discussions and the polarization gradually increased after that. Disagreements about 
the distribution of power and privilege rather than an imagined community that 
needed a state were therefore at the heart of both partitions, though alternative 
communities and states were rapidly imagined when negotiations began to break 
down. There is nothing new in this. Economic interests have also been important 
elsewhere in driving groups to define the “nation” and of course to define themselves 
as its representatives. But economic interests can be structured in different ways, and 
these differences matter for understanding subsequent developments.  
 
A number of different ways in which economic interests may have driven the 
evolution of nationalism have been suggested in the literature. First, there is a 
Marxist-inspired literature that has explained nationalist conflicts in terms of 
underlying class conflicts. The problem this literature has to address is the following. 
While economic classes like peasants, landlords, capitalists and workers have lined up 
in different ways in these struggles, the nationalist struggles were conflicts between 
more amorphous coalitions of classes. The eventual conflicts were between factions 
composed of various classes, led by members of the “intermediate classes” such as the 
petty bourgeoisie and rich peasants. Moreover, the most significant beneficiaries of 
these conflicts were not peasants or workers (even when the factions they supported 
won) but much smaller groups from within the intermediate classes. The Bangladeshi 
peasant or worker today is no better off than their colleagues in neighbouring South 
Asian countries. The Marxist literature has responded by explaining these features in 
terms of leaders from the intermediate classes exploiting broader class grievances for 
their own ends (Umar 1980b, 1980a; A. Rahman and Azad 1990; Hashmi 1994). This 
does seem to explain why both capitalist accumulation and the real incomes of 
workers and poor peasants have not improved, and indeed often suffered following 
these conflicts.  
 
A weakness in the simplistic Marxist analysis is that too much depends on the 
susceptibility of the masses to “false consciousness”. What enables the political 
leadership to exploit class grievances and exploitation in this way, not just once or 
even twice in a single generation but repeatedly? Secondly, while political 
entrepreneurs from these intermediate classes have clearly dominated politics in 
Bangladesh, these entrepreneurs have not represented the class interests of their own 
(intermediate) class once they get to power. The rich peasant or petty bourgeois 
politician who represents their class interest systematically is the exception rather than 
the rule. More typically, political leaders have represented factional interests, usually 
with negative effects for institution-building and economic growth. 
 
The role of factions is central to a second set of explanations that draws on the 
Weberian sociological tradition. In Bangladesh, as elsewhere in the Indian 
subcontinent, political action has not normally been organized by class organizations 
even though class conflicts have been intense in different periods. Rather, political 
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conflicts have been predominantly between rival multi-class factions. The approach 
adopted by sociologists in the Weberian tradition has focussed on the role of patron-
client networks and patrimonialism in defining political agendas (S. I. Khan, et al. 
1996). This approach suggests that charismatic but arbitrary leaders mobilized people 
in their own narrow interest, and continue to control the “neo-patrimonial” state in 
Bangladesh. The competition between factions headed by charismatic leaders with 
different ideological agendas explains the intense political instability that we observe.  
 
The problem with this approach is that while national conflicts have clearly been 
dominated by competing patron-client networks, this patron-client approach is 
divorced from an analysis of the economic interests of the participants. It does not 
explain why patron-client networks have been able to exercise such power and have 
been able to define the contours of major social conflicts. In Weber's original story, 
charismatic leaders were able to play such a role in pre-modern societies because they 
enjoyed traditional legitimacy. It is difficult to argue that Bangladeshi leaders in 
recent history have enjoyed such a tradition-based legitimacy. Rather, their limited 
and fragile legitimacy has been conditional on the economic benefits they have 
offered their followers. 
 
We argue that the problems of democracy and of institution-building have to be seen 
in the context of a clientelist political settlement that in general characterizes 
developing countries in general, but is differently structured across countries (M. H. 
Khan 2010). The organization of politics along the lines of patron-client factions is a 
structural feature of developing countries according to our analysis because of 
economic and political characteristics of these societies, not related to traditional 
authority or the absence of democracy. This makes our analysis of clientelism very 
different from the analysis of neo-patrimonialism in the neo-Weberian tradition 
(Médard 2002). In advanced capitalist countries, the groups that have political power 
and economic power are likely to be significantly overlapping for a number of 
structural reasons. But developing countries face significant structural imbalances 
between economic and political power. This is why patron-client politics plays a 
significant role in developing countries as a mechanism for managing redistributive 
demands in contexts where fiscal resources are insufficient and social democratic 
states are not feasible. Political stability is typically achieved through the allocation of 
resources to powerful political organizers operating patron-client networks (M. H. 
Khan 2010). These structural features explain why the ‘Weberian states’ of advanced 
countries are nowhere in evidence in the developing world. The significant 
differences in the structure of the political economy of developing and advanced 
country states is one reason why a direct comparison with the latter does not 
necessarily help us to identify weaknesses in particular developing countries (see also 
North, et al. 2007).  
 
If developing countries could construct modern Weberian states, the homogenous 
ethnic and religious structure of Bangladesh may have been an advantage. If politics 
were organized along interest representation and welfarist fiscal policy, the absence of 
religious and ethnic cleavages may have simplified the construction of a cohesive 
society. Perhaps in the future, when countries like Bangladesh are closer to 
constructing modern Weberian states, this may yet turn out to be an advantage for 
Bangladesh. But in a low-income developing country, the organization of a clientelist 
political settlement is of primary importance, and ethnicity is only one of a number of 
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determinants of how a clientelist polity is organized. If anything, the violent history of 
partitions followed by violent processes of constructing new (clientelist) political 
settlements disrupted the normal development of patron-client politics in Bangladesh. 
When factions use violence, the stakes become much higher, and strong animosities 
can develop that are justified by ideologies that may have little bearing on the actual 
interests that are at stake. But these factors do affect the evolution of informal norms 
regulating the conflict between competing factions. Patron-client politics therefore 
faced significant difficulties in achieving viable forms in Bangladesh even compared 
to other parts of India. This can help to explain why democracy took relatively long to 
establish after independence. It can also help to explain why the competition between 
factional political groupings in Bangladesh continues to take zero-sum forms. By 
looking at the major crises of partitions and nation-building through the lens of 
patron-client politics we can explain both what was different about these events 
compared to the normal politics of South Asia, but also what was strikingly similar. 
The analytical frame of clientelist politics helps to explain some of the crises that 
emerged in Bengal over the last century, and also why politics and state-building in 
Bangladesh turned out to be more fragile compared to India despite Bangladesh 
eventually emerging as a far more homogenous country than its larger neighbour. 
 
Democracy in Bangladesh, as in other developing countries, is a competition between 
clientelist factions and the process can be described as competitive clientelism. But 
competitive clientelism has specific requirements for its smooth operation. In 
particular it requires a distribution of power between factions that makes it credible 
that the ruling coalition will not use administrative power too heavily to fix elections 
and prolong its tenure. The history and structure of factions and how they relate to 
productive processes differs across countries and over time. Some of the most 
important problems with institutionalizing democratic processes in Bangladesh can be 
better understood if we go behind the rhetoric of nationalism as a driver of state 
formation and focus instead on the organizational power of the clientelist factions that 
have driven historical change in the past, often positively, but sometimes negatively. 
If some major contemporary problems are located in the structure of its clientelist 
organizations, it may be that political entrepreneurs in Bangladesh have to consider 
further fundamental changes in the organization of its clientelist politics. This may be 
necessary to address issues of institution-building and economic development.   
 
Though the organization of clientelist politics in Bangladesh has many similarities 
with India, there are also relevant differences. Paradoxically, the diversity of India’s 
factions based on different coalitions of castes, ethnicities and religious identities has 
enabled its patron-client politics to operate in more stable ways compared to both 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. In India, no faction was big or strong enough to imagine 
that it could dominate the others (except during the brief period of Indira Gandhi’s 
Emergency of 1975-77). In contrast, smaller countries with homogenous populations 
or a small number of ethnic groups can suffer from polarizations in their patron-client 
politics that obstruct the operation of democratic politics in clientelist polities (M. H. 
Khan 2005). The result can be frequent electoral crises and occasional military 
governments. While the creation of Bangladesh was undoubtedly beneficial for the 
rapid expansion of the Bengali-Muslim middle class and for the emergence of its own 
capitalist class, a better understanding of the constraints facing state-building in 
Bangladesh is required to respond to ongoing political and economic challenges. 
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The partitions that created Bangladesh have also left deep legacies and geo-political 
problems for the region. The Bengalis, who today constitute around 250 million 
people, are split between the independent state of Bangladesh with a population of 
150 million and the Indian state of West Bengal with a population of 80 million. A 
significant number of the remainder are in several neighbouring North-eastern Indian 
states, in particular Assam. But so deep were the roots of the partition of 1947 that no 
significant political movement on either side of the border has since seriously 
challenged that partition or espoused reunification even as a distant objective. These 
borders now have an appearance of permanence, cutting across historic trade and 
migration routes and rivers. The water problem is particularly acute in downstream 
Bangladesh whose river flows are now determined in India with insufficient regard to 
Bangladeshi agricultural requirements.  
 
For India too, the Bangladesh border created significant problems. The partition of 
Bengal converted the Hindu-Muslim conflict into a significant cleavage in the politics 
of a number of Indian states with a significant Muslim presence, including the 
neighbouring state of Assam. India’s regional politics has been driven by the fear that 
the demographic balance in neighbouring Indian states is again shifting in the 
direction of a significant Muslim presence. Contemporary West Bengal has a 25 per 
cent Muslim minority and Assam a 31 per cent Muslim minority, second only to the 
Muslim-majority Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions between Hindus and 
Muslims are frequently intense in Assam. Responding to its own internal politics, 
India has almost finished constructing a 4000km fence around Bangladesh. The fence 
itself has created new problems for India. If India simply needed to construct a fence, 
Bangladesh would have no option but to live with it. But India also needs to have 
pathways for itself through the fence, and this has made the politics of the region 
potentially explosive. 
 
India’s problem is that the 1947 partition almost entirely blocked its access to its 
troubled North-East. There are seven Indian states on the other side of Bangladesh, 
tenuously connected to India by a narrow strip of hilly land, the Shiliguri Corridor, 
which is barely 20km wide at its narrowest point. Transportation and access have 
become more and more important as there are frequent insurgencies and tensions in 
the North-Eastern states which have significant separatist movements of their own. To 
make matters even more fraught, large areas are also disputed by China. The 
disastrous 1962 war with China was fought in this region. To deal with insurgencies 
and economic backwardness in its North-East, India has persistently demanded transit 
rights through Bangladesh. This was difficult enough in the past, but now with 
Bangladesh effectively fenced in, it has become an even more difficult proposition to 
sell within Bangladesh. It is possible to envisage Bangladesh living with the fence (it 
can do very little on its own to reverse it) and it is also possible to envisage a more 
open border with greater inter-connectivity across the region. But a Bangladeshi 
government that accepts India’s right to travel through its country while accepting that 
it will otherwise be fenced in is likely to rapidly lose domestic support. If Indian 
pressure forces a Bangladeshi government to proceed in this direction, there is also a 
significant risk of new nationalist responses within Bangladesh. Yet, successive 
Bangladeshi governments have been under intense pressure from India to concede 
exactly this. 
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2. A Theoretical Framework for Analysing Clientelist Development  
To analyse the political and economic instability that characterized Pakistan and 
Bangladesh after independence we need an analytical framework that can capture the 
relationship between economics and politics in developing countries. The new states 
in Pakistan and India did not have the rule-following characteristics of Weberian 
states, nor did they reflect dominant class interests in the way a simplistic Marxist 
analysis may suggest. To analyse the political economy dynamics driving the 
partitions that created Bangladesh and the subsequent institutional performance of the 
country, we use our framework of ‘political settlements’ developed in Khan (2010). 
This framework provides a way of looking at the interaction between economics and 
politics in developing countries through the lens of power and institutions. We will 
not reproduce the full analysis here, but only outline the critical features which are 
necessary for following this specific analysis of clientelism in Pakistan and later 
Bangladesh.  
 
Economic and political activity takes place in a context defined by formal and 
informal ‘rules’. Rules are institutions, which can be formal if they are enforced by 
the state; or informal if they are based on non-state enforcement or if they are 
voluntarily adhered to. In developing countries, formal rules like property rights or the 
operation of democratic processes are in reality often implemented in ways that are 
quite different from what their legal description says. In these cases, the formal rules 
have a large element of informality and we need to explain why and how formal rules 
are modified in particular ways. This is a critical part of any explanation of economic 
and political performance in developing countries because a major part of their 
difference from advanced countries, and indeed from each other, lies in the particular 
informal ways in which formal rules are applied and implemented. Informal rules also 
describe the activity of significant parts of the economy and polity that are entirely 
outside the ‘formal’ economy.  
 
The Ubiquity of Patron-Client Politics  
In developing countries, the informal networks used by powerful groups to generate 
and protect benefits can be generically described as ‘patron-client networks’. Any 
informal relationship or organization that involves individuals with different degrees 
of power can be broadly described as some variant of a patron-client relationship. 
There are systematic hierarchies and exchanges in these relationships but they are 
‘personalized’ because they are not formal contracts that can be enforced by the 
application of a ‘rule of law’. Patron-client relationships can clearly include a wide 
variety of relationships through which power is exercised. The goals of patrons and 
clients, their relative power, and the distribution of benefits they achieve can all vary 
widely. These networks can operate directly as informal networks or within formal 
organizations like political parties. As mechanisms through which power is exercised, 
the typical patron-client network involves a patron as an organizer of power 
organizing groups of clients who offer their organizational support in exchange for 
benefits that the patron offers. The organizational power that this type of patron-client 
network can deploy is an important explanation of why they are able to capture and 
sustain significant rents in developing countries, often through their involvement in 
the protection and operation of formal institutions.  
 
Patron-client networks that are deployed to preserve informal distributions of benefits 
are typically organized as factions or collections of factions. Bigger factions are 
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typically coalitions of smaller factions organized by a higher-level patron. Both 
factions and coalitions of factions are organized as pyramids. At the lowest level, a 
faction in many developing countries consists of a patron with a group of followers 
who are locally powerful individuals. Collectively, they appropriate a share of 
benefits from the local economy by engaging in local enforcement and dispute 
resolution activities. Sometimes this also crosses the line into expropriation and the 
extraction of protection money. More significant patron-client organizations are 
typically pyramidal organizations of lower-level factions. Here patrons at higher 
levels organize factions or clients below them to provide them with bargaining power 
in contests with other groups or factions for more significant rents. For instance, 
bigger factions may be constructed to participate in electoral contests or to gain entry 
into other formal organizations that provide access to rents.  
 
Patrons are therefore typically more enterprising or powerful political entrepreneurs at 
each level who can mobilize significant groups of clients below them to capture rents 
and resources for their particular factions at that level. Clients lower down the 
factional ladder provide the organizational muscle to patrons higher up the pyramid 
for a share of the rents distributed downwards within the faction. The modern patron-
client faction is therefore constructed on the basis of a rational calculation of interests 
by both patrons and clients and has little to do with traditional deference or cultural 
values. The class identity of patrons and clients can vary significantly across societies 
as can the organization of factions and the distribution of power within them. Finally, 
the ideological symbols that are used to mobilize people and distinguish factions from 
each other obviously also vary significantly. The fact that factions are often 
distinguished using traditional cultural symbols like caste, religion or tribe can serve 
to confuse the fact that these are typically opportunistic arrangements. Patrons are 
typically unable to keep their factions together unless they are successful in 
generating rents that they can distribute down the network, and clients are always 
ready to redefine their allegiances if other factions offer them higher rewards.  
 
Differences in the organization and structure of patron-client networks are likely to 
reflect differences in the productive organization of societies, differences in their 
organizational and political histories and differences in their colonial histories. 
Dominant political organizers in different countries may come from various economic 
backgrounds and mobilize groups from different backgrounds and organized around a 
range of signposts. Factions can be organized along ethnic, religious, tribal, caste or 
ideological lines; they can be large or small, centralized or fragmented, with strong or 
weak patrons and so on. The number of competing factions can also differ, affecting 
the competitive structure in politics and the possibility of coordination across factions. 
All these variations have important consequences for the ways in which conflicts over 
rents are organized in different societies and we will summarize some of these 
differences and the likely effects later.  
 
A number of features of the political competition in developing countries can help to 
contextualize the rapidly changing but sustained ideological conflicts that often 
characterize them. First, political parties in developing countries are typically multi-
class organizations that bring together a large number of patron-client networks in a 
pyramidal structure. Secondly, members of the “intermediate” classes dominate the 
organizational leadership of these factions. It is widely noted, for instance, that the 
major parties in Bangladesh represent quite similar multi-class interests, that they 
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routinely split and re-form along factions led by strong personalities, and that these 
factions are themselves loose coalitions of smaller or primary factions which are to be 
found at all levels of society (Siddiqui 1984; S. A. Khan 1989; Riaz 1994; Wood 
1994; S. I. Khan, et al. 1996)  But recognizing this process raises an obvious question 
that deserves analytical attention. Why is it that formal organized politics has been 
dominated by the conflicts between these multi-class patron-client factions rather than 
by the conflict between classes which clearly also exist?  
 
Looking from the bottom up, the basic component of any party or coalition, however 
large, is a myriad of basic patron-client factions. Each of these is organized around a 
single or small group of leaders. These basic patron-client factions are ubiquitous and 
range from neighbourhood groups led by petty mafia bosses known in Bangladesh as 
mastans to village factions led by somewhat more respectable matabbars, dalals and 
upazilla chairmen. Looking from the top down, factions at lower levels are too small 
to wield any real bargaining power vis-à-vis factions organized at higher levels or vis-
à-vis the state. Bargaining power depends on the number of people who can be 
occasionally mobilized by the faction for elections but more generally for maintaining 
local level enforcement networks, organizing civil protests, demonstrations, enforcing 
general strikes, and other forms of activity which aim to inflict costs on those who 
refuse to make deals or offer payoffs to that faction.  
 
Since bargaining power is greater when the faction is bigger, there is a strong 
incentive for coalitions of factions to start coalescing in a pyramidal fashion. The 
more serious the conflict, the bigger the coalition that will form to fight it, with the 
payoffs from victory being distributed in varying proportions down the pyramid. 
Success in redistributive contests depends on each faction being able to field more 
organizational holding power than its rivals. This is as true of the lowest level factions 
fighting over disputed land in villages as of national level factions competing for 
control of the state. The payoffs targeted by a faction depends on the economy and the 
dominant types of rents that political power can be used to allocate through formal 
and informal mechanisms. The valuable resources at stake can include licenses, loans 
from state banks, control over local state organs such as the police that allows land 
grabbing, and jobs in public sector enterprises, to give just a few examples. The 
national factions are, of course, constructed out of primary factions. If they are 
successful, members of the intermediate classes in leadership positions at different 
levels of the faction can become quite well off and may make a transition to the asset 
owning class.  
 
Higher-level faction leaders deal with lower level faction leaders, adding or removing 
them as conditions change. At the same time, lower level faction leaders join or exit 
from the coalition depending on what they are being offered by the coalition 
compared to others. The leader of a major party is the leader of a relatively small 
number of factions at the highest level, but if we follow each of these factions down 
the pyramid, a vast number of factions will be found at the lowest levels. The ability 
of any particular primary faction to get included at any level in a bigger faction 
depends on its perceived ability to deliver organizational power at least cost for the 
higher leadership. The organizational power of a faction depends on its ability to field 
its supporters, from mobilizing them for local elections to bringing them out to 
impose costs on opponents, in many cases through organized violence. At each level 
including the highest, leaders want to have the maximum number of the most 
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powerful factions under them, but not without limit, because the more factions they 
incorporate, the more thinly will they have to distribute the resources they eventually 
hope to capture.  
 
Primary factions can be excluded if the leadership of a higher level faction feels that 
the economic cost of including it is too high for achieving its redistributive agenda or, 
(if the higher level faction already has access to resources), the political cost of 
excluding the lower level group is acceptable. The strategy of excluded groups in turn 
is to shift their political positions from being simply troublesome to being totally 
incompatible with the ruling group depending on their assessment of whether 
accommodation is still possible or not. This ensures that factions never become truly 
encompassing, and when they do become too big they start to fragment because an 
increasing number of lower-level factions become dissatisfied with what higher levels 
are then able to give them. Thus, the paradox of many clientelist systems with a large 
number of factions or with rapidly increasing numbers is that neither full inclusion of 
all factions nor the exclusion of too many is a stable equilibrium. Rather, stability in 
these contexts depends on a continual negotiation of insiders and outsiders to achieve 
a sustainable combination of economic and political viability. 
 
The ubiquity and often vagueness of the notion of the faction in the Indian 
subcontinent has led some to question its usefulness (Hardiman 1982). Interestingly, 
the Bengali word for faction, dol, is the same word that now means party. But is 
Hardiman right to question all analysis that focuses on the faction? First, he argues 
that not all political leaders operate through factions. Some are activists who directly 
engage in agitational (for which we can read class) politics. The existence of such 
exceptional individuals does not, of course, preclude the usefulness of the notion of 
faction if we observe, as we do, that many important political issues are contested 
between factions.  
 
A second critique is that higher-level leaders are often observed to fail in forcing their 
decisions on lower level clients. This too does not rule out the importance of factions, 
it simply says that the bargaining power between patrons and clients within factions 
can vary greatly. Not only is this true, the rapid formation and dissolution of big 
coalitions testifies to the ability of lower level clients to opt out of the coalition as 
conditions change or as better offers are made by competing coalitions.  
 
A more significant criticism offered by Hardiman is that clients often have strong 
class organizations of their own which can over-ride their loyalties to their patrons. 
This criticism is really directed against those who present factions and other economic 
interests as mutually exclusive categories such that collective action is only of one 
type or the other. Hardiman's critique of factional analysis that ignores class entirely 
is totally justified. But as individuals can and do operate within both class and 
factional organizations, we have to explain why the most important political battles in 
South Asia and across developing countries continue to be between factional 
organizations. 
 
Finally, Hardiman points out that there is little evidence of factions operating at the 
national level with tentacles spreading right down to the village. He reviews the 
classic works on factions by F.G. Bailey, Ralph Nicholas and Paul Brass amongst 
others to show that their work does not support the claim that the day-to-day operation 
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of village factions is dominated by loyalty to patrons outside the village. This 
criticism is levelled against an anthropological notion of faction based on loyalty. If 
factions were indeed based on loyalty then a faction once established would be fairly 
immutable and we would see traces of its existence even when no immediate conflicts 
were going on. However, we would argue that most factions and factional alliances 
are rationally made pragmatic alliances based on what the lower level faction can 
offer the higher level one and vice versa. The coalition that would form during an 
election would be different from the coalition that would form during a land dispute.  
 
Shakeeb Adnan Khan (1989) provides an account of the operation of village-level 
factions in Bangladesh from a Marxist perspective. He describes in rich detail how 
patron-client factions compete vigorously at the village level for access to state 
distributed resources like irrigation pumps or Food for Works contracts, or to settle 
land disputes where mobilizations of rival forces by the contestants plays a critical 
role. Successful patrons not only have to be more successful in organizing locally, 
they also have to be successful in forging flexible alignments with parties and factions 
at higher levels controlling the state. The clients of village patrons, the small and 
middle peasants who benefit from the resources which village-level patrons can 
distribute, are not only not upset by their patrons changing their party allegiances as 
power shifts in Dhaka, they expect them to do so (S. A. Khan 1989: 91-125). Thus 
here too, Hardiman's critique is relevant but only when directed against analysts for 
whom factions are based on pre-rational loyalties to caste or kin. Such factions are 
very rare, and when coalitions are constructed on the basis of primordial loyalties 
such as religion they rapidly break down once their immediate objectives have been 
achieved. The experience of caste-based coalitions in India has been very similar. 
 
The second point which is worthy of note is that not only are factions ubiquitous, they 
are organized and led by political organizers who typically come from the 
“intermediate” classes. Factions are very rarely led by capitalists and almost never by 
workers, the landless or poor peasants. The poor are numerous but are too poor to 
organize politics on their own. The emerging capitalists and capitalist landlords may 
be rich as individuals and occasionally organize their own factions but they are too 
few in numbers and collective wealth to set the political agenda. Classes that occupy 
an intermediate position in society, often collectively described as the intermediate 
classes, dominate factional leadership positions. The term was popularized by Kalecki 
(1972) who noted that the urban petty bourgeoisie, rich peasants and state bureaucrats 
politically dominated post-independence India.  
 
Our use of the term differs somewhat from Kalecki. We include a broader group of 
classes in the category of intermediate classes, which we treat as a residual to 
describe classes that are not capitalist, or working class (including the unemployed) 
or poor peasant (who are at, or close to, subsistence levels). Nor do we want to say, 
like Kalecki, that these classes have some shared interest in non-capitalist 
development that the intermediate regime promotes. Rather, our intention in 
identifying these classes is simply to point out that the polar classes do not dominate 
organizational politics in developing countries. On the other hand, the intermediate 
classes too do not act as classes. They simply provide tens of thousands of recruits for 
leading and organizing factional politics at different levels of society. The economic 
policies the state follows cannot simply be read off from this fact, and here we differ 
from Kalecki. The tension between the redistributive demands coming from factional 
15 
 
politics and the imperative of ensuring economic growth largely through the capitalist 
sector has resulted in sharp shifts in state policy. The state has sometimes followed 
dramatically pro-capitalist policies, and at other times (as in the early seventies) it has 
almost destroyed capitalism. 
 
Our broader definition of the intermediate classes includes rich peasants, middle 
peasants, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and the educated “middle class”, both employed 
and unemployed. While these classes have different interests, it is not surprising that 
they should have collectively provided a significant proportion of the political 
entrepreneurs of recent history.  Compared to workers, poor peasants and the illiterate 
unemployed, they have a relatively high degree of organizational ability based on 
their relatively high levels of education and wealth. Secondly, though still a relatively 
small fraction of the population, they are far more numerous than capitalists and large 
landlords whose numbers are insignificant in developing countries like Bangladesh, 
and who therefore do not play a central organizational role in politics. Nor is 
capitalism so developed that the capitalist class can dominate politics indirectly by 
exercising their purchasing power.  
 
The important point is that while political entrepreneurs from the intermediate classes 
play a key role in political organization, it is not the case that the intermediate classes 
dominate the political scene as classes. Thus the political dominance of the 
intermediate classes reflects an incomplete transition to capitalism.  
 
For Weber too, pre-capitalist societies were characterized by variants of patron-client 
relationships, but for very different reasons. Weber contrasted the “rational” 
bureaucratic form of governance seen in modern capitalism with traditional forms of 
authority in pre-capitalist societies. Patrimonial rule was identified as one of the most 
important of these pre-capitalist forms of governance, where allegiance to a leader 
was based on personal loyalty and traditional legitimacy (Weber 1978: 1006-110). 
What we describe as informality is explained in Weber’s framework by the 
importance in patrimonial societies of authority exercised by “charismatic” leaders. 
As charisma entails allegiance to a person and not to an office, by definition, the 
exercise of power in these societies has to be informal.  
 
While Weber has inspired contemporary sociologists to look for personalized 
authority exercised through patron-client networks, the patron-client networks we 
observe in contemporary developing countries are typically not based on traditional 
legitimacy or charismatic authority. On the contrary, the “contract” between patrons 
and clients is often surprisingly modern and rational. It is based on an exchange of 
organizational muscle for material benefits and is readily re-negotiated if clients (or 
indeed entire factions) are offered better terms by other patrons. Neo-Weberians 
recognize that modern patron-client relationships are based on the exchange of 
favours and rewards, and are no longer typically based on charisma or traditional 
authority. However, they explain the persistence of personalized power in neo-
patrimonial models in terms of the weakness of formal structures of democracy that 
allows patrons to maintain their privileged access to power and rents (Médard 2002). 
 
Weber's analysis is also different from ours in its underlying analysis of the economy. 
What interests Weber is the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of patrimonial rule, 
which he contrasts with the formal and predictable nature of bureaucratic rule. 
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Capitalism, he argues, requires the rule-governed predictability of bureaucratic 
governance. The arbitrariness of patrimonialism stifles capitalism by lowering 
investment and preventing long-term planning by capitalists. It also encourages 
patrimonial rulers to arbitrarily favour their clients by granting them monopolies. 
Since this description has an uncanny resemblance to features of governance in 
contemporary developing countries, Weber's analysis of patrimonialism has informed 
a new interest in the deleterious effects of patron-client networks and of ‘poor 
governance’. 
 
Despite its apparent fit with some observations of the governance problem in 
developing countries, Weber's analysis is misleading because it conflates the 
functional requirements of advanced capitalism with an analysis of the constraints and 
requirements of the period of transition during which capitalism is being created and 
institutionalized in developing countries. No advanced country organized this process 
of transition by first successfully institutionalizing a bureaucracy that would pass the 
test of impersonality and modernity at a time when its productive sectors were still 
based primarily on, say, peasant or handicraft production. Nor has any country 
succeeded in institutionalizing an effective rule of law protecting all property rights 
and contracts without significant incomes generated by a formal modern sector that 
are sufficient to pay for the enforcement of a general rule of law as a public good. 
Most developing countries are far away from meeting these entry conditions to 
formality. Periods of transition between the collapse of formal pre-capitalist systems 
and the emergence of a modern capitalist economy have always been characterized by 
significant levels of ‘personalized’ or informal interventions and institutions despite 
the presence of pockets of modern capitalist economies. The relevant question is why 
these arbitrary processes (in the sense of not being strictly rule-following) have led to 
the growth of capitalist sectors and eventually a successful transition to a rule of law 
economy in a few countries but not in many others.  
 
There is, however, an important paradox that we must address. Why do the masses 
persistently collude in being “fooled” by factional politics since this pattern of politics 
has been around long enough for everybody to realize what is going on? Even though 
the intermediate classes dominate in leadership positions, parties can only succeed if 
they can bring out mass support at critical times and, of course, at elections. The mass 
supporters of parties do not in the end get substantial economic payoffs or payoffs in 
the form of their preferred ideological positions being realized. Nevertheless there 
seems to be a widespread collusion in the acceptance of the meaningfulness of the 
claims made by parties, and alternative movements or parties that could in theory 
reflect mass aspirations better do not replace them. Two types of answer have been 
provided. The first comes from a narrowly defined class analysis and the second from 
a neo-Weberian analysis of the patrimonial state, but neither is satisfactory on its own. 
 
The conventional class approach relies on either “false consciousness” or betrayal by 
the leadership to explain how the genuine grievances of poor and middle peasants or 
of urban workers get translated into a political language and agenda which in the end 
offers them little. While such explanations often have a factual description at their 
core, they are not fully satisfactory for several reasons. First, a false consciousness 
and/or betrayal explanation may be convincing once or twice, but if a country persists 
with clientelist politics for decades on end, something else is going on. When anyone 
actually bothers to ask the poor about their opinions and beliefs there is very little 
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evidence of false consciousness. Unfortunately, representative surveys do not exist for 
the earlier periods but increasingly such studies are being conducted to test popular 
perceptions. Banu (1992) is an example of a nation-wide survey of contemporary 
attitudes. In the eighties when mainstream clientelist parties in Bangladesh were 
fighting a battle defined by secularism on one side and Islamic values on the other, 
this survey found that only 6.4% of rural respondents were proud of national 
independence and only 1% of the War of Liberation, the most potent symbols of the 
commitment to secularism. At the same time, barely 9% of the respondents reported 
that they were proud of Islam. This hardly suggests the kind of deeply felt primordial 
commitments that could explain a century of strife. The mass of Bangladesh's 
working people seem to have little time for the fine ideological debates of the 
intermediate classes, a fact which should hardly be surprising. But it does leave 
unexplained the ability of parties and factions to mobilize the masses ostensibly on 
such issues rather than on the basis of the economic interests of the poor.  
 
Instead of false consciousness, it may be that individuals at the bottom of the pyramid 
behave as they do because what little they can potentially get through the success of 
their faction is greater than the expected payoffs from class action. The poor do get 
some benefits from factional politics although the benefits are pitifully small. They 
may range from the patron's offer of protection through the mobilization of the faction 
during disputes over land and resources, the offer of credit at less than usurious 
interest rates, or in the case of more active foot soldiers, a regular retainer. A rational 
rejection of class policies by the poor may be based on a number of considerations. 
First, there may be a justifiable perception that class action to change society is 
unlikely to succeed unless a very significant degree of class unity was to emerge. If 
the poor perceive that they are fragmented, and that the rich and the intermediate 
classes will most likely succeed in dividing them, then following class politics is 
irrational. The widely observed preference of the poor to support factional patrons 
rather than class organizations (Jansen 1987; S. A. Khan 1989) may then be based not 
on false consciousness but rather on a rational calculation about which strategy is 
likely to make any difference in the actual class context in which the poor find 
themselves. 
 
A more fundamental problem may be that the poor (and indeed their leaders) may not 
be able to visualize a credible change in the productive system that could make 
everyone who was poor better off. Like fragmentation, the absence of credible 
strategies to increase the size of the pie through inclusive politics is not necessarily an 
unalterable fact. Nevertheless, in the absence of credible strategies to increase the size 
of the pie, upward mobility through the political process has elements of a zero-sum 
game. There may then be a trade-off between the size of the group one belongs to and 
the payoff one gets. More specifically, there may be an “inverse-U-shaped” 
relationship between the size of the group and the payoff. If the group is too small, its 
bargaining power is negligible and the payoff it gets is zero. If it is too big, involving 
for instance all the poor, the payoff is again very small because the payoff has to be 
widely distributed, given that no convincing programme exists for increasing 
production through class action. The typical patron-client faction may offer the best 
payoff to the individual poor person, providing that he or she succeeds in selecting a 
winning faction. Belonging to a faction and participating in this type of politics may 
then be attractive given the very limited alternatives as perceived by the poor 
themselves. 
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Political Settlements and Growth-Stability Trade-offs  
The analytical frame of a ‘political settlement’ allows us to identify and analyse these 
differences. A key theoretical concept in this framework is that of organizational 
power, which we relate to the game theoretic concept of ‘holding power’. Holding 
power measures the ability of a group to hold out against other groups in conflicts 
over distribution. It can be based on economic capabilities since conflicts have 
economic costs and the group with greater economic resources has an advantage in 
holding out. But economic advantage is not necessarily decisive because poorer 
groups can often win conflicts. Holding power can also be based on organizational, 
ideological and other characteristics that enable groups to inflict and absorb pain 
during conflicts.  
 
The relationship between institutions and the distribution of power arises because 
adhering to any rule implies a specific distribution of benefits for the different parties 
that are subject to the rule. If a rule implies a distribution of benefits that powerful 
groups do not accept, enforcing that rule results in resistance and contestation. The 
result may be a partial enforcement of the rule, or a decline in political stability as the 
rule is enforced, or some combination of the two. The partial enforcement of many 
formal rights often means that the distribution of benefits is changed through informal 
mechanisms such as payments to mafias or political parties for informal enforcement. 
As a result, the final distribution corresponds more closely to the distribution of 
power. Thus, even where formal institutions exist in developing countries, their 
operation has significant elements of ‘informality’ which is another way of describing 
partial enforcement. These insights lead us to define a political settlement as a 
combination of a social distribution of power with formal and informal institutions 
that is compatible and sustainable (M. H. Khan 2010). Compatibility refers to the fact 
that the mix of formal and informal institutions has to be compatible with the 
distribution of power, and sustainability refers to the fact that for the society to 
reproduce itself a minimum level of political stability and economic performance has 
to be achieved, though the minimum that is sustainable can itself vary across 
societies. These interdependencies are summarized in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 Political Settlements 
Source: (M. H. Khan 2010: Figure 5) 
 
A number of significant analytical implications follow. First, if significant holding 
power is based on informal capabilities of organizers to organize, these informal 
sources of power are likely to be eventually reflected in informal institutional 
arrangements that sustain them. This is the two-way interaction between institutions 
and the distribution of power shown in Figure 2. The eventual combination of formal 
institutions and informal modifications or entirely informal institutions is important 
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for explaining political and economic dynamics. This analytical approach can explain 
why political organizations and relationships between state and society are often 
organized through largely informal patron-client organizations, and this exercise of 
power in turn affects the enforcement of formal rules in significant ways. Thus, in our 
analysis, the structure of patron-client organizations and their relationship with the 
state has a significant effect on economic and political outcomes.  
 
A second implication is that the full enforcement of formal institutions that could 
notionally improve economic performance may result in an unacceptable decline in 
political stability if powerful groups contest the distribution of incomes that would 
follow. Depending on the distribution of organizational power in that society, and the 
initial configuration of institutions and economic capabilities, there is a growth-
stability trade-off as the ruling coalition in control of the state tries to improve the 
enforcement of formal rules in particular directions. This provides an explanation for 
the differences in the enforcement of formal institutions in developing countries, 
because the organization of patron-client politics can affect the nature of the trade-off. 
The essential argument is summarized in Figure 3. Stability is ‘measured’ by the 
ranking of different situations according to the costs of political resistance and 
instability faced by the ruling coalition. There is a minimum sustainable level of 
stability beyond which the political settlement is no longer viable and conflicts break 
out to renegotiate the settlement.  
 
 
Figure 3 The Growth Stability Trade-off 
Source: (M. H. Khan 2010: Figure 11) 
 
Depending on the particular political settlement, and the initial institutional situation, 
incremental improvements in institutions or their degree of enforcement to enhance 
economic outcomes is likely to face increasing resistance from adversely affected 
groups. This is because any institutional change or change in the degree of 
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enforcement has implications for the distribution of benefits between affected parties. 
If we make the realistic assumption that strengthening the enforcement of formal 
rights is likely to negatively impact the incomes of informal coalitions who may have 
been involved in their (informal) enforcement or in otherwise determining 
institutional outcomes, we can expect these groups to organize increasing resistance to 
progress in these directions.  
 
The minimum sustainable level of stability defines the limits to which developmental 
agendas can be pushed in different contexts. Whether this limit is reached depends on 
the leadership and interests within the ruling coalition. Nevertheless, the distribution 
of power described by the political settlement describes by the shape of the trade-off 
between growth and stability and therefore the limits to growth. Compared to a base-
line political settlement with a trade-off that is described by PS1, changes in the 
construction of the political settlement can shift the trade-off favourably to PS2 or 
adversely to PS3. In the more favourable configuration, the organization of interests 
within the ruling coalition is more closely aligned with growth and it is able to push 
through growth-enhancing changes to a greater extent. In contrast, in the adverse 
political settlement PS3, attempts to improve growth result either in conflicts within 
the ruling coalition or opposition from powerful factions outside. In the extreme case 
shown in Figure 3 as PS3, the ruling coalition is unable to achieve the minimum 
sustainable economic conditions without descending below the minimum tolerable 
stability. This political settlement is therefore unviable and is likely to collapse into 
crisis and violence.   
 
The effective enforcement of formal institutions in advanced countries (and therefore 
the Weberian quality of their states) is explicable from this analytical perspective. In 
advanced countries, a broad-based productive sector exists and the rights of the 
different parties engaged in these activities are defined by formal rules. The 
beneficiaries of these rights enjoy significant income flows supported by these rights. 
These incomes provide a distribution of holding power that is consistent with the 
protection of the formal structure of rights. In other words, in advanced countries 
important formal rights are both valuable and numerous. Those possessing these 
rights are rich and therefore collectively powerful, and this power can be deployed to 
protect and enforce formal rights. The protection of formal rights is therefore not 
intensely contested nor does the state suffer a decline in political stability to enforce 
these rights. We describe this combination of formal institutions and power as a 
‘capitalist’ political settlement. Of course, in reality technologies and market 
opportunities are evolving, as are the organizational capabilities of different groups, 
and so at the margin contestation and challenges to existing institutions are always 
taking place. This is simply the process through which incremental changes in 
institutions and the distribution of power takes place in all societies.  
 
There is, however, a qualitative difference between the political settlements in 
advanced and developing countries. These differences explain why the formal 
institutions of advanced countries cannot be replicated in developing countries nor do 
they have the same economic and political effects when they are formally introduced. 
In contrast to the capitalist political settlement, the clientelist political settlement in 
developing countries is defined as one where significant holding power is based on 
sources outside the incomes generated by formal institutions. In particular, 
‘intermediate class’ elites like the rich peasants of Bengal, and in general, coalitions 
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of urban professionals, the urban educated classes, rich and middle peasants and other 
intermediate class groups have played a critical role as political organizers. 
Individuals from these classes may have relatively small incomes based on their 
formal rights, but they have significant organizational capabilities in developing 
countries and can organize clients with significant holding power. This explains why 
informal organizations based on patron-client networks have been important and they 
set critical limits on the operation of evolving formal institutions.  
 
These observations are in general true for all developing countries. Most developing 
countries have many of the formal features of advanced countries: they have property 
rights, they have courts enforcing these rights through a rule of law, and they often 
have institutions of democracy. But formal institutions here do not behave in the 
expected ways nor are they impersonally implemented in any developing country. 
Existing formal institutions are either not enforced or are only partially enforced and 
many relevant formal institutions may be entirely absent. The general observation 
about developing countries is systematic and cuts across differences in culture, history 
and economic structure. Nevertheless, there are important differences in the 
organization of power in different developing countries and therefore between 
different types of clientelist political settlements. We focus on the construction of the 
ruling coalition by different combinations of patron-client factions as a critical 
variable determining the type of clientelist political settlement in a developing 
country. Other important variables are initial institutions and the initial conditions 
describing the development of the capitalist sector in terms of its extent and 
technological capabilities (M. H. Khan 2010). Together, these characteristics of the 
political settlement can help to explain differences in the performance of specific 
institutions and the growth-stability trade-offs facing their development and 
enforcement.  
 
We describe political settlements in developing countries as clientelist because of the 
dominance of ‘personalized’ or informal exercises of power in these countries. Our 
use of the term ‘clientelist’ should be distinguished from existing usages in a number 
of ways. First, many standard explanations of personalized power in developing 
countries refer to primordial loyalties or deference supported by culture, the insecurity 
of the poor, or the absence of democracy (Eisenstadt 1973; Engerman and Sokoloff 
2002; Médard 2002; Barbone, et al. 2006). Instead, our definition of a clientelist 
political settlement is a general definition that looks for a mismatch between existing 
distributions of holding power and the structure of formal institutions. Our 
explanation of the informality that emerges in these contexts can incorporate a wide 
variety of exercises of power in developing countries that are responsible for the gap 
between the expected operation of formal rules and their actual operation. This is 
potentially an advantage because narrower explanations of personalized transactions 
cannot explain the general observation of some variant of personalized or non-formal 
power in all developing countries regardless of their political institutions, cultures and 
social histories. However, the specific social, cultural and economic characteristics of 
societies can of course explain important differences in the manifestations of 
personalized power.  
 
Secondly, we do not use the term ‘clientelist political settlement’ to describe any 
particular institutional structure or form of government or any specific set of 
outcomes. The group of countries that could be characterized as having clientelist 
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political settlements is very diverse and ranges from military dictatorships to party-
based democracies. They also include high growth converging countries operating 
variants of industrial policy and countries with very stagnant economic performance. 
Pakistan and Bangladesh evolved a range of political institutions to deal with the dual 
challenges of managing their clientelist politics while maintaining economic viability. 
These experiments were not always successful and some experiments and periods 
were more vulnerable than others. Bangladesh initially had poor economic 
performance but in the last two decades it has emerged as a relatively high growth 
developing country based on its strong garment industry. Yet, contemporary 
Bangladesh remains vulnerable in significant ways because the competition between 
its clientelist factions has not yet achieved the kind of stability that allows elites to 
carry out the long-term planning that is required for sustained economic development.  
 
The Organization of the Ruling Coalition and Variations in the Political Settlement 
An important set of variations in the type of clientelist political settlement can be 
related to the organization of the ruling coalition. We will use a classification of 
clientelist political settlements based on characteristics of the ruling coalition based 
on the analysis in Khan (2010). The classification in Figure 4 distinguishes between 
two dimensions along which a ruling coalition can be classified. First, we look at the 
power of factions excluded from the ruling coalition relative to the ruling coalition. 
Secondly, we look at the internal distribution of power within the factions that 
constitute the ruling coalition, in particular between higher and lower levels. These 
dimensions are important for understanding the likely time horizon of the ruling 
coalition and its implementation capacities. These ‘political’ differences may be more 
important than differences in formal political institutions. Clearly, formal political 
institutions like the institutions of democracy and representation are important. 
However, a focus on formal institutions can often hide more significant differences in 
the informal distributions of power affecting the ruling coalition, with more 
significant effects on the enforcement and operation of formal institutions.  
 
Returning to our two dimensions of interest in the ruling coalition, the first is the 
‘horizontal distribution of power’. This describes the power of excluded coalitions 
relative to the ruling coalition. If excluded coalitions are weak, the ruling coalition is 
likely to feel secure and act with a longer time horizon. This means that the interests 
of the ruling coalition are more likely to be aligned with growth and development. 
Clearly, there is a range of variation possible here, with the power of excluded 
coalitions ranging from very weak to being almost as powerful as the ruling coalition. 
At its limit, if excluded coalitions become more powerful than the ruling coalition, the 
latter is unlikely to survive. Relative strength can be assessed by looking at the 
organization and strategies of excluded organizations, the success with which they 
have engaged in conflicts and the informal and formal distributions of benefits that 
they have been able to achieve. Excluded coalitions can be weak for different reasons. 
The most benign possibility is that all or almost all powerful coalitions have been 
incorporated within the ruling coalition. It could also be that the distribution of power 
across factions was unequal and factions within the ruling coalition are significantly 
more powerful because of legitimacy, organizational capabilities or other 
characteristics. Finally, excluded groups could be potentially strong but temporarily 
repressed by the ruling coalition. The latter is obviously less sustainable over time. 
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The second dimension describing the structure of the ruling coalition is the ‘vertical 
distribution of power’. This describes the relative power of higher compared to lower 
level factions within the ruling coalition. The greater the relative power of higher over 
lower levels within the ruling coalition, the greater the implementation and 
enforcement capacities of the coalition. This is because given the pyramidal structure 
of patron-client organizations, the more powerful lower level factions become, the 
greater the number of points at which the enforcement of particular rules can be 
blocked. Enforcement and implementation now requires much greater collective 
action and the distribution of rents to many or all lower-level factions to ensure their 
cooperation. Otherwise, those who are adversely affected by a rule simply have to buy 
in a small number of lower-level factions to block its implementation. By definition, 
lower levels in a patron-client hierarchy are always weaker and to some extent 
dependent on higher levels. But this too can vary from a situation where lower-level 
factions have little bargaining power to one where they can effectively block or limit 
implementation if their demands are not met. The first case would correspond to a 
situation where lower level clients have little holding power and higher level patrons 
can pick clients without great cost to themselves. The second describes a situation 
where lower level factions have significant holding power and can impose serious 
costs on patrons.  
 
 
Figure 4 Patron-Client Factions and the Structure of the Ruling Coalition  
Source: (M. H. Khan 2010: Figure 17) 
 
These two dimensions range along a scale but the polar limits define four possible 
structures of the ruling coalition in Figure 4. The most favourable combination is at 
the top left-hand corner, which we describe as a ‘potential developmental coalition’. 
Here the ruling coalition has a long time horizon and therefore its interests are aligned 
with development and it has effective implementation capabilities. In terms of the 
growth-stability trade-off described in Figure 3, this variant of the clientelist political 
settlement has the most favourable trade-off. Distributions of power that are further to 
the right or lower down have relatively more adverse growth-stability trade-offs. The 
bottom right hand corner has the most adverse growth-stability trade-off, but may 
remain viable because of other characteristics of the economy determining the 
position of the trade-off relative to minimum viability conditions. The ruling coalition 
described in the top left-hand corner is a potential developmental coalition because 
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these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a developmental state. The 
emergence of the latter of course requires other conditions, including the emergence 
of an appropriate developmental leadership, as well as minimal technological 
capabilities within the country. The ruling coalition in South Korea from the 1960s to 
the 1980s approximated these characteristics.  
 
A second type of ruling coalition is shown in the top right-hand corner, which we 
describe as an authoritarian coalition. Here the ruling coalition faces moderate to 
strong excluded coalitions but lower-level factions are relatively weak. As excluded 
factions get stronger, the ruling coalition becomes more vulnerable. By definition, if 
there are powerful, some institutional mechanisms for controlling excluded groups are 
necessary. These include legal or constitutional measures banning political activity 
outside the coalition, implicitly backed by the threat of force. The weaker the ruling 
coalition of this type, the more likely it is to have to regularly use force. 
Paradoxically, stronger authoritarian coalitions are less likely to have to use violence. 
For instance, Tanzania’s one-party state under TANU in the 1960s faced very little 
resistance from excluded factions, but organizational rights were limited in a pre-
emptive way to prevent resistance developing. The military controlled ruling coalition 
in Pakistan/Bangladesh in the 1960s was initially strong but became weaker and more 
violent over time as excluded coalitions became stronger. It was eventually 
overthrown by a mass uprising in 1969. The ill-fated BAKSAL one-party 
authoritarian experiment in Bangladesh in 1975 did not even take off. The distribution 
of power facing the ruling coalition included significant excluded coalitions (in 
particular the army) but also strong lower-level factions within the ruling party. In this 
case, the one-party system was very short-lived as internal factions conspired with 
excluded factions in the army to assassinate the President. 
 
Authoritarianism is typically overthrown when excluded factions become too strong. 
But the strength of excluded factions also depends to a large extent on whether the 
ruling coalition can keep its own supporters satisfied within it. After a critical point, 
the strength of excluded factions can set off a cumulative decline that undermines the 
authoritarian coalition. The strength of external factions provides bargaining power to 
internal factions as they can threaten to leave, and if the leadership is unwilling or 
unable to pay the price, some do leave, further strengthening the excluded factions 
and further increasing the bargaining power of remaining lower level factions. As a 
result, authoritarianism is difficult to sustain for long in most clientelist political 
settlements unless there are special factors like natural resource rents or external 
military support. Like the developmental coalition, enforcement capabilities within 
the authoritarian coalition can be relatively good, but time horizons are likely to be 
poorer given the vulnerability of the leadership. Moreover, the presence of strong 
excluded factions is likely to increase the bargaining power of lower-level faction 
leaders over time. Thus, the capacity to enforce decisions within the coalition is likely 
to get poorer over time. As authoritarianism collapses, and has to deal with 
increasingly powerful lower-level factions, it can acquire hybrid qualities, as we will 
see in the case of the militaristic clientelism of Bangladesh in the 1980s and 1990s 
where authoritarianism adopted methods of competitive clientelism. Authoritarianism 
can have a variety of growth-stability trade-offs ranging from reasonably good (but 
likely to be short-lived) to fairly adverse depending on the time horizon of the ruling 
coalition. If the threat of force or other mechanisms used to exclude outside factions is 
credible, the ruling coalition can have a long-term horizon, but as this becomes less 
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credible, the time horizon can collapse. If implementation capacities are also 
becoming weak as lower-level factions become powerful, the growth-stability trade-
off can collapse even faster. 
 
The third type of ruling coalition is the dominant party that is ‘dominant’ to varying 
extents and could sometimes be quite weak. Here, excluded factions are weak either 
because all or most powerful factions have been included within the dominant party 
or because excluded factions are very internally fragmented. The characteristic feature 
that distinguishes it from authoritarian arrangements is that a dominant party does not 
have to use administrative or military power to exclude others, and could win formal 
contested elections. The result is once again a somewhat poorer growth-stability 
trade-off compared to the developmental coalition because in this case the inclusion 
of many factions can make the implication of policies difficult as it is likely to be 
blocked by factions that are powerful but lower in the hierarchy of the ruling 
coalition. Moreover, as excluded factions become stronger, the time horizon of the 
ruling coalition can also collapse. 
 
 If excluded factions are weak, the ruling coalition is likely to opt for competitive 
elections to boost its legitimacy. Like authoritarianism, the dominant party also faces 
a structural dilemma. If it includes all powerful factions within it, it can remove 
powerful factions outside that can challenge it. But this makes it likely that the ruling 
coalition has too many powerful factions within it that are likely to block the 
implementation of almost anything. Excessive inclusion also means that the 
distribution of rents within the party will be thinner and leave many factions 
dissatisfied. On the other hand, leaving powerful factions outside results in the 
likelihood of external challenges and the possibility that lower-level factions will be 
induced by the excluded coalitions to leave and join them.  
 
Sooner or later, once dissatisfied internal factions start joining excluded factions or 
new groups organize outside that cannot be included, the process of cumulative 
decline begins. Thus, dominant parties are likely to have longer time horizons but 
weaker implementation capabilities compared to authoritarian systems, but both are 
likely to decline over time. Thus, initially reasonable growth-stability trade-offs are 
likely to get more adverse over time. India under the Congress Party in the 1950s and 
1960s, Tanzania under the CCM, West Bengal under the CPM, Thaksin’s Thai Rak 
Thai in the 2000s were all variants of dominant party coalitions enjoying different 
levels of vulnerability and weakness. Bangladesh never evolved a sustainable 
dominant party. The early Awami League from 1972 to 1975 was a weak and short-
lived dominant party that began to fall apart very rapidly. Mujib’s attempt to create a 
one-party state by constitutional amendment in 1975 was an attempt to create one-
party authoritarianism but it was misconceived because the distribution of power was 
not consistent for its survival.  
 
This brings us to the fourth and final variant which in some ways describes the state 
of entropy of the clientelist political settlement. This is competitive clientelism, where 
the number of potential factions is so great or they are so fragmented that the 
inclusion of all of them in a ruling coalition would not work but neither would a 
strategy of keeping excluded groups out by legal or military mechanisms. When 
cumulative decline undermines a dominant party or an authoritarian coalition, 
competitive clientelism typically emerges as the default organizational structure of 
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clientelist political settlement. In this variant, the ruling coalition is formed by a 
leadership of political entrepreneurs that seeks to bring together enough factions to be 
able to rule but at the lowest price for themselves. The excluded are technically free to 
organize, restructure and entice some factions currently included in the ruling 
coalition to leave and join with them to attempt to form a new coalition. Elections in 
this system provide a mechanism for testing the organizational power of competing 
coalitions, and elections are successful if they reflect the balance of organizational 
power on the ground and if there is an implicit rule of law amongst the competing 
coalitions that ensures that losers accept the outcomes of these contests without 
descending into open warfare. Competitive clientelism can provide comparative 
stability when the underlying factional structure is very fragmented and attempting to 
construct authoritarian or dominant party solutions would not immediately work. But 
by its structure, the ruling coalition here has a short time horizon and weak 
implementation and enforcement capabilities.  
 
The competitive clientelist system is only stable over time if credible mechanisms 
allow the ruling coalition to be replaced by an alternative coalition which can 
demonstrate greater organizational power during elections. Voting in these systems is 
a test of relative factional strength. However, the possibility that the ruling coalition 
can use administrative and police powers to excessively tilt the balance of the voting 
outcome can cause a breakdown of the electoral process. In a context of substantive 
informality, the temptation on the part of the ruling coalition to use administrative 
powers to target even a few of the informal activities of the opposition is often 
sufficient to make an impact on the electoral outcome. Once this type of intervention 
interferes with the establishment of the balance of forces on the ground, the 
competition between factions can break out in violence. India’s competitive 
clientelism is significantly different from other developing countries in that it has 
successfully allowed a cycling of factions into and out of power. One possibility is 
that India’s size and diversity helped to prevent any ruling coalition from imagining 
that it could get away with significant administrative intervention in elections. 
Intervention would have to benefit a complex coalition of factions and disadvantage 
another complex coalition, and the complexity itself can help to ensure an informal 
rule of law emerges for conducting elections.  
 
A further factor that helps the credibility of elections in India is that it is a large 
federal country and elections are organized at the state level. If excessive violations 
happen within a particular state, the federal government has strong incentives to 
intervene to prevent a particular state descending into crisis. The federal government 
can impose president’s rule and re-run the election. Therefore, while election fraud, 
violence and rigging does happen in India, the parties know that an outcome that is 
significantly out of line with their organizational strength on the ground cannot be 
sustained. Third-party ‘institutional’ oversight of electoral outcomes is far less 
credible in smaller states like Bangladesh because the ruling coalition includes 
enough of the relevant factions in a country to believe that it can get away with it. In 
practice it never can for very long, if only because of the processes of cumulative 
decline, but the ruling coalition can be tempted. Electoral crises are therefore more 
frequent and typically lead to occasional military takeovers. But these raise further 
problems because exit strategies from military rule are complex and many developing 
countries therefore cycle through periods of (vulnerable) authoritarianism and periods 
of competitive clientelism. The conventional way of looking at the conduct of 
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elections focuses on ‘institutionalization’ and the governance capabilities of 
organizations like Election Commissions. This is only partially useful. Our approach 
focuses on the organization of factional politics and examines an important additional 
dimension of the problem.  
 
It is very easy for the distribution of power within a clientelist political settlement to 
evolve into such a degree of fragmentation that only competitive clientelism can be 
supported. Exiting from competitive clientelism is quite difficult because the 
distribution of power between factions can only be changed with significant political 
activity such as the construction of more disciplined and inclusive political parties or 
the weakening of some centres of political power so that authoritarianism or a 
dominant party can emerge. Competitive clientelism results in a ruling coalition with 
short time horizons and weak implementation and enforcement capabilities. Ceteris 
paribus, it has the most adverse growth-stability trade-off in Figure 4. But here too 
there is a range, because if the competing coalitions are internally disciplined and 
have some implementation capabilities, then the growth-stability trade-off can be 
tolerable. But if the coalitions not only have short time horizons but also weak 
implementation capabilities because of many powerful internal factions, the trade-offs 
can be very adverse. Competitive clientelism can have some desirable features. If the 
distribution of power has become very fragmented, the organization of political 
competition in the context of a formal democracy may be the only feasible way of 
managing the competition over political rents. But democracy is not always 
stabilizing in these contexts and does not necessarily generate developmental 
outcomes for the reasons just discussed.  
 
And for competitive clientelism to even achieve a moderate level of stability there has 
to be a credible distribution of power that ensures that the cycling between factions 
can continue without an impasse caused by administrative interventions in elections. 
If this is absent, significant violence can break out between competing factions. All of 
South Asia is now governed by competitive clientelist coalitions as is much of Africa, 
through there are exceptions such as Tanzania. Thailand in the 1980s and 1990s was 
also characterized by competitive clientelist coalitions. But only India has achieved an 
internal distribution of power that makes its competitive clientelism operate relatively 
smoothly. An examination of the evolution of factional politics in countries like 
Bangladesh can identify critical problems with the operation of competitive 
clientelism.  
 
The organization of the patron-client factions within the ruling coalition and outside is 
therefore a lens through which to look at the interdependent evolution of institutions, 
politics and economics in clientelist political settlements. This allows us to look 
deeper than the formal structure of parties and constitutions, which may not tell us 
much about enforcement capabilities and institutional performance across countries. 
Formal military governments can be dependent to different degrees on patron-client 
networks, making military governments substantially different from each other. 
Indeed, army-led governments in developing countries have ranged from relatively 
strong but short-lived authoritarian regimes, as in Pakistan in the early 1960s, to very 
weak authoritarian regimes with characteristics of competitive clientelism in 
Bangladesh in the late 1970s and 1980s. In the latter, military leaders formed parties 
with many characteristics of competitive clientelism where excluded coalitions could 
compete to be included but could not replace the top man. At other times, military-led 
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coalitions have had developmental characteristics, as in South Korea in the 1960s, or 
have been strong and long-lived authoritarian regimes like the Baathist regimes of the 
Middle East. Mapping these processes can help to explain why looking at nation-
building through the lens of national ideologies or of class struggles offer very partial 
understanding of the challenges for sustaining development.  
 
The distribution of power within and between competing factions is an important but 
not the only important aspect of the distribution of power affecting economic and 
political outcomes. Another critical aspect is the capability of emerging productive 
sectors and their political links with the ruling coalition. Here too there are a number 
of relevant variations. A number of possible combinations are summarized in Figure 
5. Entrepreneurs engaged in productive activities can have more or less holding power 
relative to other political factions and they can have greater or lesser technological 
and entrepreneurial capabilities. Some combinations of political and entrepreneurial 
power and capabilities can be developmental, other combinations face much more 
adverse growth-stability trade-offs. These combinations are ‘non-linear’ because a 
configuration of entrepreneurial power and capabilities that is developmental with a 
particular configuration of political power may be problematic with a different 
distribution.  
 
 
Figure 5 Patron-Client Structures and the Organizational Power of Emerging 
Capitalists  
 
The most favourable growth-stability trade-off in developing countries attempting to 
catch up comes about with a developmental coalition in the political sphere described 
in Figure 4 matched with the entrepreneurial characteristics described in the bottom 
left hand of Figure 5. The latter describes the existence of high capability 
entrepreneurs who are not politically powerful. This allows high capability 
entrepreneurs to be effectively disciplined by market and non-market mechanisms and 
potentially allows assistance to be provided to firms for technology acquisition in 
ways that can be effectively disciplined. The result is likely to be rapid moves up the 
productivity and technology ladder, as was the case in the East Asian countries in the 
1960s. But this configuration of entrepreneurial power and capabilities may not be 
developmental with a different configuration of power within the ruling coalition. A 
dominant party that has a strong component of internal interests that are antithetical to 
the business sector can result in a loss of business confidence and capital flight.  
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In Pakistan and Bangladesh, entrepreneurs have been closely integrated with political 
power from the outset because many emerging capitalists were actually previous 
politicians who had made money through political accumulation and corruption of 
different types. While they were relatively low on technological and entrepreneurial 
capabilities till the 1970s, by the 1980s entrepreneurs of moderate entrepreneurial and 
technological capabilities had begun to emerge. The overall characteristics of 
entrepreneurial power were therefore initially in the top right-hand corner of Figure 5 
with a movement towards the top left-hand corner over time as entrepreneurial and 
technological capabilities gradually improved. The combination of these 
characteristics with either weak authoritarianism or competitive clientelism does not 
result in very favourable growth-stability trade-offs for sustaining development. 
Powerful networked emerging entrepreneurs who could not be easily disciplined 
combined with an authoritarian power structure in the 1960s resulted in the rapid 
growth of existing entrepreneurs but limited success in creating new entrepreneurs or 
sectors that were likely to become competitive over time. In the 1970s immediately 
after the birth of Bangladesh, the processes of primitive accumulation accelerated 
dramatically as new political entrepreneurs directly grabbed resources and became a 
new emerging class of entrepreneurs. The growth-stability trade-off was most adverse 
during this period. It was only in the 1980s that some of these individuals became 
proper productive entrepreneurs as the growth of the garments, pharmaceutical and 
other sectors took off. The growth-stability trade-off improved but in the context of 
the competitive clientelism of the 1990s it remained relatively adverse.  
 
Our analytical framework of competitive clientelism can shed light both on the forces 
that have driven the evolution of national identities in Bangladesh and the 
implications of these for state building, growth and governance. Our general 
definition of a political settlement as a compatible and sustainable combination of 
institutions and power suggests that moments of shock can come about for a variety of 
economic and political reasons. In East Bengal there were two shocks in the course of 
the last century that violently disrupted existing political settlements. This opened up 
the scope for new waves of primitive accumulation but also made the consolidation 
and stabilization of new political settlements very difficult afterwards. In both cases, 
evolutionary changes in the political settlement were blocked by existing economic 
and political elites. To some extent this is always the response of existing elites but in 
East Bengal this eventually became explosive because the upstarts demanding 
inclusion were from a different religion or region. The result was a series of short-
lived but grand factional alliances of excluded groups that in turn made evolutionary 
changes in the political settlement even more difficult. The dominant elites ironically 
blocked their own room for manoeuvre by forcing the excluded to unite on religious 
or ethnic grounds that made eventual compromises potentially much more costly and 
perhaps unviable. The history of these mobilizations raises special problems for 
countries like Bangladesh beyond the normal constraints of a clientelist political 
settlement. The history of factional violence and zero sum games that they were 
forced to play for reasons out of their control created a political tradition that makes 
the ‘normal’ operation of clientelist politics more difficult. Devising growth-
enhancing organizational and institutional strategies in countries like Bangladesh not 
only requires an understanding of the growth challenges but also of the factional 
politics and the political settlement in which these have to be implemented.  
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3. The Roots of Islam in Bengal  
As the history of partitions and nation-building that created Bangladesh begins with 
the religious division of Bengal, it is useful to go back to the emergence of Islam in 
Bengal. Interestingly, the reasons why Islam gained such a significant presence in 
eastern India, far from the centres of Mughal power near Delhi, explains both the 
overlaps between religion and class in Bengal as well as why it was relatively easy to 
mobilize upwardly mobile peasants around their Muslim identity in the 1930s and 
beyond. When the British arrived in Bengal in the mid-eighteenth century, Bengal had 
a narrow stratum of Muslim aristocrats at the top, a substantial administrative class of 
largely Hindu landed elites who administered the revenue system, and a peasantry 
below which included both Hindus and Muslims but with a Muslim peasant majority. 
The origins of this social structure will be discussed below. Till the early twentieth 
century, the political leadership of Bengal’s Muslims was provided by the declining 
descendants of the old aristocracy. Their access to the Muslim peasants was limited 
and in the absence of political representation, a greater part of both political and 
economic power was in the hands of the increasingly English-educated largely Hindu 
administrative and landed classes. The political opportunity for a new Muslim 
leadership appeared with the emergence of electoral politics and the parallel growth of 
an ‘intermediate class’ of Muslim Bengali rich peasants. From the 1920s the latter 
found it in their interest to mobilize the Bengal peasantry as the franchise began to be 
extended by the declining British Raj in India. These intermediate class political 
organizers were attempting to use political power as the route towards upward 
mobility for themselves. Their emergence on the political scene was one of the first 
instances of intermediate class-led patron-client politics in India, which now defines 
politics across much of the Indian subcontinent.  
 
We need to go back to the emergence of Islam in the region to understand why so 
many of Bengal’s peasants were Muslims in the first place, and why Islam could 
serve so well as a mobilizing ideology. Islam has a long history in Bengal, going back 
to Arab trading communities of a thousand or more years ago along the Bengal 
coastline. Arab chroniclers noted the presence of Muslim trading communities in 
Bengal as early as the tenth century (Eaton 1993: 129-30). These traders were part of 
the maritime trading community involving Arabs trading around the Indian Ocean 
into the Bay of Bengal and down to South East Asia. In contrast, the Muslim military-
political adventurers who began to establish areas of political control in India came by 
land from the west. It took them much longer to reach Bengal. The first Muslim ruler 
of Bengal was the Turkish commander Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khilji who in 1204 
overran King Lakshman Sen’s capital at Nudiah. The Sena kings of Bengal were part 
of a Hindu revival, attempting to recover Bengal for Hinduism after a century of 
Buddhist rule. Like Islam, Vedic Hinduism came to India from the West through the 
Aryan invasions. And like Islam, it took a long time to reach the eastern reaches of 
Bengal. From the twelfth century BC there was a thriving Indo-Aryan civilization in 
western India but even six centuries later Bihar and Bengal were still regarded as 
beyond the pale and ‘unclean’ in Vedic texts (Eaton 1993: 6-7). Significant Hindu 
influence began to penetrate into Bengal only during the Mauryan Empire (321-181 
BC). But even this was not a smooth process because the third and greatest of the 
Mauryas, Asoka, converted to Buddhism. As a result, Bengal’s contact with Hinduism 
was moderated from the earliest period by its simultaneous contact with Buddhism. 
The strict hierarchies of the Hindu caste system that had been established further west 
never took the same kind of root in Bengal’s peasant society. 
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The consolidation of a brahminical caste society in Bengal did not happen till the fifth 
century AD under the Gupta empire and even this was restricted to the western parts 
of Bengal (Mukherjee 1972). The eastern part, beyond the river Padma, remained 
covered by dense forests. Versions of Hinduism and Buddhism, where they existed, 
were loosely superimposed on ancient animist cults. When Bakhtiyar Khilji arrived in 
Bengal, its rural hinterland had a patchwork of indigenous religions, together with 
loosely defined versions of Hinduism and Buddhism. Much of the population in the 
eastern two-thirds of the province were therefore not yet part of any organized or 
institutional forms of religion. Muslim rule in Bengal continued uninterrupted till the 
British arrived in 1757. Different dynasties of Muslim kings continued to rule Bengal, 
either directly, or after the sixteenth century as Mughal governors. As in other parts of 
India, Muslim rulers depended on alliances with Hindu landlords and administrators 
who by and large did not convert to the new faith in large numbers. Indeed, in most 
parts of India, Muslim rule did not result in any significant conversions, even amongst 
the poorer classes. That is why when the 1872 census of Bengal revealed that the 
province had a Muslim majority both the British and the Indians were genuinely 
surprised. The immigration of Muslims into the province could hardly explain these 
numbers, particularly since the bulk of Muslim immigration into India had been 
towards the Mughal capital at Delhi. While a large numbers of Muslims had indeed 
arrived in Bengal from outside, the immigrants were always a small proportion of the 
total population.  
 
A significant part of the local population must therefore have converted to Islam over 
the centuries. But why did they convert in Bengal and not in most other parts of 
India? Muslim kingship across India did very occasionally use force or patronage to 
achieve religious conversion but never to any significant degree. This is supported by 
the glaring fact that the military and economic power of Muslim emperors was 
concentrated around the imperial capital at Delhi but Muslim conversion was 
relatively insignificant near these centres of power. Rather, as the 1872 census 
showed, the bulk of Indian converts were in the remote eastern and western fringes of 
the empire where both the coercive reach of the state and the patronage it could offer 
were much more limited. Indeed, even within Bengal, Muslim conversion appeared to 
be concentrated in the eastern and southern parts of the province, far even from the 
provincial capitals where Muslim political and military power was based.  
 
Neither is it easy to explain conversions to Islam primarily in terms of the oppression 
of caste Hindus and the desire of lower castes to escape from the caste system. While 
some conversion was undoubtedly driven by caste oppression, this too cannot be the 
full story. This is because in the Hindu heartland in central India where the caste 
system was at its most oppressive, far fewer of the lower castes converted. On the 
other hand, conversion was extensive in Bengal (and in the far western fringes of 
India) where the caste system and caste repression were weak to begin with. 
Migration, military coercion and social liberation may all have played some part in 
the story of conversion, but do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the scale of 
conversion that could explain a Muslim majority in Bengal. Richard Eaton suggests 
elements of an answer that is both more complex and more plausible.  
 
At the time of Bakhtiyar’s conquest, Bengal was the location of a number of religious, 
cultural and economic ‘frontiers’. The frontiers of Sanskritic Hinduism with 
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indigenous societies that had never been properly Hinduized ran through Bengal. This 
frontier now became Islam’s frontier with the amorphous religious practices of 
populations further to the East. These religious practices were not yet 
institutionalized. They had been influenced by both Hinduism and Buddhism but still 
retained many pre-Hindu animist practices. Last but not least, an ‘economic frontier’ 
ran through Bengal as much of its eastern part was still marsh, swamp and jungle. But 
the eastward shift of major river systems was converting this land into potentially 
valuable agricultural territory (Eaton 1993). 
 
As the agrarian frontier shifted eastwards, particularly during the Mughal period, 
populations had to be settled in new territories. New settled societies had to be 
constructed out of peoples who had not previously been settled and this could only be 
done by organizers who had the legitimacy to create new social orders. The weakness 
of institutionalized religion in the East, and the organizing and mobilizing role of 
charismatic Muslim preachers and social organizers provides an alternative and 
altogether less sinister explanation for the rapid expansion of Islam into the East. The 
presence of these charismatic Sufi holy men in Bengal is well known, but Eaton 
provides a rich body of evidence showing that many of these Muslim Sufi preachers 
and religious leaders played a vital economic role at this critical juncture when the 
agrarian frontier was shifting east. Sufi saints, many of them immigrants from other 
parts of India or even further afield were popular and widely accepted in rural Bengal 
because of their very personal and spiritual interpretation of Islam. This appealed to 
the tribal and forest-dwelling people who inhabited eastern Bengal at that time. Many 
of these preachers, social organizers and reformers now became land grantees as they 
leveraged their social legitimacy to settle new areas while maintaining social 
discipline in newly opened agrarian societies.  
 
The real drivers of this change were Bengal’s powerful rivers which were shifting 
eastwards during this period, opening up new territories for cultivation. The Mughal 
state began to give land grants to organizers who could clear the forest and bring in 
people who could be settled to engage in agriculture. The Mughals were always 
indifferent as to whether Hindus, Muslims or even Christians got land grants, but 
Eaton shows that in eastern Bengal a significant number of grants now went not only 
to Muslims but to the Sufi and other religious leaders who constituted the Muslim 
notables of the region. The suggestion is that at this confluence of frontiers, the 
combination of ideological and economic authority that Muslim preachers had in this 
region gave them a huge advantage in organizing settlement compared to Hindu 
landlords from the west. The latter simply did not have the same authority in eastern 
Bengal and therefore could not organize settlement. Islam’s success was in providing 
an ideology of social discipline and organization that was appropriate for this agrarian 
frontier through the work of religious and social organizers who had worked in the 
hinterland and were trusted by local people who still did not yet fully subscribe to any 
particular religion. Eaton’s analysis is important because it suggests that the 
‘conversion’ of Bengal did not involve large numbers of individuals abandoning one 
organized religion for another. Rather, Islam provided the initial organizing ideology 
of settlement and social discipline in a frontier where organized religion did not yet 
exist for much of the population. This explanation also helps to explain the deep 
historical roots of Islam in Bengal as a mobilizing ideology. 
 
33 
 
As the East got settled, more established Hindu landlords and administrators from the 
West moved in with their capital and formal administrative skills, supporting Mughal 
rule and establishing themselves as higher level tax collectors or zamindars. A 
densely tiered land administration system developed over the centuries, where control 
over land and taxation at the village level was often in the hands of Muslims, many of 
them the descendants of the early organizers of settlement, while higher level tax 
collection and administration over groups of villages passed to the mainly Hindu 
zamindar class. At the apex stood the Muslim aristocracy in the provincial capital, 
which shifted from place to place, but was located at Murshidabad in modern West 
Bengal when the British arrived. With the Muslim nawabs and aristocracy at 
Murshidabad removed by the British, the social map of Bengal was roughly one of a 
large peasantry consisting of both Hindus and Muslims, but with the predominantly 
Muslim peasantry of the East ensuring an overall Muslim majority. On top was a 
predominantly Hindu zamindar and administrative class who rapidly made peace with 
the British and became the immediate beneficiaries of participation in a new 
administrative structure.  
 
The British Empire had a very obvious interest in responding to the results of the 
census of 1872 in ways that could help to deepen their hold on power. A consensus 
began to emerge in the British analysis of these figures which was summed up in the 
work of James Wise. He suggested, obviously without providing any evidence, that 
widespread conversions to Islam had been achieved ‘by the sword’, and some 
conversions had been of lower castes who wanted to escape the subjection of their 
caste Hindu oppressors (Eaton 1993: 122-3). This ‘balanced’ analysis implicitly 
provided a critique of both major religions even though it had scant reference to 
significant historical evidence, certainly in the case of Bengal. But the claim that 
Islam had used the sword to convert Hindus resonated with some experiences of early 
Islamic iconoclasm that had seen the destruction of temples and other acts of violence, 
particularly in western India. This view of Islam in Bengal rapidly gained currency 
amongst sections of the Hindu elite (Chatterjee 1993: 76-94).  
 
Ironically, the equally unsubstantiated claim that conversions were driven by the 
search for social liberation did not get picked up by the leadership of Bengal’s 
Muslims at that time as vindication of Islam’s superiority as a social system. In the 
late nineteenth century the Muslim leadership in Bengal came primarily from the 
declining Muslim aristocracy, the descendants of the class displaced by the British. 
This declining class of aristocratic descent had a visceral antipathy to the idea that the 
Muslims of Bengal were converts from the poorer classes and spent much of their 
time trying to establish that all the Muslims of Bengal were largely immigrants from 
outside like themselves. Not surprisingly, their social distance from the peasants of 
Bengal meant that they were not able to mobilize much support for their political 
ambitions. The political mobilization of the East Bengal peasantry had to await a later 
juncture when new intermediate class organizers from the middle and upper peasantry 
appeared on the scene. 
 
4. The British Conquest 
From the Indian perspective, the impact of British imperialism came at a most 
unfortunate moment when the Mughal system of land rights and revenue collection 
was facing severe internal tensions. The organization of a thriving long-distance trade 
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by local merchants like the Jagat Seths exporting the products of a growing textile 
handicraft industry created growing conflicts between new money and the old landed 
elite. Without outside intervention at this critical juncture, Bengal’s economy and 
polity may well have evolved in the direction of a gradual productive transformation 
of its agriculture and manufacturing led by merchant capitalists in alliance with 
regional rulers willing to develop the ‘national’ economy. In the eighteenth century 
there were growing conflicts between merchants, financiers and the nobility who 
comprised the Mughal ruling classes over what to tax and by how much. These 
conflicts were in turn increasingly expressed in political conflicts and intrigues within 
the state apparatus of the last independent ruler of Bengal, Nawab Siraj-ud-Daula. But 
instead of a new and potentially productive internal alignment, the alliance of some of 
Bengal’s merchants and politicians with the British against the old order resulted in a 
disastrous outcome whose full extent these groups could not possibly have imagined.  
 
Some of the Nawab’s financiers and some of his generals believed that the alliance 
with the East India Company would open up their trading opportunities. Intrigue, 
deception, British bribes and a disastrous miscalculation by these domestic elites led 
to a pre-arranged victory for the English against nominally much superior Bengal 
forces (Pavlov 1979: 83-107 and 215-56). The calamitous dénouement of the military 
disaster of 1757 at the Battle of Polashi (Plessey) has been portrayed in English 
history as a great military victory against much superior Indian forces. The truth is 
that the miscalculation by sections of Bengal’s merchant and military classes meant 
that the bulk of Bengal’s military forces did not even engage in battle. Internal 
conflicts and miscalculation provide the most plausible explanation of what happened 
at Polashi, rather than the explanation offered by Kaushik Basu that Indians lacked 
(and still lack) something called ‘organizational capital’ (Basu 2004: 7-11). It took 
significant organization to ensure that the 60,000 troops on the Indian side would not 
fight the 3,000 English. And indeed significant organizational skills are still required 
to operate the patron-client politics that characterizes contemporary Bangladesh or 
India. What Basu is referring to is the fact that some types of organization have 
negative social effects but this is not the same as the absence of ‘organizational 
capital’.  
 
If emerging Indian capital thought they could do a beneficial deal with the English 
traders after they had weakened their own feudal rulers, they had made a disastrous 
mistake. The new balance of military power enabled the East India Company to 
pursue their own interests and to kill off indigenous capital that could have competed 
against them. It began by installing and removing subservient nawabs at the 
provincial capital Murshidabad to achieve the greatest possible advantage till in 1772 
Warren Hastings brought the unnecessary facade of dual government to an end. An 
English council under a governor took over the administration and shifted the capital 
to Calcutta, which eventually became the capital of British India. Before the colonial 
impact, Bengal was ironically a relatively prosperous and food surplus province of the 
disintegrating Mughal Empire. The agricultural technology used in India just prior to 
the colonial period was inferior to that used in Europe but yields per acre were 
comparable or even higher than European levels (Raychaudhuri 1983: 17-18). Bengal 
in particular also appeared to be an especially promising region for the indigenous 
development of manufactures from the late seventeenth century onwards. The artisan 
sector, particularly textiles, was well-established and was the basis of a thriving long-
distance trade organized by Indian merchant capital. The agricultural surplus and the 
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growth of the handicraft textile industry was large enough to maintain substantial 
urban populations, particularly at Dhaka and Murshidabad, even when the Mughal 
capital at Delhi could enforce the full payment of taxes to the central authority (N. 
Ahmad 1968: 98-104).  
 
Prior to the English, civil and military administration was in the hands of the tax-
collecting zamindari nobility, the Indian equivalent of a ‘feudal elite’. It was not in 
the interest of this landed nobility to either accumulate inordinately or kill the 
peasants and artisans who produced their surplus, both of which would attract the 
unwelcome attention of the higher-level aristocracy. This allowed the growth of a 
substantial artisan sector, which despite technical backwardness produced 
commodities which were in high demand throughout the world. In particular, Bengal 
was known internationally for its fine muslin cotton fabric which was marketed 
globally by Indian merchants operating through global chains involving Arabs and 
Europeans. Many artisans were directly settled in cities supplying the demands of the 
administrative and military elite. According to one estimate, the home market for 
luxury handicrafts alone amounted to about five per cent of Mughal national income, 
with the export market accounting for another one and a half per cent before the 
English takeover  (Maddison 1971: 54). Nevertheless, there were inevitably growing 
tensions between the emerging trading and financial interests and the landed classes.  
 
The Mughal state collected land-tax by appointing a chain of intermediaries, who 
even though they had no rights to the land they collected from, had formal and often 
inheritable and transferrable rights to collect revenue (Sinha 1962; Habib 1963; S. N. 
Hasan 1969). While the disintegration of the Mughal Empire from the late 
seventeenth century onwards made some difference to the relative power of different 
levels of this hierarchy, the structure itself remained more or less intact. The most 
important effect was that the Mughal subahdar (governor) of Bengal, Murshid Quli 
Khan, virtually declared independence in 1707 by stopping revenue payments to the 
centre, but within Bengal he rationalized the revenue collection system and attempted 
to exert greater pressure on the higher level revenue collectors, the zamindars, to 
increase revenue collection (Ray 1979: 1-51). Thus, as the Mughal Empire weakened, 
one effect was that regional powers became stronger, with the possibility that 
gradually regional states would begin to emerge. At the same time, however, conflicts 
within these regional economies like Bengal were growing between the declining 
Mughal aristocracy and the growing mercantile and financial interests. It was the ill-
fated alliance of the latter with English traders that brought about the collapse of 
indigenous military and political elites in Bengal. 
 
Thus, the tottering Mughal imperial system was not overthrown by the emerging 
merchant classes in alliance with new military and political forces that were 
supportive of local economic forces. Instead, the conflicts between these groups 
enabled a tiny group of marauding English traders to destroy the old military forces 
before new ones could consolidate. In the space of ‘a brief startling score of years’ the 
English found themselves transformed from suppliants to the Mughal into the new 
masters of India (Woodruff 1963). Bengal, the province first brought under ‘Company 
Rule’, suffered the greatest from the early depredations of colonialism. The merchants 
of the East India Company had no difficulty in understanding the connection between 
political power and the ‘gains from trade’. Bengal’s textiles had undoubtedly attracted 
the English traders, but the way in which textiles were ‘exported’, ensured the 
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destruction rather than the development of the artisan economy. The company and its 
servants acquired the right to move goods in the interior duty-free, depriving the 
nawab’s treasury of revenue, and destroying local merchant capital through this 
process of ‘exchange’, since local merchants, unlike the expatriate traders, were 
forced to pay domestic tolls and duties. In 1763, Nawab Mir Kasim made a final 
attempt to save the local economy by declaring that since the English enjoyed free 
trade, his treasury would also absolve Indian merchants from paying any duty. The 
English reaction was swift and unequivocal. The head of the company’s factory at 
Patna attacked the city, and in the ensuing two and a half month war, the nawab’s 
depleted army was defeated in six successive battles. The company’s privileges were 
restored by restoring duties for indigenous merchants. This symbolic effort was in 
effect the last ‘nationalist’ stand of the indigenous ruling elite (Mukherjee 1974: 304-
12; S. Islam 1984: 47-53). 
 
The company’s servants and gomastahs (local agents) now had unbridled power to 
underpay the artisan. The company appeared to prefer vast short term profits rather 
than the growth or even the survival of the artisan economy. William Bolts, a 
contemporary English merchant has left a graphic account of the system of fines, 
floggings, imprisonments and forced bonds which enabled them to do this (Bolts 
1772: 73, 83, 191-4; Mukherjee 1974: 302-4). Furthermore, the destruction of the 
Mughal elite destroyed a substantial part of the domestic demand for luxury 
handicrafts. As much as three quarters of domestic demand disappeared according to 
one estimate (Maddison 1971: 54). In less than a century, the thriving artisan 
manufacturing sector was virtually destroyed, with serious implications for 
indigenous skills, technology and entrepreneurship. The vast urban settlements which 
visitors from Europe had once marvelled at also disappeared. Sir Charles Trevelyan 
reported in 1840 a decline in the population of Dhaka (which he described as the 
Manchester of India) from 150 thousand to as little as 30 or 40 thousand with the 
destruction of the artisan sector producing fine cotton muslin cloth (Dutt 1950: 114). 
 
In the century from the 1850s onwards, the administrative and physical infrastructure 
which developed in Calcutta enabled the province to develop modern jute 
manufacturing and export. During that century, in terms of absolute size, Bengal 
developed the largest industrial sector in British India. According to one estimate, 
with 15.5 per cent of India's population in 1939, Bengal accounted for 28.7 per cent of 
its industrial workers. At the close of 1936, 49.6 per cent of Indian joint stock 
companies were based in Bengal, accounting for 44.2 per cent of total Indian paid up 
capital (Awwal 1982). The historically prior destruction of handloom textiles meant, 
however, a somewhat different social trajectory in Bengal from the ‘classic’ 
transformation from artisan to factory production as it had happened in Britain, where 
indigenous producers were absorbed into more efficient units. The early industrial 
sector in Bengal was in contrast an isolated and largely foreign-owned and foreign-
controlled modern economy centred around Calcutta in the western half of the 
province, while the eastern half, where much of the older handloom textile industry 
was situated around Dhaka, actually experienced ‘de-industrialization’ (Krishnamurty 
1983: 544-5).  
 
However, on the issue of land revenue and land rights, the early colonial interventions 
attempted to be productive even if the actual outcomes were not. The declared aim 
was to create a productive landlord class by creating rights over land revenues that 
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were formal and marketable. The fact that this was not just a cynical discourse is 
shown by the fact that when the results in Bengal proved disappointing, the colonial 
authorities experimented with different allocations of land revenue rights in other 
parts of India. As a result of these different experiments as well as important 
differences in initial conditions, there were differences in the character of the new 
middle classes which emerged across British India, and in the pace and extent of 
industrial development. Class evolution depended not only on pre-existing structures 
of land rights and the organization of merchant and usury capital, but also on the types 
of land rights that the British experimented with. Much depended on when a province 
was annexed and changes in prevailing fashions in the contemporary ‘institutional 
economics’ debates going on in England. Regional variations in the availability of 
raw materials and in the fertility of the soil were also of importance. But while some 
Indian regional results were indeed better than the Bengal experiment, nowhere did 
the British succeed in creating the productive agrarian capitalist class that they wanted 
to create to increase land revenue collection.  
 
The conflicting objectives and strategies of the evolving colonial state in India can be 
analysed in terms of the analytical distinction David Washbrook makes between the 
motivations of the ‘mercantilist’ colonial state of the mid-eighteenth to mid-
nineteenth century and those of the ‘High Colonial state’ that coexisted from the 
beginning but emerged in its full form after the 1857 Mutiny/War of Independence. In 
its initial phase, the colonial power was primarily interested in maximizing revenue 
from the land, and this was achieved by making the pre-existing Mughal and Nawabi 
land-tax collection system more efficient (Washbrook 1981). The ‘mercantilist’ 
colonial state’s ambitious property rights experiment was in intention not just a 
surplus extraction project but an attempt to create institutional incentives for 
agricultural ‘improvement’ along the English model (Arnold 2005). The Permanent 
Settlement of 1793 boldly declared that zamindars were ‘proprietors of the soil’ and 
granted them formal tradable rights to collect revenue (Chaudhuri 1983: 88).  
 
In fact, the Act only gave zamindars the formal right to buy and sell their revenue 
collecting authority, in exchange for a perpetually fixed money rental paid to the state. 
Though the money rent was fixed at a high level, it was fixed in perpetuity in nominal 
terms, so the intention was clearly to create incentives for zamindars to improve the 
land. At the same time, failure to pay the revenue to the state would lead to the 
zamindari being auctioned. Historical consensus has now shifted away from the 
opinion that the Permanent Settlement created ‘capitalist’ property rights in land 
(Mukherjee 1974; Alavi 1975), to the more tenable position that it attempted to make 
the pre-existing revenue structure more efficient by ensuring that zamindars had 
strong incentives to make the revenue payment on time and to improve the land (Ray 
and Ray 1973; Ray 1974; Ray and Ray 1975; Ray 1979). But whether any of this 
could be done depended on whether the zamindar had adequate rights to compel the 
settled peasant producers to put in more effort or otherwise do things differently. And 
here lay one of the fatal flaws in its institutional design. The Permanent Settlement 
did not give zamindars any such rights, and the subsequent evolution of colonial law 
successively increased the rights of lower level intermediaries at the village level 
(though rarely the rights of the poorest peasants).  
 
Under the Permanent Settlement, as before, the bargaining power over the distribution 
of the agrarian surplus at a critical point in the hierarchy, between the peasant 
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producers and the higher level rent-collectors, remained to a substantial extent with 
the ubiquitous class of village level petty landlords and rent collectors. Despite 
substantial regional variations in the precise mix of rent collecting and land-holding, 
different commentators find enough in common across these ‘intermediate’ rich 
peasants to describe them as the jotedar class (Sinha 1962; Ray 1979; Goswami 1982; 
Bose 1983). These village level power brokers were very likely the descendants of the 
organizers who had settled peasants on the land several centuries earlier. They were 
certainly most powerful in the eastern part of the province and were predominantly 
Muslim. Because of their close proximity to the production process, their relationship 
with the direct producers, though it was exploitative, was not usually perceived as 
such by the peasants. The village elite were the intermediaries between them and the 
outside world, and moreover they shared in the disasters which struck the village from 
time to time. 
 
If anything, the Permanent Settlement weakened the zamindari nobility, by destroying 
the political and administrative structures on which their authority was based. The 
design failure could initially have been the result of thoughtlessly transporting bits of 
an institutional model from one context to another. The Mughal zamindari system 
worked through the zamindar using lower level tax collectors who included village-
level petty landlords and professional tax collectors. In the original version, the 
zamindar had a strong hold over these lower level collectors and over peasants 
because the zamindar was not just a revenue collector but also at the apex of a local 
political unit providing policing and conflict resolution functions (H. Z. Rahman 
1986). These formal powers gave the Mughal zamindar a network of informal powers 
through which revenue collection could be enforced. But under the permanent 
settlement, while the British created formal rights for zamindars they also removed 
policing and judicial functions to new classes of professional functionaries. This 
undermined the informal powers of zamindars without giving them new rights that 
may have established a market-based discipline. For instance, peasant ryots could 
pledge land against arrears, but they could in theory also claim their land back by 
paying off the arrears even after generations, significantly weakening the possibility 
of zamindars permanently changing land use (Chaudhuri 1983: 151-2).  
 
Lacking market power, rural creditors and agents of zamindars often used crude 
forms of coercion that created hatred rather than efficient responses by the producers. 
The outcome was therefore not surprising. The increase in revenue could not be 
delivered in many cases without very crude and obvious coercion and large numbers 
of zamindaris went up for auction without many new takers appearing. As inflation 
reduced the real burden of the revenue settlement, zamindaris eventually did become 
viable investment propositions for merchants and traders, but the creation of 
zamindari rights never had the desired effect of creating incentives for improvement. 
The persistence of this experiment and others like it in other parts of India cannot 
simply be explained by a technical design error. Zamindars and merchants continued 
to demand that their rights vis-à-vis lower level surplus claimants and peasants should 
be strengthened but these demands were systematically rejected. Subsequent reforms 
made the situation even worse by further strengthening the rights of village-level petty 
landlords and revenue collectors. 
 
Why this happened must be more than an oversight and can only be understood in 
terms of the evolving motivations of the ‘High Colonial State’ (Washbrook 1981). 
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The colonial power clearly lacked traditional sources of power and authority and its 
existence could not but undermine the authority of indigenous dominant classes. This 
made the maintenance of social order a matter of great concern from the outset but 
particularly after the 1857 Mutiny/War of Independence. It is not surprising that the 
state’s policies demonstrated a growing concern to construct new allies and balances 
of power. The innovation was a new concern with the ‘peasant’ or ryot meaning not 
the impoverished tillers of the soil but the petty village landlords and intermediaries 
or jotedars who were most likely to emerge as the organizers and representatives of 
mass discontent. Prior to 1857 this concern manifested itself in the refusal to extend 
zamindar rights too far against lower level intermediaries and peasants. After 1857 
the state’s concern with the possibility of further disturbances took the form of 
positive legislation to protect ryots and strengthen their rights.  
 
This was clearly a political agenda of delivering to groups whose support the colonial 
power thought it needed. The strategy cannot be explained either by a desire to extract 
a greater surplus (indeed this was a period of falling land revenues) or to enhance 
growth (as these rights made it more difficult for zamindars, merchants and usurers to 
achieve effective control of the land to change production relations and technologies). 
Important legislation of this period includes the Rent Act of 1859 and the Tenancy 
Act of 1885. Both Acts, and particularly the latter, strengthened the rights of the so-
called ‘occupancy ryots’ who were the petty village level landlords often called 
jotedars in Bengal. As the jotedars were surplus farmers and sometimes also village-
level rentiers, they had structural conflicts of interest with the higher-level revenue 
collecting zamindars (Chatterjee 1982: 123-4). The Tenancy Act formally recognized 
the rights of ryots as formal tenants of zamindars but again without granting the latter 
any formal powers to compel their ‘tenants’ to do anything.  
 
The creation of these new rights meant that these ‘intermediate classes’ could keep a 
bigger share of the surplus for themselves. But the jotedars too did not have any 
effective capacity to change production relations at the village level because their 
powers to accumulate land, evict their own tenants on any significant scale or to settle 
new tenants were very limited. It was only through an amendment of the Tenancy Act 
in 1928 that ryots acquired the right to buy and sell their occupancy rights, but that 
too by paying 25 per cent of the sale price to the zamindar and with the zamindar 
having the right of pre-emption (Chaudhuri 1983: 152-3; Barkat and Roy 2004: 25-7). 
These complex checks and balances were intended to preserve the status quo in 
precisely the way in which a properly working land market would threaten to disrupt. 
The result was that by the 1870s it was clear that the surpluses of the village petty 
proprietor group were not being invested in agriculture but rather to finance the 
migration of their sons to the city. This migration was greatly assisted by another 
‘stabilization’ strategy of the raj: the rapid growth in the largely unproductive 
employment opportunities created by the burgeoning state that ‘managed’ empire 
(Gordon 1974: 28; A. M. Ahmad 1975; Chatterjee 1982: 121). 
 
Thus the raj was already creating a political settlement that was beginning to 
incorporate jotedars as critical political organizers and intermediaries into the rent 
distribution systems that were meant to sustain political stability. However, formal 
political and economic power was largely in the hands of the English-educated and 
largely Hindu urban professionals, many of them directly connected to zamindari 
families. The crisis towards the end of Empire in Bengal was that the transfer of 
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power would be contested strongly between the urban professional and zamindari 
elites who were largely Hindu and the emerging political organizers who were in 
origin rich-peasant or jotedar and had the requisite organizational abilities to ‘deliver’ 
the countryside. The fact that Muslim peasants constituted the majority in Bengal 
created an intense conflict between economic privilege and the emergent centres of 
political power based on electoral politics.  
 
It was clear that if the zamindars could not organize a capitalist transformation of 
agriculture, neither could the jotedars. Rather they used their political power to 
demand access to urban jobs and further changes in tenancy rights that would leave 
them with a greater share of the agrarian surplus. Already by the 1870s, better 
educated Hindus from the petty proprietor group were the basis of much of the rapid 
expansion in the urban ‘middle classes’. They provided the most successful 
professionals in law, journalism, medicine, teaching, and the judicial and civil 
services (Chatterjee 1982: 121). Lord Curzon’s enquiry found that whereas in 1875 
there were no Indians in the hallowed Indian Civil Service, by 1903, there were 
16,000 Indians at relatively senior levels with salaries above seventy five rupees 
(Misra 1961: 316). A turning point for the new middle class came in 1892 with the 
passage of the Indian Councils Act. Under the act, the Legislative Council of Bengal 
was to have twenty members, admittedly in an advisory capacity, of whom not more 
than ten were to be officials. Of the rest, seven were to be nominated by the 
Lieutenant Governor from panels suggested by the Calcutta Corporation, municipal 
and district boards, the senate of the Calcutta University, the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce and the Trades Association. Only one of the remaining three was 
‘ordinarily’ to be a zamindar, a numerical balance which reveals the shifting political 
balance in the broader society (Misra 1961: 351-2). 
 
Part of the growth of the urban ‘middle class’ was undoubtedly the result of the 
modernization of the economy. But the evidence put forward by economic historians 
and biographies of that period suggests that the ‘push’ of political mobilization from 
the countryside was much more important than the ‘pull’ from new demands for 
services generated by a growing modern sector (Nooruzzaman 1965: 232; A. M. 
Ahmad 1975; Chatterjee 1982). The most enduring effect of the set of representative 
institutions introduced by the raj, and the political culture that developed around them, 
was to legitimize a pattern of upward mobility for the vast class of rural petty-
landowners who were perceived to be such a potential threat. By the 1920s, the 
Muslim intermediate classes were mobilizing to demand a significant improvement in 
their access to urban jobs. Paradoxically, the flow of people from the intermediate 
classes to urban professions resulted in a further increase in the organizational power 
of the intermediate classes and the creation of further rights and protections for them. 
The increasingly assertive intermediate classes were behind the formation of the 
Indian Association in 1876, which split from the old British Indian Association 
dominated by the big zamindars. They were also to provide the organizational 
backbone of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and in Bengal set up 
their own party, the Krishok-Proja (or Peasant) Party. Ironically, in the end, the 
empire was brought down by the very intermediate classes the British nurtured to 
check the pretensions of the zamindars and merchant capitalists above and the poor 
below.  
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The growth in the importance of industry and urban politics brought about yet another 
change in the overall political context. Washbrook describes the third and last phase 
of the colonial state as that of the ‘Incipient Nation State’, which lasted from the early 
twentieth century till the transfer of power in 1947. The stable balance of forces 
which had characterized the previous era came to an end. The new balance which the 
raj had to politically manage included the landed petty proprietors as before, but 
instead of the zamindari and mercantile interests, it was now the emerging domestic 
industrial capitalism which was making demands on the state (Washbrook 1981: 693-
710). Washbrook’s analysis of the conflicts inherent in this new context needs to be 
re-considered. On the one hand, the evidence does support his claim that a growing 
pressure from the nationalist and expatriate industrialists, and a growing net financial 
dependence of the state on industry was pushing the raj towards an interventionist 
policy which amounted to somewhat greater subsidies for industry. On the other hand, 
the growing political and economic tensions of this period are not adequately 
explained in terms of the state having to continue with its policies of social 
conservation in the village, strengthening the village-level landlords and giving them 
enhanced opportunities for economic gain.  
 
The essentially rural political mobilization the raj had supported had by the 1930s 
created an urban middle class as successful intermediaries migrated to the towns to 
take up professional jobs. The rural jotedar intermediaries now had one foot in urban 
politics but still mobilized their rural constituencies. Populist politics and the 
mobilization of ever growing sections of the stagnant rural society swelled the 
numbers of those who came to the towns, such as Calcutta, to seek education and a 
share in the surplus of the state. The attempt by the raj to establish a political role for 
the jotedar to sustain political stability in the village unleashed a social dynamic that 
included the town. According to one set of estimates, between 1900/09 and 1940/46, 
the real value of output at 1939 prices in the primary and secondary sectors in India 
increased by 34 percent, but in the tertiary sector by 143 percent, the bulk of this 
accounted for by the growth of a “large and unwieldy government” (Sivasubramanian 
1965). Even allowing for statistical errors, the absolute and relative growth of the 
‘service’ sector was remarkable. 
 
In a sense, the continuing, and by now perhaps irrevocable responsiveness of the raj to 
the political demands of the ‘countryside’ represented a formal continuation of its 
commitment to the jotedar voice, but what does not emerge from Washbrook’s 
analysis is that this relationship with the village elite had by now created a large and 
growing urban constituency. The political culture and the history of its evolution 
impelled many within this group to continue a populist pressure in the name of the 
‘peasant’, but the economic content of the demand had by now qualitatively changed. 
By the twenties and thirties, mass-movements emerged organized jointly by the urban 
middle classes and the rural jotedars. This was actually the key characteristic of 
political mobilizations which emerged in the last two decades of Empire, and was 
indeed the legacy it bequeathed to its successors (Sarkar 1983: 63-6). 
 
It is perhaps ironical that the Calcutta jute industry contributed most to the prosperity 
of the jotedar at the turn of the century as the rural jute growing agriculture prospered. 
But it was a prosperity which was extremely vulnerable. First during the Great War, 
again during 1921-3 and throughout the thirties, the jute farmers were thrown into 
depression by the vagaries of the world market and the monopsonist powers of the 
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Calcutta enclave economy. Jotedars did not on the whole do too badly, primarily 
because they were able to diversify into money-lending, but they provided an 
increasingly vociferous constituency for populist politics (Goswami 1982: 224-49). 
The depression of the 1930s destroyed many poor peasant cultivators and further 
weakened the zamindars, many of whom began to lose their estates. However, some 
rich peasants acquired greater control over the land during this time (Chatterji 1995: 
63-8). This did not further any agrarian transition, but did increase the organizational 
capacities of the jotedars. The response of the British to the agrarian crisis was to 
accelerate the introduction of electoral politics to the countryside. The 1935 
Government of India Act introduced party politics to the rural areas, and the rural rich 
peasants were the immediate beneficiaries in their role of organizers. 
 
If the Indian Councils Act of 1892 was a turning point for the Indian middle class, the 
1937 elections to the provincial Legislative Councils marked yet another significant 
shift in the political balance of power. In Bengal, the decidedly jotedar Krishok-Proja 
Party (Peasant and People’s Party) of Fazlul Huq caught this tide of ‘peasant’ 
discontent at its flood. It was elected as the largest party. It wanted to form a coalition 
with the Congress but the latter refused to deal with the upstarts and Huq formed a 
coalition with the Muslim League. The Muslim League was originally led by 
aristocratic Bengali Muslims, but by now had its own base of jotedar organizers. 
Nevertheless, the electoral victory of the Krishok-Proja Party over the aristocratic 
Bengal Muslim League represented the coming of age of the Bengali Muslim jotedar. 
By now the aspirations of the upwardly mobile jotedar were explicit. While the 
demands of the movement were always couched in terms of justice for the peasant, 
neither the city-based leaders like Fazlul Huq, nor the rural constituencies who acted 
as the mobilizers of the movement, revealed any great interest for the agrarian sector 
in their actions. In its first budget, the Fazlul Huq government allocated one percent of 
the budget to agriculture, half the allocation approved for ‘stationery and printing’ 
(Goswami 1982: 12).  
 
While both the urban and the rural jotedar were interested primarily in upward 
mobility, the prerequisite for this was a move to the town. The possibility had already 
begun to emerge, therefore, of conflicts of interest between the jotedar proper, a vast 
and nebulous class spread over hundreds of thousands of Indian villages, and their 
urban brethren who had graduated to the petty-bourgeois urban classes. The 
ascendance of the jotedar in the politics of the countryside, and the symbiotic if 
tension-prone relationship with the political movements of the urban middle classes 
was one of the most significant of the political balances which were established as a 
result of the arrangements devised by the raj in its steadily more futile attempts to 
maintain a political balance of power. Whether in the village or in the town, the 
interests of this coalition would have to be henceforth taken into account.  
 
It can be argued that the most damaging effects of British colonialism were not 
primarily caused by its extraction of surplus but rather its social engineering. This 
created competing rights that blocked a productive transformation of agriculture or 
even the acquisition of effective rights over contiguous territories of land, which 
could have reduced the transaction costs of a subsequent productive transformation 
into manufacturing (Nooruzzaman 1965; M. H. Khan 2009a). As a relatively weak 
imperial power, the British needed to balance the interests of different domestic 
groups, particularly on the land. They were averse to any changes that threatened 
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serious discontent, let alone peasant uprisings. Their interventions therefore supported 
contradictory sets of rights, simultaneously supporting the rights of a complex mosaic 
of landlords and peasants (Washbrook 1981). In Bengal, they introduced the so-called 
Permanent Settlement that attempted to create tradable rights of revenue collection for 
the upper landlords or zamindars that some thought would result in a capitalist 
transformation of Bengal’s agriculture. But at the same time, the British also 
strengthened the rights of different classes of peasants, in particular the critical 
intermediate class of jotedars, which ensured that zamindars would find it very 
difficult to impose capitalist discipline (Ray and Ray 1973, 1975).  
 
5. British Strategies of Divide and Rule 
The initial impact of the British conquest of India had been to displace the Muslim 
aristocrats from their positions at the apex of the political system. The Muslim ruling 
class response for long time afterwards was to reject all aspects of British rule 
including English education. As a result, they were severely underrepresented in the 
growing British administrative structure. Their loyalty to the British cause was in any 
case suspect, and even more so after what the British called the Mutiny of 1857. In 
contrast, many of the Hindu landlords and administrators who had operated within the 
Mughal system initially saw British rule as an opportunity to break through the 
Muslim ceiling and enthusiastically adopted English education and bureaucratic 
service. While Indians of all religions were involved in the 1857 uprising, important 
organizers came from or appealed to the old Muslim aristocracy, who were therefore 
even more thoroughly weakened after this event. But by the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the English-educated and mainly Hindu Indians who were now part 
of the Indian administration began to emerge as the main challengers of British rule. 
The Hindu Bengali middle classes in particular had benefited greatly from the 
expansion of formal employment opportunities. They were now at the forefront of the 
opposition to colonial rule, and began to use legal and constitutional arguments to 
question discrimination against Indians (Chatterjee 1993: 18-27). In this context, the 
British began to explore mechanisms of bringing the now backward Muslims back 
into the political fold to balance the pretensions of the Hindus. The ‘communal’ 
balancing act was overlaid on the economic and social balances that the British were 
also constructing. 
 
British communal strategies operated at both the national and provincial levels, with 
regional strategies responding to local opportunities. At the national level, strategies 
like the Morley-Minto reforms established separate electorates for Muslims in 1909. 
Separate electorates meant that Muslims with the appropriate voting qualifications 
would only vote for Muslim candidates. The aim was to increase Muslim 
representation in municipal, legislative and other bodies where Indian representatives 
were gradually being elected by Indian constituencies defined by profession, 
landholding and other voting criteria. The idea was that the Muslim elite were 
unlikely to gain proportional representation if they stood in first-past-the-post contests 
in electorates that were mainly Hindu. Secondly, at the provincial level, divide and 
rule took some specific forms like the short-lived administrative partition of Bengal in 
1905. The eastern part of Bengal with its significant Muslim majority was separated 
as an administrative unit, not only to guarantee Muslim representation and voice, but 
also to invite Muslim loyalty to a Raj that was belatedly responding to their exclusion. 
Interestingly, this administrative partition failed to generate the Muslim mobilization 
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that the British had hoped for and was eventually reversed in 1911. Thus, while these 
colonial interventions contributed to the deepening of divisions, taking a long view, 
the eventual partitions were to a large extent driven by the failure of Indian elites to 
reach viable compromises in the context of the types of patron-client politics that 
were emerging around that time.  
 
The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 were a response to Indian demands to extend 
Indian representation in provincial and imperial legislative councils based. But to 
temper the ambitions of the English-educated and largely Hindu elites, the reforms 
simultaneously established separate electoral colleges for Muslims on the grounds that 
this was a legitimate Muslim demand. The conventional wisdom in Indian nationalist 
history is that this was the critical step that encouraged and established Muslim 
separatism that eventually led to partition. It is certainly the case that separate 
electorates were driven by British calculations. While there were some Muslims 
making such demands, they were mainly the aristocratic Muslims whose political 
weight was very limited.  If the British conceded that these demands were legitimate, 
they must have had other reasons for doing so. Ironically, far from setting up the 
Muslims as a useful counterweight to the increasingly troublesome Hindus, the 
Morley-Minto constitutional arrangements served to further isolate Muslims from 
mainstream Indian politics, enabling many in the Hindu mainstream to characterize 
Muslims as ‘communal’ and therefore a problematic minority which could now be 
legitimately ignored (Tejani 2007: 113-43).  
 
The most serious problem facing the nationalist reading of the implications of the 
Morley-Minto reforms is that it is hard to see how they could have led to the partition 
of India had it not been for the presence of significant Muslim majority areas. 
Partition affected only the Muslim-majority areas, where Muslims did not ultimately 
need separate electorates to dominate regional politics. In Bengal certainly, the 
problem was not the presence of separate electorates but rather that electoral politics 
itself resulted in a significant confrontation between political power and economic 
privilege. Nevertheless, separate electorates created significant bitterness, particularly 
amongst Hindus. In Bengal, the Communal Award of 1932 allocated the 250 seats in 
the proposed Legislative Assembly. Of this, 10 per cent of the seats were allocated to 
Europeans who were less than one per cent of the population. Hindus who were 44 
per cent of the population were awarded 32 per cent of the seats, and Muslims who 
were 54 per cent of the population were awarded 48 per cent of the seats. While both 
communities were unrepresented, Hindus were more so. But while separate 
electorates contributed significantly to distrust, the electoral outcomes in favour of 
Muslims would have persisted in the absence of any separate electorates in a Muslim-
majority province like Bengal. 
 
The failure of the British administrative division of Bengal in 1905 is a vivid 
demonstration of the limits of divide-and-rule strategies in the absence of supporting 
local factors. The administrative partition was a deliberate act to weaken opposition to 
British rule and to get Muslim support, but it utterly failed. As the first major province 
of India to be fully conquered, Bengal was further ahead compared to other parts of 
India in terms of English education and in confronting the English using the legal and 
constitutional tools they had introduced. Shortly after the 1872 census, the British 
began to explore the possibility of cutting this problematic province down to size. 
Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, decided to partition Bengal along a north-south axis in a 
45 
 
way that was designed to leave the Muslims in a huge majority in the eastern half. 
The hope was both to weaken the Hindu elites many of whom had landholdings in the 
East, and to mobilize important sections of the Muslims in favour of the British. The 
ostensible British argument was administrative: Bengal was too big, with 189,000 
square miles of territory and a population then of 79 millions. But the British made 
little attempt to conceal their political objectives. Curzon stated these quite clearly: 
“The Bengalis, who like to think of themselves as a nation, and who dream of a future 
when the English will have been turned out, and a Bengali Babu will be installed in 
Government House, Calcutta, of course bitterly resent any disruption that will be 
likely to interfere with the realisation of this dream. If we are weak enough to yield to 
their clamour now, we shall not be able to dismember or reduce Bengal again: and 
you will be cementing and solidifying, on the eastern flank of India, a force already 
formidable, and certain to be a source of increasing trouble in the future” (cited in 
Chatterjee 1997: 28). The British administrator H. H. Risley put it even more clearly: 
“Bengal united is a power; Bengal divided will pull in different ways… One of our 
main objects is to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule” 
(cited in Chatterjee 1997: 27-8). 
 
But this administrative partition was short-lived. The calculations of the British were 
based on several strategic miscalculations. In the absence of electoral politics, the 
Muslim leadership in Bengal was still in the hands of the fading Muslim aristocracy. 
They did need protection and support if they were to balance the educated Hindu 
elites and the administrative partition was designed primarily to help them. But they 
were so delinked from their own constituency that they failed to organize any 
significant counter-mobilization in favour of the administrative partition that was 
strongly opposed by the Hindu elite. If the British hoped that this aristocratic Muslim 
leadership would succeed in giving them excuses for sustaining the partition, they 
were wrong. On the other hand, with electoral politics (which the British were also 
gradually introducing), Muslims would not need special protection because they were 
in any case the majority. By the 1920s, the gradual extension of electoral politics 
brought to the fore a new type of Muslim leadership from the Muslim intermediate 
classes who were masters at mobilizing their peers (and later the peasants below them 
as the franchise extended). As Muslim leadership passed to the intermediate classes, 
they discovered they had no need for protection or partition as their numerical 
advantage meant they could dominate the whole of Bengal. When that happened, it 
was paradoxically the Hindu elite that needed protection, and much of the drive for 
partition in the 1940s began to come from them (Chatterji 1995). But in 1905 neither 
the British nor the Indian political contenders had figured out the consequences of the 
different processes that had been unleashed.  
 
Thus, the administrative partition of 1905 was a misconceived strategy for 
empowering the Muslims from a divide-and-rule perspective. The aristocratic Muslim 
leadership of that time was not strong enough to exploit it and the intermediate class 
Muslim leadership that would emerge with electoral politics would not need it. The 
opposition to the 1905 partition led by the Calcutta-based Hindu elites reflected the 
fact that in the absence of electoral politics, they still dominated both in the economic 
and political spheres. Partition simply threatened to weaken them on both fronts. They 
were able to mobilize a broad front of opposition and the administrative partition was 
reversed in 1911. Ironically for the British, the mass mobilization against this partition 
strengthened even further the emerging Bengali identity promoted by the Hindu elites 
46 
 
that Curzon and Risley were so explicitly trying to contain. The only response of the 
Muslim aristocracy was to set up the Muslim League in 1906 in Dhaka, the short-
lived capital of the eastern province and later the capital of Bangladesh. The League’s 
roots in Bengal were very weak. Setting it up required the organizational capabilities 
of Muslim aristocrats from across India. The new organization appeared to have little 
support and few would have dared to suggest that it would play a significant role in 
Bengal let alone in Indian politics in the future. The British did not even consult it 
when they made their decision to revoke the administrative partition five years later.  
 
This is not to deny that the colonial power was responsible for encouraging political 
mobilization along religious lines. But this was just the precursor of contemporary 
strategies of identity-based mobilizations on the basis of caste and language. The 
initial intention of the British was to balance the ambitions of existing groups by 
encouraging the organization and mobilization of new ones. However, from the 
perspective of political organizers, identity politics was simply a process of 
consolidating the client groups on which their bargaining power was based. Political 
organizers, typically from the intermediate classes, sought to capture benefits (rents) 
for themselves, and also to distribute some of these rents down the pyramidal factions 
they had constructed. In itself this was just a particular way of organizing clientelist 
politics and satisfying those with organizational power with arrangements of rent-
sharing to sustain the social order. From this perspective, the organization of identity-
based groups by political organizers could just as well have been a politically 
stabilizing process. The reasons why these processes turned out to lead to violence 
and crisis in Bengal in the 1940s have to be sought in the specific conditions that led 
to a breakdown in clientelist politics.  
 
British attempts to mobilize Bengal’s Muslim aristocracy through the recognition of 
separate electorates and even the administrative partition of 1905 generally failed to 
create a Muslim counterweight to the Hindu elites. Identity politics required the 
emergence of a patron-client politics that could use identities to mobilize client groups 
for political bargaining. Even then, when a clientelist politics emerged in Bengal led 
by Muslim Bengali political organizers from the intermediate classes it was not 
communal from the outset. It only proceeded gradually in that direction when 
dominant economic elites refused to compromise in any significant way. The accident 
that the dominant economic elites happened to be mainly Hindu and the factions that 
were contesting them for a share of political power were largely Muslim led to that 
outcome. Thus, to explain the communal confrontation of the 1940s we have to go 
beyond the divide-and-rule policies to examine the nature of the patron-client politics 
that emerged during this period and the failure of the older elites to reach the 
compromises that could have averted the partition. In that sense, partition was to a 
large extent an Indian affair, even though the British were obviously implicated.  
 
The elements that we need to consider in order to explain why partition happened 
include the following. The first is obviously the divide-and-rule strategies of the 
British that contributed to create a politics of ‘communal’ (religious) identities. 
Second and more significant were the British attempts to create a political settlement 
based on the jotedar intermediaries that resulted in the empowerment of new classes 
of rural organizers. These happened to be Muslims but were not the specific outcome 
of divide-and-rule policies. Initially, the jotedar organizers of factions that came 
together in the Krishok-Proja Party or organized as independents had no religious 
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affiliation, and would have preferred to have formed coalitions with the Congress 
rather than the Muslim League (Jalal 1985: 151-63). It was only when Congress 
established that it would block their ambitions that a temporary and fateful unification 
of these peasant factions on a religious banner emerged. The failure of their early 
attempts at establishing a place within the political settlement that was to be 
established in independent India was therefore a critical determinant of their shift 
towards ‘communal’ politics. This has to be separately understood and cannot be 
entirely attributed to British divide-and-rule strategies.  
 
6. The First Partition: A Crisis of Exclusion in Clientelism 
The critical problem that emerged in the late 1940s in Bengal (and again in the 1960s 
in Pakistan) was the unwillingness of dominant economic groups to compromise 
rapidly enough with political organizers who had mobilized new sources of 
organizational power. This encouraged excluded factions to look for unifying 
characteristics that could enhance their organizational and bargaining power. In the 
1940s the obvious peg for constructing an umbrella coalition was religious identity, 
while in the 1950s and 1960s it was to become language. This does not deny the 
strongly felt passions aroused on both sides when ethnic or religious identities were 
used to mobilize excluded groups and to ensure their unity. Of course, in the crisis of 
the 1940s, the Hindu professional and landlord elites were not yet the ruling coalition 
because the British were still ruling India. But their conflict with the political 
coalitions led by the intermediate classes was about the likely composition of the 
ruling coalition once the British departed. The failure was not primarily a primordial 
conflict about the religious identity of the nation but a failure to construct a viable 
political settlement where enough of the excluded factions were included to make the 
ruling coalition politically viable.  
 
Here the all-India politics of the Congress Party played a significant role. Its 
orientation encouraged Bengal’s dominant classes to attempt to exclude the new 
political organizers for too long. The result was a growing consolidation of new 
factions around the banner of the Muslim League. Once the division was defined in 
religious terms, there could be no resolution short of a complete defeat for the 
dominant coalition. The latter were largely Hindu and once the excluded Muslim 
factions united, their electoral strength meant that the dominant coalition could expect 
a significant loss of economic privileges if the Bengal legislature had any powers. The 
political dynamics therefore veered towards confrontation. As the intermediate class 
led peasant coalitions reacted to Congress strategies by gradually coalescing over the 
1940s, compromise became progressively more difficult. Eventually partition became 
an attractive exit option for the dominant coalition (Chatterji 1995). Ironically, while 
in one respect the Muslim Bengali political entrepreneurs ‘won’ on both occasions 
when they succeeded in uniting their excluded factions to challenge the dominant 
coalition, in both cases the dominant coalition came out rather well as well. In both 
cases, they were able to exit without addressing the historical injustices that had led to 
the conflict. In 1947 East Bengal lost the industrial assets that its agrarian surplus had 
helped to build when it lost Calcutta, and in 1971 it gave up its claim to the industrial 
assets it had helped to build in West Pakistan when Bangladesh seceded. This is why 
it is misleading to see these partitions simply as class conflicts or even as conflicts 
where the partition outcome would have been preferred by the winning side in quite 
the way in which it actually happened.  
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Congress politics in Bengal and its relationship with the Hindu zamindar and 
professional elites was therefore an important factor in the crisis that led to partition. 
Through the 1930s the Bengal Congress had possessed a significant ‘left’ wing which 
understood the importance of making concessions to the rich peasant-led factions that 
were emerging. The progressive group, represented by the Bose brothers was not only 
powerful in Bengal, but one of its leaders, Subhas Chandra Bose, was also briefly 
president of the All-India Congress Committee. In 1939, the Bose brothers were 
expelled from the Congress as Gandhi and his followers in the central high command 
came into a confrontation with the left. Their expulsion not only deprived the Bengal 
Congress of its progressive and secular wing, it also established central Congress 
control over provincial Congresses which would have significant implications for 
Muslim majority provinces like Bengal (Chatterji 1995: 103-49).  
 
As the Bengal Congress swung to the right and became more closely controlled by the 
centre with its power base in Delhi, there was a parallel swing in its support for 
established Hindu landlord and professional interests within Bengal. The latter in turn 
used the Congress to protect themselves from rich peasant demands. There was no 
necessity in this turn of events and a different provincial Congress leadership of the 
type that the Bose brothers represented may have resulted in different outcomes. As it 
happened, the Congress Party increasingly appeared to the Muslim intermediate 
classes to be a protector of the majority Hindus of India. Independent India was going 
to be ruled by the Congress, and if it monopolized power at the centre, the interests it 
supported in a state would remain dominant despite the most powerful factions in the 
state being opposed to these interests. This fear was supported by the way in which 
Congress refused to form coalitions in Bengal with the secular Muslim-peasant led 
Krishok-Proja Party after the first elections in 1937, forcing it to form a coalition with 
the Muslim League. Congress also refused to cooperate with Muslims in many other 
provinces after the 1937 elections despite having previously agreed to do so with the 
Muslim League (M. Hasan 1993: 1-44).  
 
The effect was to unite the different peasant factions in Bengal to fight against what 
they increasingly saw as the common enemy, and in doing so they inevitably 
constructed a class alliance of rich and middle peasants in Bengal against the 
dominant professional and landlord classes. Some historians have indeed described 
the Muslim coalition against Congress as a class mobilization (Hashmi 1994). But in 
fact, as we have seen, the class conflict between the zamindars and their jotedars was 
minimal by the 1940s. The middle and rich peasants very likely controlled a bigger 
share of the agrarian surplus than the zamindars by then, and in any case, the 
aspirations of the political entrepreneurs and their clients in the ‘peasant’ parties was 
to get jobs in the towns, not to transform the agrarian countryside (Chatterji 1995: 55-
102). It is more accurate to see the unification of the multiple peasant-led factions in 
1946 under the Muslim League as a contingent unification of factions against a 
common enemy that threatened them with a strategy of apparently permanent 
exclusion. But once the unification happened, it was even less likely that the Hindu 
elites could concede power to the new Muslim political organizers because the 
unification ensured the permanent exclusion of the dominant economic interests.   
 
To understand the unwillingness of Bengal’s Hindu elites to reach compromises with 
the Muslim political organizers who were emerging in the 1930s, we have to look at 
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the dynamics of Congress politics in India at the time. As the leading party of Indian 
independence, Congress insisted it should incorporate all groups within it, and was 
unwilling to share power with any other group. This eventually came to mean, as the 
Bengal Congress discovered, a significant centralization of decision-making powers at 
the central levels of the party. Equivalently, it also meant provinces were to have less 
power and provincial interests were to be subordinated to the central command. In 
provinces like Bengal it meant the majority would become a minority if subordinated 
to Delhi. On the other hand, for the Hindu landlord and professional elites, the 
centralizing trends in the Congress were very welcome for exactly the opposite 
reasons. Muslims may be a majority in Bengal, but in India they were around a thirty 
per cent minority. In a first past the post electoral system, Muslims would be unlikely 
to get even this share of representation at the centre. It was therefore extremely 
unlikely that Muslims in Bengal would have allies at the centre when the Bengal 
Congress was backing the old elites. In a united India, the Muslims’ only hope of a 
significant exercise of power was in the provinces where they were in a majority. 
Fortunately for them they were in a majority in a number of provinces, including two 
important ones, Punjab and Bengal. At the all-India level, the Muslim League was 
therefore campaigning for a greater share of power to be devolved to the provinces 
because this would transfer real power to the two significant Muslim-majority regions 
of India. Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League calculated that this would be a 
sufficient guarantee for the security of Muslims like himself who lived in Hindu-
majority parts of India (A. M. Ahmad 1975; Jalal 1985; Hashmi 1994).  
 
The political brinkmanship between Congress and the Muslim League at the all-India 
level over the constitutional arrangements for post-independence India provide the 
last critical element for understanding the crisis. The likelihood that the Congress 
would prevail in its vision of a centralized India made Bengal’s old elites less likely to 
compromise with their intermediate classes whose power was based on provincial 
politics. The last straw in this drama came about in 1946 with the failure of the all-
India negotiations around the Cabinet Mission Plan proposals for devolving power to 
provincial units. The Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan as a 
framework for keeping India united. But Nehru decided to call Jinnah’s bluff and 
rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan. This was the unfolding of a series of decisions 
taken by the non-Muslim leaders of the Congress as early as the early 1940s, to allow 
Muslims the option of partition if the alternative was to concede to their demands for 
devolved power (Roy 1993: 124-5). Later on in life Nehru admitted to the British 
author Leonard Mosley that “we expected partition to be temporary, that Pakistan was 
bound to come back to us” (Mosley 1961: 248). The catastrophic decision to reject the 
Cabinet Mission Plan outright signalled to the Muslim-led provincial parties in 
Bengal and Punjab that they could expect to be dominated by the centre after 
independence in a Congress-led India. In that context it is not surprising that almost 
all Muslim Bengali political organizers coalesced around the Muslim League in the 
fateful 1946 elections.  
 
The result was an overwhelming Muslim vote in Bengal for the Muslim League, for 
the first and the last time. The League won 108 of the 117 Muslim seats. In no other 
Muslim majority province was its victory so complete (Hashmi 1994; M. G. Kabir 
1995: 30-121). At the same time, with his bluff called, Jinnah had no option but to 
proceed with his demand for Pakistan.  In the final fateful vote of the Bengal 
Provisional Legislative Assembly on 20th June 1947, Nehru and the Congress 
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persuaded Mountbatten not to allow a vote on the independence of Bengal outside the 
framework of Pakistan. The assembly could only vote to join India or Pakistan, and 
the Muslims and Hindus would vote separately to determine if the province should be 
partitioned or not. The rules agreed between Mountbatten and Nehru allowed the 
votes of either group in the Legislative Assembly to trigger the partition of the 
province. This was specifically designed to prevent the Muslim majority voting to 
keep the province united but outside India. The choice of options was designed to 
produce the outcome that eventually came about. The Assembly with its Muslim 
League majority voted to join Pakistan. The Hindu members voted overwhelmingly to 
partition the province and Muslim members voted overwhelmingly against. And so 
the partition of Bengal came about (Gordon 1978).  
 
The different responses of Hindu and Muslim elites to the 1905 and 1947 partitions 
reflects the dramatic changes in the strategic options of different groups that came 
about as a result of the extension of representative politics. Divide-and-rule policies 
did not prevent Hindu elites from successfully overturning the 1905 partition because 
in the absence of electoral politics, that partition threatened to weaken them. But by 
the late 1930s, Muslim middle-peasant organizers began to dominate the organization 
of votes in rural Bengal, and they would have done so with or without separate 
electorates. Given the legitimate mechanisms of exercising organizational power that 
the British had already established, the dominant classes had several unfavourable 
options. They could attempt to reach compromises early on and absorb critically 
powerful factions into the proposed ruling coalition for the province. Given the 
demographic advantage of the Muslim peasantry, the long-run implication would 
nevertheless be a significant dilution of the formal privileges they enjoyed, and the 
gradual intrusion of greater numbers of Muslims into formal rights through informal 
political processes. Alternatively, they could follow the high-risk strategy of relying 
on the Congress and its centralizing agenda to ensure that the Congress dominance at 
the centre would protect their interests at the state level. Effectively, the political 
settlement would be constructed at the Indian level and not the Bengal level, and 
Bengal Muslims would be excluded by deploying organizational power from across 
India. This strategy was not only unjust but also dangerous because the Muslim 
League had foreseen this possibility and long campaigned for a unity of all Muslims 
against Hindu domination. That dire prediction was suddenly coming true for 
Bengal’s Muslims and their defection en masse to the Muslim League was the result.  
 
The real irony is that the centralization that Congress envisaged was not viable and 
has over time been gradually reversed. The process of devolution of powers to the 
states still has a long way to go in India and in that sense the political economy of the 
patron-client mobilizations that underpinned the conflicts and partitions of the past 
remain relevant today. The history of conflict and partitions going back to the first 
partition shows that those crises were not solely or even primarily the result of British 
divide-and-rule strategies, nor were they the outcome of primordial aspirations of East 
Bengalis to construct a state that was associated with either a single religion or a 
single language. This is why after the departure of the British, the Hindu Bengali 
elites and the Pakistanis, the main challenge facing Bangladesh is still to construct a 
political system that can accommodate the intense competition between its patron-
client factions. This competition did not become less intense simply because the old 
economic elites had departed. Indeed, it became more intense as the competition now 
became one over the construction of new economic elites and an indigenous capitalist 
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class. Paradoxically, independent Bangladesh discovered that the management of 
factional competition is more difficult when the factions are fewer in number because 
the ruling group is repeatedly inclined to believe that it can exclude the opposition 
using administrative methods. We will return to this problem later.  
 
7. East versus West Pakistan  
The two wings of the Pakistan that were suddenly created in 1947 shared little in 
common and had not engaged in a common struggle to achieve joint nationhood. In 
particular, Pakistan’s borders did not include any significant industrial assets and it 
immediately faced significant economic crises and military vulnerabilities. Nehruʼs 
decision to call Jinnah’s bluff did not result in a chastened Muslim leadership coming 
back to the table to accept Congress terms either immediately or in a few years. It 
resulted in a catastrophic end-game that drew borders that are as permanent as any, 
and where the immediate human costs alone testify to the scale of the tragedy. Around 
12.5 million people were displaced and estimates of deaths range from hundreds of 
thousands to a million (Metcalf and Metcalf 2006: 372). From a Muslim perspective, 
the borders of the new Pakistan made no sense at all. Both major Muslim-majority 
provinces were carved up and East Bengal in particular lost its industrial base. A third 
of the Muslims of pre-partition India remained in post-partition India, and so its 
Muslims were now divided into three geographical units. Ayesha Jalal was right to 
ask: “how did a Pakistan come about which fitted the interests of most Muslims so 
poorly?” (Jalal 1985: 4). An answer in terms of Muslims attempting to create their 
own nation simply does not fit the facts. Rather, the first partition was clearly an 
outcome of a failure to construct a political settlement in India that could protect 
emerging Muslim aspirations and interests, particularly in Muslim-majority provinces 
like Bengal.  
 
The political and economic crises that immediately faced the new state of Pakistan 
were therefore not accidental. The economic underdevelopment of the region was bad 
enough but in addition trade links with industrial areas elsewhere in India were 
severed. The reasons behind the political crisis were even deeper. A constitutional 
crisis in the newly independent Pakistan was almost inevitable given the way in which 
the country was created. East Pakistan was poorer and less developed, had virtually 
no indigenous capitalists, and virtually no senior bureaucrats or army officers. West 
Pakistan too was underdeveloped compared to more advanced areas of India, but 
many of the immigrant Muslim businessmen and senior bureaucrats from other parts 
of India now settled in West Pakistan as they were culturally closer to that region. The 
army too was largely drawn from the Punjab region of West Pakistan.  
 
The irony was that the indigenous elites in neither wing of Pakistan had been strongly 
behind the idea of Pakistan. The two most important Muslim-majority areas of India 
were Punjab and Bengal, which both suffered partitions. The demographic dominance 
of Muslims in these provinces before partition had meant that Muslims already 
enjoyed substantial power in the representative politics introduced by the British in 
1936. They were generally not supporters of the Muslim League and had not been 
preparing for partition. When partition suddenly took place in 1947 as a result of a last 
minute failure in the negotiations between Jinnah and Nehru, the two main provinces 
were unprepared for statehood. Muslim suspicions about Congress’s centralizing 
plans led to an increased support for the Muslim League in Muslim-majority 
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provinces in the 1946 elections (very significantly in Bengal and less so in Punjab) 
but its organizational roots remained weak in both. Not surprisingly, the Muslim 
League faced serious problems in trying to cobble together a Pakistani state after 
1947. But West Pakistan’s largely Punjabi elites soon discovered that they were the 
dominant economic and military group in the new state and this helped many of them 
to rapidly buy into the idea of Pakistan. In contrast, East Pakistani elites remained 
embroiled in conflicts with the central leadership. As a result of these tensions, the 
new state of Pakistan faced serious conflicts between elites from its two wings from 
the outset and a decade of constitutional discussions failed to resolve the crisis.  
 
Federal arithmetic and relative populations were at the heart of the problem. West 
Pakistan had four provinces, the largest being Punjab, but the population of East 
Pakistan alone at that time was greater than West Pakistan as a whole. If provinces 
had equal weight in the legislature it would be unfair for the east, if they had 
representation according to population, the economically dominant west, with its 
centres of bureaucratic and military power would feel threatened. The closest Pakistan 
came to a constitutional settlement was under the Bogra Formula put forward by 
Mohammed Ali Bogra, the third Prime Minister of Pakistan and a Bengali from East 
Pakistan. Under this formula there would be a bicameral legislature with an upper 
house with 50 seats, 10 from each province. There would also be a lower house with 
300 seats in proportion to population, so that East Pakistan would have 165. The 
arithmetic then gave East and West Pakistan exactly the same number of seats in the 
two houses added together. The president and prime minister would also have to be 
from different wings. The plan was popular but was put to rest by the military and 
bureaucracy who conspired to dissolve Constituent Assembly in 1953 and this 
eventually led to the military takeover of 1958. 
 
Even though East Pakistan was relatively underdeveloped compared to the West, its 
intermediate class political organizers were more organized as it had a longer history 
of mobilization against colonial rule. Moreover, rich peasants in East Bengal had been 
in power in the province since the 1936 reforms through parties like the secular 
Krishok Proja Party. East Bengal’s political organizers not only had more people to 
mobilize, they were probably better at organizing than West Pakistani political 
organizers. These asymmetries in the economic, political and organizational 
capabilities of the two wings made the construction of a ruling coalition difficult and a 
legitimate political leadership was absent that could incorporate factions from both 
wings credibly. The imposition of martial law terminated these attempts, curtailed the 
organizational freedom to operate political organizations and established an 
authoritarian ruling coalition in the sense described in Figure 4. One effect of this 
intervention was that for a decade, the political settlement in Pakistan ensured a 
relatively favourable growth-stability trade-off for top-down state-led 
industrialization. This allowed the development of an indigenous capitalist class in a 
country that was virtually non-industrial in 1947. But the new capitalists and the 
bureaucratic beneficiaries of the state-led development strategy were almost entirely 
from the West. This, together with a number of other factors gradually undermined 
the authoritarian ruling coalition and the political settlement crumbled after 1969 
when military rule was overthrown by a popular uprising in both wings of Pakistan.  
 
Capitalist Development with an Authoritarian Ruling Coalition 
The areas of India out of which Pakistan was formed were composed primarily of the 
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raw material producing agrarian hinterland of India. East Bengal, which became East 
Pakistan, had previously supplied raw jute to the jute mills located around Calcutta. 
West Punjab, the most important component of West Pakistan, provided raw cotton to 
the Bombay textile industry. Some figures will indicate the extent of economic 
backwardness that the new economy faced. At the time of partition, the two wings of 
Pakistan constituted 23 per cent of the land mass of India, possessed 18 per cent of its 
population but inherited less than 10 per cent of its industry (Jalal 1990: 64) It also 
possessed relatively little in the form of natural resources or known mineral deposits 
(important deposits of oil and gas were discovered much later).  
 
In 1950, agriculture accounted for 60% of the GNP of Pakistan and manufacturing 
only 5.9%. Large scale manufacturing accounted for a mere 1.4% of GNP. In 
comparison, in India in 1950 the share of agriculture in NDP was 50.1% and the share 
of manufacturing was almost double that of Pakistan at 11.4%. Modern 
manufacturing in Pakistan was therefore roughly half as developed as India even 
adjusting for the smaller size of its economy. This difference had substantial 
implications. The low share of manufacturing and particularly of large-scale 
manufacturing meant there was no significant indigenous industrial capital that could 
become a developmental partner of the state. It also meant that the state felt even 
more vulnerable militarily than its relatively low population alone would suggest.  
 
The political crisis that faced Pakistan in the 1950s therefore had two aspects. The 
first was the imbalance between the economic power of the West and the political 
power that the East threatened to deploy. But a second problem was even more acute. 
The new state was economically very vulnerable. It had virtually no industrial 
economic base and India had closed access to its markets after the devaluation of the 
Indian Rupee in 1949 when Pakistan refused to follow suit. Pakistan’s agricultural 
exports had to find new markets, and the obvious challenge was to industrialize so 
that these inputs could be domestically processed. This explains why compared to 
India, the state in Pakistan took much more drastic steps to encourage primitive 
accumulation to create an entrepreneurial class. On the one hand it used the state 
machinery to create enterprises using bureaucrats as entrepreneurs and then sold these 
off at attractive prices. In addition, the state provided exceptional incentives to the 
private sector to invest and to absorb new technologies. In pursuing these strategies, 
the authoritarian coalition found that the growth-stability trade-off was initially 
reasonably favourable for rapid horizontal growth that set up new industries using 
basic technologies. However, authoritarianism in Pakistan was vulnerable and the 
ruling coalition found it hard to take a long-term view. Moreover, as political 
contestation increased, its implementation capabilities also declined. 
  
Economic historians who have examined the political impasse before the military 
coup of October 1958 have generally tended to see the problem in terms of a conflict 
between the West Pakistani ‘feudal oligarchy’, who dominated the Constituent 
Assembly, and the bureaucracy imported from British India who perceived the need 
to step up industrialization (Amjad 1983). This way of looking at the conflict 
perpetuates the mythology on which the raj based its social interventions. The large 
West Pakistani landlords were undoubtedly over-represented in the Constituent 
Assembly, just as the jotedar dominated the Bengal Legislative Assembly. But like 
the jotedar voice in East Pakistan, the ‘landed interests’ of the West were not 
primarily interested in rural issues. In East Pakistan, the Muslim League suffered a 
54 
 
crushing defeat at the hands of the new United Front in the provincial elections of 
1954, despite keeping its promise to the jotedar to abolish zamindari, which it did in 
1950. The East Pakistani political elite had simply discovered that the Muslim League 
was not receptive to its demands for more autonomy for (and hence local access to 
state power in) East Pakistan. This political assertion by the class which had won East 
Bengal for Pakistan was however quickly suppressed by the central bureaucracy, 
which dismissed the legislative assembly and imposed Governor’s Rule. 
 
The divisions and conflicts in the central Constituent Assembly were quite similar in 
that here too the issue at stake was the sharing of the social surplus which the central 
state machinery had the power to allocate. The debates which paralysed the 
constituent assembly were not about the price of grain or the rights of tenants, but 
about the division of power between the centre and the provincial assemblies and the 
division of power between East and West Pakistan (Sayeed 1960, 1967). The ‘feudal 
oligarchy’ was not so much interested in the protection of feudal rights as in the 
negotiation of a constitutional arrangement which would assure the West Pakistani 
political representatives a secure control of the all-Pakistan political process, not only 
to control the troublesome Bengalis in the east, but also to check the pretensions of 
new groups like emerging industrialists who threatened their access to resources. 
 
Behind the bureaucratic and ultimately military suppression of the political process in 
Pakistan from 1954 to 1958 were several powerful bureaucrats, men like Ghulam 
Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza, in whose perception, the state faced a stark choice. It 
could concede to the demands of political representatives. Conceivably, this could 
have resolved the constitutional crisis, by creating a ruling coalition that could viably 
rule. But it would have been a series of weak democratic coalitions with an 
unfavourable growth-stability trade-off for the economic transformation these 
bureaucrats wanted to achieve. It is therefore possible that the men behind the coup 
were at least partly motivated by an agenda of economic nationalism. The economic 
decisions of the military government which eventually took power in 1958 supports 
this interpretation of the motivations of some critical decision-makers. From 1958 to 
1962, the military government of Field Marshal Ayub Khan ruled entirely without the 
mediation of politicians, and even after the 1962 constitution, most of the important 
ministries, such as planning, finance, home affairs and defence were normally given 
to professional civil servants (Jahan 1972). While the army went back to the barracks 
shortly after the 1958 coup, it was clearly the political intervention of the army, and 
the ultimate sanction of the gun, which sustained the authoritarian ruling coalition and 
temporarily created a political settlement that was conducive for the rapid creation of 
a capitalist sector. Unfortunately for Pakistan, almost all of these capitalists were 
individuals from the West, and this fatally undermined the political viability of the 
new settlement.  
 
Early growth in Pakistan was initially financed by the trading profits of Gujarati 
Muslim merchants who settled in West Pakistan. The Korean War boom left large 
surpluses with these traders, and when a foreign exchange crisis hit Pakistan in the 
early fifties, the state imposed import controls which made domestic production 
extremely profitable. The early import substitution was primarily in textiles, generally 
of low capital intensity. The evidence shows rapid industrialization based on import 
substitution but easy growth opportunities were soon exhausted (Papanek 1967: 1-74). 
Though the state did not yet have the resources to actively channel subsidies to 
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industrialists, the imposition of import controls amounted to a hidden subsidy. 
Papanek reported that profits of fifty to a hundred percent a year were not uncommon 
in the early to mid-fifties (Papanek 1967: 33). Personal contacts also existed between 
the ruling Muslim League leadership and a small number of traders, dating back to the 
pre-partition days. ‘Nation Building Companies’ like the Mohammadi Steamship 
Company and Habib Bank Limited had been established by these traders in India in 
alliance with the Muslim League, and they provided obvious candidates, when 
individuals or companies had to be offered industrial projects (J. Rashid and Gardezi 
1983: 1-8). 
 
Apart from incentives in the form of higher prices in the domestic market, the 
government also directly absorbed the risks of setting up new projects by doing 
industrial start-ups in the public sector. A month after independence in 1947 from 
Britain, an industries conference was convened where various forms of assistance 
were offered to businessmen but the response was very poor. Partly as a result of this 
disappointment, in 1952 the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was set up, 
with the objective of setting up and divesting working enterprises to risk-averse 
owners in the private sector. Four members on its board came from the leading 
monopoly houses, and the first head of the Corporation, an enterprising public servant 
named Ghulam Faruq, went on to become one of the leading industrialists of the 
country. The relationship between business and government was therefore close to say 
the least, and the levels of accumulation and growth in the industrial sector were 
commensurate. Growth in the late fifties and early sixties was further aided by 
buoyant world markets and a steady flow of aid. 
 
Also established in the early years were the key financial institutions that would 
finance investments by unknown new entrepreneurs in new industries that did not yet 
have a track record in the country. These were the Pakistan Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation (PICIC) and the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation 
(later Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, IDBP) which were to assume great 
importance in later years (Alavi 1983: 46-50; Amjad 1983: 235-50). Finally, a system 
of multiple exchange rates emerged, so that importers of capital goods could import at 
an overvalued exchange rate but could export at an effectively lower exchange rate 
due to various export bonuses. But since export bonuses were not available for 
agriculture, this also represented a subsidy from agricultural exporters to industrial 
investors. As East Pakistan was the agricultural exporter, the system of industrial 
incentives constituted a transfer of surplus from East Pakistani peasant producers to 
West Pakistani industrial investors. A differentiated structure of quantitative import 
restrictions and tariffs was also imposed.  
 
Table 1 shows growth rates in different sectors between 1950 and 1980 in 
Bangladesh. Even allowing for the statistical magnification caused by the initially tiny 
base, industrial growth in the first spurt was rapid from the mid-fifties to the mid-
sixties, even in the relatively less dynamic East Pakistan. But the owners of the new 
manufacturing and industrial units were in the main not Bengalis. Pakistan’s growth 
success led observers such as Gustav Papanek, a Harvard Advisory Group economist 
working on Pakistan, to publicize Pakistan as a new model of growth (Papanek 1967: 
2). With the benefit of hindsight, the weakness of Papanek’s analysis was that this 
acceleration of growth depended on the state’s ability to direct vast quantities of 
resources into the hands of a tiny capitalist class during the late fifties and early 
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sixties. The early results of growth in Papanek’s statistics concealed the fact that these 
accumulation strategies were based on a very vulnerable political settlement and did 
not reveal the limited capacity of the state to govern these subsidies to ensure that 
productivity growth was rapid enough to make the investments viable. 
 
Table 1 Growth in East Pakistan / Bangladesh 1950-80 
 Manufacturing  Industry  Agriculture  
1950-55 9.5 11.5 2.4 
1955-60   8.5 8.6 0.3 
1960-65 10.6 17.4 3.2 
1965-70 5.3 7.7 2.8 
1970-75 -9.8 not available  not available  
1975-80 5.1 5.9 3.3 
Sources: Alamgir & Berlage (1974 Apdx C Table 4, Apdx 14-A), World Bank (1984, 1986) 
 
First, as in India, the state’s governance capabilities for limiting moral hazard 
problems were not sufficient given the scale of the strategy. The result was that even 
by the late sixties, new enterprises set up a decade ago had not graduated to the point 
where they could become globally competitive without protections and subsidies 
continuing. The popular perception therefore was that this was a strategy for enriching 
privileged groups. The high industrial growth rates achieved through the fifties (see 
Table 1) reflect the efficacy of these early policies. The very high growth rates of the 
early fifties are statistically exaggerated because of the almost non-existent industry in 
1947 in the areas that constituted Pakistan (Lewis 1970: 15-16). Nevertheless, growth 
was high even after allowing for this and reflected the success of these policies in 
maintaining profitability in the emerging industrial sector at very high levels. Papanek 
(1967: 39) reports that profit rates were as high as 50-100 per cent in industry in the 
early fifties, declining to 20-50 per cent by the late fifties. These incentives had the 
desired effect and merchants fell over each other to invest in industry (Papanek 1967, 
Lewis 1969, 1970, Lewis & Soligo 1965 and Amjad 1982). There was a rapid growth 
particularly in consumer goods industries such as oil processing, rice milling and food 
manufacturing which were generally not capital-intensive and which mostly involved 
low risks. On the other hand, there was also some development of more capital-
intensive intermediate industries such as textiles through the fifties.  
 
However, this success should not be overstated. By 1960, the share of large scale 
manufacturing industry had only increased to five per cent of GNP while agriculture 
still accounted for 53.3 per cent (V. Ahmed and Amjad 1984: 4). Moreover, by the 
mid-1960s, easy import substituting possibilities had been exhausted and the 
industrial growth rate began to decline sharply (see Table 1). The industrial sector 
needed a more targeted policy regime to sustain further growth, to increase 
investments in better and more sophisticated technologies and to persuade the early 
industrialists to upgrade their technologies and improve productivity. The problem 
was not that the economy necessarily needed to move into more capital intensive 
industries or into the production of capital goods. It was rather that further 
industrialization involved greater risks and required more targeted allocations of 
capital for longer periods as new expertise had to be acquired and new markets 
captured. This held true not only for capital goods industries but also for more 
sophisticated consumer goods industries. And yet, at the very moment when simple 
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consumer goods had been mastered and the industrial sector was ready to move into 
more risky investments, the country faced a growing political crisis.  
 
Table 2 Industrial Investment in West and East Pakistan 1961-71 
(Million Rupees in Constant 1960 Prices)
 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
West Pak 852.94 846.15 757.05 1062.50 1221.43 1087.96 987.16 1013.79 916.87 1061.36  
%Public    
Sector  
5.1 3.9 15.6 3.2 9.8 10.8 10.9 11.6 8.3  3.2 
East Pak 205.99 459.42 332.21 382.30 450.21 390.00 477.02 799.81 796.84 700.88  
%Public 
  Sector 
21.7  13.8 29.8 24.3 24.3 25.0 24.8 53.0 50.7 45.7 
 
All Pak 1058.9 1305.6 1089.3 1444.8 1671.6 1478.0 1464.2 1813.6 1713.7 1762.2 
 
            Source: Amjad (1982: Table A.9) 
 
The second weakness, closely connected to the last, was the failure to develop a 
broad-based Bengali capitalist class (in East Pakistan/Bangladesh). The weakness of 
the Bengali bourgeoisie is reflected in Table 2 since much of the growth in industrial 
investments in East Pakistan initially took place through a growth in the public sector, 
peaking at 53 percent of total investments in 1968. Nevertheless, a very limited 
Bengali industrial bourgeoisie did emerge in this period. At the time of independence 
in 1971, one study found sixteen major Bengali business houses, each with assets of 
more than Rs. 25 million, and with combined assets of nearly Rs. 700 million (S. 
Baranov, cited in Sobhan (1980: 15)). The bulk of the nascent industrial bourgeoisie 
was, however, small to medium entrepreneurs. Excluding the large jute and textile 
industries, state financial institutions funding the establishment of enterprises had, by 
1971 given over 3000 loans to Bengalis, most below Rs. 400,000, helping to set up 
around 1300 units (Sobhan and Ahmad 1980: 64-5). A much bigger group of Bengali 
lower middle classes felt totally excluded by these policies and their response to 
independence was to engage in a massive acceleration of primitive accumulation 
through which a new Bengali capitalist class was to emerge after a decade.  
 
While it worked, the authoritarian ruling coalition, combined with the significant 
political access and power of emerging capitalist groups created a feasible political 
settlement for the rapid imposition of ‘extensive’ industrial policy (M. H. Khan and 
Blankenburg 2009). Extensive growth was initially rapid, but as in contemporary 
India with its dominant party coalition, the fact that powerful business groups were 
strongly networked with particular politicians, and in the case of Pakistan initially 
with particular bureaucrats or generals, meant that disciplining and resource re-
allocation faced very adverse growth-stability trade-offs. The ruling coalition rapidly 
lost the ability to discipline its own lower levels, particularly as it began to face 
stronger opposition from excluded factions. Productivity growth and the capacity to 
approach the global competitiveness frontier were therefore limited (M. H. Khan 
2009b). The Pakistan experience is particularly interesting because despite an export-
promotion strategy, individual capitalists could still block resource re-allocations 
away from themselves just as much as in India. This suggests that Chibber’s (2003) 
thesis that disciplining of industrial subsidy-recipients is easier in an export promoting 
regime is too simplistic. The Pakistan experience also challenges the thesis that 
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authoritarian regimes are able to exercise their ‘autonomy’ to implement industrial 
policy effectively. The authoritarian ruling coalition here only temporarily enjoyed a 
favourable growth-stability trade-off, but this gradually became less favourable even 
during the 1960s. The weakness of implementation capabilities and the weak political 
capability to overcome lower-level rent-sharing arrangements involving bureaucrats, 
bankers and industrial subsidy-recipients meant that disciplining the latter never 
acquired East Asian characteristics in Pakistan despite its formal authoritarianism (M. 
H. Khan 1999). 
 
Regional Inequality and Asset Concentration  
The Pakistani state initially had limited resources to allocate as credit through the 
DFIs. Domestic resource mobilization through taxation was limited. Foreign capital 
inflows in the form of aid and soft credit were also relatively scarce in the fifties. This 
is shown in Table 3. In the early fifties there were significant inflows into West 
Pakistan but a large part of these were transfers from East Pakistan as foreign 
exchange earned by the agricultural exports of the East were invested in the West. 
The transfer reduced somewhat over the fifties and terminated by 1960. East Pakistan 
continued to get less than its share of foreign inflows until the late sixties. This 
transfer was to prove to be a powerful symbol which excluded elites in the East were 
eventually to use to mobilize East Pakistani opposition to Pakistan’s industrial policy. 
But as Table 3 shows, Bangladesh achieved its independence just as political pressure 
was shifting the balance of investment in its favour and as a result, it lost any chance 
of recovering the investment it had made in the joint industrialization of Pakistan in 
the decades before that. 
 
Table 3 Foreign Inflows as Percentage of Provincial GDP 
 1950-55 1955-60 1960 1965 1970 
West Pakistan 5.6 6.5 5.4 8.9 3.1 
East Pakistan  -1.7 -0.7 0.3 4.6 3.2 
Note: Foreign inflows for each province include inflows from the other province. The 
outflows from East Pakistan in the 1950s were going entirely to West Pakistan. 
Source: Haq (1966) Table 16, Amjad (1982) Table 1.3. 
 
What is important is that true foreign inflows (netting out transfers between the 
provinces) were relatively small in the fifties and did not become substantial until the 
mid-sixties. Since an important part of aid and soft loans were allocated domestically 
by the DFIs, it was only in the early to mid-sixties that the state was able to play a 
more important role in directly allocating investible resources through the two 
industrial banks. The early import substituting industrialization in the fifties thus 
relied on other sources of funds for investment. Much of this came from the retained 
profits of the merchant capitalists, which in turn was based on squeezing consumers 
and the agricultural sector (Papanek 1967: 184-225). The squeeze on the agricultural 
sector was particularly important and is partly reflected in the transfer of resources 
from East to West Pakistan. Import substituting industrialization generally squeezes 
agriculture. With an overvalued exchange rate, agricultural producers get lower rupee 
prices for their crops. Their sacrifice is converted into lower rupee prices for 
importers of machinery, thereby transferring resources from agriculture to industry. 
 
The transfer from agriculture through this mechanism was particularly severe between 
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1949 and 1955. In 1955, the rupee was devalued by 30 per cent but even after that it 
remained substantially overvalued. On top of the exchange rate squeeze, the Pakistan 
government imposed additional export taxes on raw cotton and jute, the two major 
cash crops. Through these two mechanisms, agriculture provided the bulk of the 
surplus for industrialization in the early phase of Pakistan’s industrialization. This no 
doubt contributed to the growing alienation between the political representatives of 
rural vote banks and the state bureaucracy, which was at that time primarily interested 
in strengthening the industrial base of the country. 
 
Not only did West Pakistan gain disproportionately from industrial policy, a handful 
of business houses gained the most. The Pakistani economist Mahbub-ul-Haq coined 
the phrase functional inequality to describe the social utility of inequality, apparently 
providing a justification for the concentration of wealth. But Haq only argued that 
capitalist growth required the re-investment of profits and large profits implied an 
initial period of income inequality. Redistribution and welfare could be (indeed had to 
be) postponed until a later date. Haq’s argument did not directly justify a huge 
concentration of industrial assets in a few hands. A possible justification could have 
been the presence of significant scale economies, which together with limited funds 
could explain why a few large plants were chosen rather than a greater number of 
smaller plants. In any case, by the late sixties, the same Haq was so appalled by the 
extent of asset concentration in Pakistan that he coined another phrase that was to 
have wide-ranging repercussions in Pakistani politics. Using Planning Commission 
data, he described the beneficiaries of industrial policy resource allocation as the 22 
Families who in 1968 apparently controlled 66% of Pakistan’s industrial wealth. A 
more careful study by Amjad later suggested that the top 18 groups controlled 35% of 
industrial assets while the top 44 controlled around 50% (Amjad 1982: 47).  
 
Pakistan was indeed adopting industries that typically had significant scale 
economies. These were industries like cotton textiles, jute textiles, cement and 
chemical industries. Within these industries, it was also adopting some of the most 
capital-intensive technologies. A.R. Khan (1970) found that the capital-labour ratios 
in most manufacturing sectors in 1962 were higher in Pakistan than in Japan! A 
similar study by Rizwanul Islam (1976) for 1969 reached the same conclusion. The 
small scale sector was virtually absent in the new technologies that were being 
adopted through the allocation of credit and licenses through industrial policy. 
Whatever the reasons, from 1958 to 1970, the larger of the two industrial banks (the 
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation) PICIC allocated 44.7 per cent 
of its loans to thirteen monopoly houses, and even the Industrial Development Bank 
of Pakistan IDBP that concentrated on smaller loans below 2.5 million rupees, 
allocated 31.9 per cent to thirty monopoly houses between 1961 and 1970 (Amjad 
1982: 51). By the late 1960s, the top 18 business groups controlled 35% of industrial 
assets while the top 44 controlled around 50% (Amjad 1982: 47). Although these two 
institutions allocated about a fifth of total investible resources, leading businessmen 
from the monopoly houses were represented on the boards of all the state financial 
institutions and the Boards of Directors of other monopoly houses (Amjad 1982: 30-
60, 1983: Table 9.7). The private banks did not contribute to a widening industrial 
ownership structure either. In fact, of the 17 privately owned banks, seven were 
directly under the control of the very same large business houses. 
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The Unravelling of the Authoritarian Ruling Coalition  
The disappearance of the Muslim League from East Bengal politics was rapid and 
dramatic and happened long before the imposition of military rule. The concentration 
of political power in the West was directly behind the abandonment of the Muslim 
League by the East Pakistani political organizers. In 1949, barely two years after 
sweeping up all the factional organizers in the 1946 elections and independence, 
Maulana Bhashani split the Muslim League by forming the Awami (People's) Muslim 
League. Ironically, although one of the stated aims was to get Bengali recognized as a 
state language, the word Awami in its title was Urdu and not Bengali. But this is not 
really surprising because the issue was not language as language, but rather the 
decision by the Muslim League leadership to reject Bengali as a state language. The 
signal was really about where political power was to reside and that signal was not 
missed by Bengali political entrepreneurs. Moreover, in its early years at least, the 
Awami Muslim League would try to reach out to other provincial interests within 
Pakistan who also wanted greater autonomy.  
 
By the mid-1950s some of the same East Bengali politicians (like Suhrawardy) who 
had played a key role in the creation of Pakistan turned on their recent allies and 
began to assert a Bengali nationalist identity for East Pakistan. The word Muslim was 
dropped from the name of the party, which now became the Awami League. 
Politicians who had very recently organized around the banner of Islam now declared 
that they were really secular. Under the leadership of Suhrawardy (Sheikh Mujib was 
still a minor player at that time) the Awami League and its allies wiped the old 
Muslim League off the political map of East Pakistan in the 1954 elections. They 
were never to return. What is interesting is that the Awami League, which played a 
central role in the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, was a 
direct offshoot of the Muslim League that created Pakistan in 1947 both as an 
organization and in terms of its personnel (Jahan 1972; M. G. Kabir 1995: 122-82). 
Many of the very same political organizers who had swung to the Muslim League in 
1946 were by the mid-1950s organizers for the Awami League. 
 
The military authoritarian rulers bypassed and banned the activities of political 
organizers in both East and West in 1958. But of course they could not rule without 
any social intermediation by political organizers. After the military formally 
prohibited political organizations and parties, mechanisms were required to manage 
political stability and distribute resources for this purpose to the appropriate political 
organizers. The major institutional mechanism for purchasing and organizing stability 
during this period was the so-called Basic Democracy system that Ayub innovated in 
1959 shortly after taking power. This attempted to by-pass the established political 
organizers based in the towns by creating a new constituency of cheaper organizers in 
the villages. A system of 80,000 ‘basic democrats’ were elected on a non-party basis 
across the country. They served as the electoral college for electing members of 
parliament as well as directly electing the President. Authoritarian regimes have often 
used this tactic of going over the heads of their immediate opponents and appealing to 
the interests of those below them. The latter initially demand a lower price and the 
authoritarian leader often believes they will be easier to control. The provision of 
relatively limited rents to this large army of rural representatives through rural 
infrastructure construction programmes and Food for Work programmes for a time 
created a countervailing source of support for the regime that made it difficult for the 
established political organizers to organize dissent (Sobhan 1968). 
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The Basic Democrats failed in two ways. They provided inadequate feedback about 
the strength of the organized resistance building up below. The military government 
went too far and too fast in pushing accumulation by a small number of capitalists and 
that too in a regionally unbalanced way. Even if potential capitalists were less in 
evidence in the East, a political approach that was mindful of constructing a viable 
political settlement would (with hindsight) have proceeded at a slower pace. It may 
also have provided more formal and informal assistance to upwardly mobile political 
organizers in the East to create a productive entrepreneurial class out of some of them. 
In the event, the exclusion of the East created pent-up dissatisfaction that political 
organizers could mobilize with disastrous consequences for the country. Sudden and 
significant changes in the distribution of benefits in a society may result in very 
limited opposition at first, particularly if most political activities are banned, only to 
suddenly and explosively erupt. As a political safety valve, the Basic Democrats did 
not pass on to the higher echelons of the ruling coalition news of the opposition that 
was building up.  
 
To some extent this was related to a second problem for the authoritarian ruling 
coalition, and that was that as the rural basic democrats became more confident and 
ambitious, they saw obvious opportunities in throwing their lot in with the growing 
dissent in the towns. This is an example of lower-level factions within a ruling 
authoritarian coalition increasing their demands and effectively feeding off and 
adding to the growing political challenge set by excluded factions. As the organizers 
of excluded factions became stronger, so did the lower-level factions within the ruling 
coalition and processes of cumulative decline for the political settlement were set off. 
As the time horizons and implementation capabilities of the ruling coalition declined, 
not only did the ‘hot house’ economic development come under threat, the social 
order was fundamentally challenged as there were no easy ways of incorporating 
excluded elites into an authoritarian system quickly enough. The growth in the 
organizational capabilities of excluded factions accelerated in the second half of the 
1960s in both wings of Pakistan. In the West, Bhutto began to organize excluded 
factions around the banner of Islamic Socialism with a demand for distributive justice. 
In the East, Mujib led the Awami League on a programme demanding regional 
autonomy under his Six Point Programme. This programme was a return to the 
demand for federal rights that had been at the heart of the Cabinet Mission Plan. It 
demanded that the constituent units of Pakistan should have the power to set their own 
fiscal and trade policies, sharing a common currency and foreign policy. Given the 
geography of the country, a loose federation that was close to a confederation was 
perhaps the only viable strategy for keeping the country together.  
 
Under pressure in both wings of Pakistan, the military government allowed elections 
in 1970. The allocation of seats to the two wings roughly reflected their populations, 
so that East Pakistan had 162 seats in the 300 seat Assembly. The military rulers 
obviously did not foresee the possibility that a single party in East Pakistan could 
unite all the factions and win all these seats under its own banner. But the huge 
disparities in economic development and resource flows could not but focus factional 
organizers in East Pakistan to join a united front to challenge the ruling coalition. The 
same unification of factions that had happened in 1946 happened again in 1970. The 
Awami League won 160 of the 162 seats in East Pakistan and prepared to form the 
government of Pakistan. This led to an even more serious constitutional crisis as West 
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Pakistan based elites, including Bhutto, were unwilling to let an East Pakistan party 
form the government. The last desperate act of the authoritarian regime was a bloody 
crackdown on political organizers and their intellectual supporters in East Pakistan in 
March 1971. As the conflict became increasingly bloody, the political settlement 
collapsed. The civil disobedience intensified and transformed into a war for liberation 
and independence. Pakistan’s historic enemy India intervened to assist the Bengali 
struggle for independence. Although its support for Bangladeshi independence was 
obviously driven by its own strategic calculations, its military involvement in the war 
of December 1971 cut short what would otherwise have been a much longer battle. 
The independent country of Bangladesh was born in December 1971. 
 
Any discussion of 1971 in Bangladesh raises intense feelings because very many 
people died in the conflicts and the war. The official death toll of three million is 
almost certainly an exaggeration, even according to the first Foreign Secretary of 
Bangladesh, Sayyid Anwarul Karim. He argues that a more reasonable figure would 
be in the hundreds of thousands (Karim 2005: 340). Nevertheless, even the lower 
figures are horrendous in their magnitude. To make sense of such a catastrophe it is 
natural that nationalist historians should want to establish that the independence of 
East Pakistan in the form of Bangladesh was an unwavering and long-cherished 
demand of the people and their leadership. There is also no doubt that after the violent 
military crackdown of March 1971, Pakistan had crossed the Rubicon and there was 
no going back to the status quo ante. However, it is important to look at the national 
movement as a coalition of clientelist factions for a number of reasons. The strategies 
of this coalition and those of the dominant coalition attempting to block it resulted in 
an impasse, which once reached, could only result in a partition. But this partition was 
not driven by a nation-building project of a nationalist bourgeoisie or even a widely 
shared prior national ideology.  
 
First, this helps to explain why the winning coalition collapsed into disunity 
immediately after independence and points to the deep historical roots of the ongoing 
problems of factional politics and institution-building in contemporary Bangladesh. 
Secondly, it explains why the strategies of negotiation and bargaining of different 
factions in the 1960s changed over time without having to describe any of the 
participants as anti-nationals or traitors, though of course this does not excuse those 
who committed crimes during this period. Mujib himself was willing to engage in 
discussions about alternative solutions short of complete separation right till his return 
to independent Bangladesh in January 1972 from captivity in Pakistan (Mascarenhas 
1986: 4-10; Wolpert 1993: 173-6; Karim 2005: 249-55). And finally, it focuses our 
attention on the fact that once again, the exit of the previous dominant coalition was 
possibly a good deal for them. It is worth asking whether if Mujib had actually been 
allowed to become Prime Minister, he would have opted for secession rather than 
using his powers over the all-Pakistan budget to redress the two decades of unequal 
development that had been paid for by the peasants of Bangladesh.  
 
Summary 
The authoritarian ruling coalition that lasted from 1958 to 1971 defined a political 
settlement which was initially very favourable for growth-enhancing institutional 
changes. The growth-stability trade-off in this political settlement was initially 
favourable for extensive growth through industrial policy. As in India, emerging 
capitalists were well connected to factions, this time within the authoritarian state, 
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making disciplining difficult and limiting the prospects of industrial policy. As lower-
level factions became increasingly powerful over the 1960s, implementation 
capacities declined. A more successful imposition of discipline on the privileged new 
capitalists may have made both state and capitalists somewhat more legitimate in the 
eyes of the population and would have ensured that the new industries rapidly 
achieved global competitiveness. Instead, authoritarianism created many industries 
that remained dependent on subsidies. Regional imbalances and the concentration of 
asset-holding caused deep dissatisfaction elsewhere in society. By the late 1960s, a 
new generation of organizers had emerged in both East and West who could mobilize 
the growing dissatisfaction to a point where the ruling coalition was no longer viable.  
 
But as in 1946, the coalescing of all coalitions in the more populous East resulted in a 
potential ruling coalition that was unacceptable to the dominant economic interests in 
the country. Even the otherwise populist Bhutto refused to accept an East-led 
government for Pakistan, and this converted a constitutional crisis into a tragic 
conflict. Federalization may have softened the sharp disjuncture between economic 
and political power, but as in 1946, dominant economic interests rejected federal 
arrangements. From their perspective, this made short term sense, because federal 
arrangements would still have required informal and formal redistributive 
arrangements through the political process that the dominant coalition was unwilling 
to concede. As in 1946, East Bengal was given a take it or leave it offer. Staying 
required giving up their legitimate right to constitute the ruling coalition, leaving 
meant abandoning all claims on assets that had been built up in the past. Once the 
choice had been defined in this polarized way, partition was the only option.  
 
8. Phases in the Evolution of the Political Settlement in Independent Bangladesh 
The next few sections examine the evolution of the political settlement in independent 
Bangladesh. The broad characteristics of the different phases are summarized in 
Figure 6. Immediately after independence the ruling coalition is organized as a weak 
dominant party and this political settlement lasts from 1971 to 1975. This period was 
a turbulent and violent one as elites with significant political and organizational power 
but with few economic assets came to power. The dominant coalition was inclusive 
for a while but rapidly started falling apart. It was characterized by very poor 
implementation and enforcement capabilities and an increasingly short time horizon. 
The gap between formal rights and informal power was almost unbridgeable. The 
result was intense primitive accumulation: the capture of economic assets using 
political power. The dominant party that had won the election faced the prospect of 
political and economic collapse. The growth-stability trade-off was not only adverse; 
it was worsening to a position where the achievement of the minimum economic and 
political viability conditions was threatened. Famine struck. The response of the 
ruling coalition was to amend the constitution to create a one-party state. In terms of 
Figure 4, the use of administrative measures to define insiders and outsiders gave the 
ruling coalition authoritarian characteristics. The actual fragmentation of power in 
Bangladesh at that time and the growing strengths of excluded and lower-level 
factions were such that an authoritarian state of this type could not expect to last very 
long. In fact the one-party state could not even be properly implemented because 
President Mujib-ur-Rahman was assassinated in 1975. The only redeeming feature of 
this period was apparent much later. Through the intense primitive accumulation that 
was organized during this period, the future capitalist class of Bangladesh began to 
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emerge. They were at the forefront of demanding more business-friendly policies and 
by the 1980s some of these emerging capitalists began to drive growth in sectors like 
garments and pharmaceuticals.  
 
 
Figure 6 Evolution of the Political Settlement in Contemporary Bangladesh  
 
The third phase from 1975 to 1990 was a transitional phase towards full competitive 
clientelism. This was a form of authoritarianism but already with some characteristics 
of competitive clientelism. In terms of Figure 4, the characteristics of the ruling 
coalition could be located somewhere between the upper right-hand and lower right-
hand boxes. Military-backed political parties engaged in electoral competition with 
other parties with no formal restrictions on the latter. In fact, of course, everyone 
knew that winning these elections was impossible for the opposition because of 
informal administrative measures. But nevertheless, politics was competitive because 
factions could compete to get included in the ruling party or to be offered incentives 
outside. Engaging in political competition was a way of increasing the price which 
powerful factions could demand for joining or cooperating with the ruling coalition.  
 
This was the period when Bangladesh finally began to recover from years of conflict. 
The military rulers and military-backed parties began a slow process of privatization 
and opening up while encouraging industrialization. The garment sector takeoff began 
in the late 1970s, with institutional innovations and support under President Zia-ur-
Rahman. The growth-stability trade-off began to improve but growth was still 
sluggish. The entrepreneurial class was weak in terms of technological capabilities but 
had access to political power, and this assisted a slow recovery through gradual pro-
business interventions. But the political arrangements were unsustainable because 
excluded factions were growing stronger and would not accept the rules of the game 
set by clientelist authoritarianism. After a series of intense confrontations, the second 
military ruler, President Ershad, was forced to step down in 1990 and the period of 
open competitive clientelism began. 
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The fourth and final period of competitive clientelism began in 1990 and there was 
simultaneously a steady increase in the economic growth rate. This was probably 
because the garment industry, after steadily acquiring capabilities, took off in the mid 
to late 1980s and became a major foreign currency earner. The growth of this sector 
has been an important contributor to overall growth. Political competition was 
organized around two major parties distinguished by very deeply felt differences in 
the way they defined the ‘nation’. These differences had trivial implications for 
practical policy issues but allowed the definition of two rival coalitions, each big 
enough to be a ruling coalition. The major political problem was to ensure elections 
were not manipulated by incumbents to the extent that the excluded faction refused to 
participate in elections. Business groups became increasingly strong and had 
influence in and access to both major parties.  
 
The growth-stability trade-off during the period of competitive clientelism depends on 
the institutions being examined. For sectors where entrepreneurs had sufficient 
capabilities to be internationally competitive, the growth-stability trade-off was 
reasonably favourable. Institutions that appeared to be dysfunctional could often be 
made to work through informal means and payments to the power brokers within the 
clientelist parties. On the other hand, acquiring technological capabilities in new 
sectors faced significant market failures. Since responding to these market failures 
typically involves some government support and therefore policy-induced rents, 
success required the management of productive rents using formal or informal 
mechanisms. Here, the nature of the ruling coalition, with its short time horizon and 
its weak implementation capabilities constrained the growth-stability trade-off.  
 
A serious problem facing contemporary Bangladesh is how to develop the critical 
institutions it requires to sustain growth in the context of its competitive clientelism. 
In particular, its existing political institutions have proved inadequate for constraining 
the competing parties during elections. An outcome of an election is acceptable if the 
winner is actually the coalition that can field greater organizational power. But since 
the incumbent can leverage administrative and policing instruments to tilt the 
outcome slightly, electoral results can often be justifiably rejected by the loser if the 
winner is the incumbent. The attempt to solve this problem through the constitutional 
mechanism of caretaker governments organizing elections worked for three 
successive elections but failed in 2007. The sustainability of the competitive 
clientelist political settlement requires a solution that credibly ensures the possibility 
of factions cycling through elections.  
 
9. The Rise and Fall of Dominant Party Authoritarianism 1972-1975 
The victory of the excluded Bengali political organizers in 1971 created a new crisis. 
The Awami League, which won virtually every seat in East Pakistan in the 1970 
elections, was clearly for the moment a dominant party. But the aspirations of the new 
coalition with political power were so extravagant that even the formal rights of 
existing Bengali capitalists could not be protected. Not only were abandoned 
Pakistani assets the target of acquisition by the new coalition, almost all significant 
assets of Bengali capitalists were also nationalized to construct ‘socialism’. Gross 
over-employment in the now dominant public sector, corruption, looting of products 
and spares, and the conversion of public property into private property were 
mechanisms used for rapid primitive accumulation. Entirely new classes of the newly 
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rich rapidly emerged. Paradoxically, under pressure from this emerging class ceilings 
on private investments were also rapidly being raised (M. H. Khan 2008b). But the 
cost was a steep decline in economic performance, rapidly falling output and 
eventually a famine. At the same time there were increasingly violent conflicts within 
and outside the dominant party as different groups contested for power and resources. 
 
Violence kept erupting because the numbers of factional claimants had vastly 
increased and now almost all powerful factional leaders were within the ruling 
coalition. Given the limited rents that were available for distribution or capture, the 
allocation could not be settled by any other obvious means. Central control of the 
party over lower-level organizers and the effective exclusion of the growing number 
of organizers outside the party could not be easily established. Individuals and groups 
who received less than they expected threatened to leave the party and engage in 
opposition or violence from outside. Unfortunately, accommodating all individuals 
and groups on their terms would add up to more redistribution than the economy 
could possibly sustain. The growing conflicts were expressed in a number of 
ideological debates: between those who had fought or claimed to have fought in the 
war of liberation and those who for various reasons had not or could not, and between 
slightly different versions of the now dominant ‘socialist’ ideological consensus. 
Behind these debates was of course also a concern about who would have the power 
to decide or limit the allocation of rents. 
 
An analysis of the logic of patron-client politics can help to explain this crisis. Twice 
in the last fifty years in East Bengal, massive political victories were followed by the 
virtually immediate disintegration of the winning party. The Muslim League, which 
won a landslide in Bengal in 1946 and an independent country, fell apart in East 
Pakistan in a matter of months. It lost the 1954 provincial elections to the secular 
United Front, never to recover (M. G. Kabir 1995: 122-39). Now, once again, the 
Awami League had won a landslide victory in East Pakistan in 1969 and another 
independent country but began to disintegrate within months of independence (M. G. 
Kabir 1995: 183-95). Some aspects of these political disintegrations can be explained 
in terms of the economic logic of factional competition. The paradox of success is that 
when an opposition faction is too successful in attracting primary factions to itself it 
faces a problem. It can win, but in victory it will not have sufficient resources to 
satisfy all the aspirants who have joined as faction leaders. In East Bengal in 1947, 
and then in East Pakistan in 1971, the problem was even more dramatic. The 
coincidence of communal or ethnic identities with factional ones meant that in 1947 
the defeated factions preferred to leave the country and in 1971 they were forced to 
leave. In 1947 the aspirations of political organizers were blocked by new 
constitutional problems and eventually the imposition of martial law. But in 1971, 
these aspirations broke out in an intense competition for resources that threatened to 
tear apart the ruling party.  
 
This situation was clearly unsustainable and the ruling party, the Awami League, 
attempted to re-assert central authority over the powerful factions in society by 
authoritarian means. It could not impose martial law, so instead it tried to use a 
constitutional amendment to introduce a one-party state, concentrating powers in the 
hands of a president. In January 1975 the fourth amendment to the constitution was 
pushed through despite misgivings amongst many party members. Mujib, the leader 
of the liberation movement, had to threaten to resign to make his party fall into line on 
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the vote (Karim 2005: 348). The constitutional amendment changed Bangladesh to a 
presidential system, with power concentrated in the hands of Mujib who became the 
president. The amendment also provided for the creation of a ‘national party’ with the 
sole power to engage in political activity, and all members of parliament and the 
president had to belong to this party. In February all other parties were suspended and 
the national party launched. This was the Bangladesh Krishok Sromik Awami League 
(Workers and Peasants Awami League) or BAKSAL (Mascarenhas 1986: 57). The 
plan had the strong support of the pro-Moscow faction of the Communists as it fitted 
in with the blueprint of similar one-party experiments in other parts of the developing 
world then supported by Moscow. Socialist ideology aside, this was clearly also an 
attempt to reassert central control over rent allocation within a defined dominant 
coalition, in other words, to create a one-party version of an authoritarian ruling 
coalition.  
 
However, ideologies do matter. There was genuine disquiet about the plan from those 
who believed it was the thin end of the wedge that would convert the country into a 
planned economy of the Stalinist type. No doubt, the pro-Moscow communist support 
for the plan was based on the same expectation. Nevertheless, the failure of this 
proposal to win the support of many of Mujib’s key lieutenants was significant. Many 
people inside and outside the party saw the move as a logical culmination of steps 
towards an authoritarian protection of the rents of the ruling coalition. The 1973 
elections, though it resulted in a huge victory for the Awami League had revealed the 
vulnerability of many of the top leaders of the party and their re-election was widely 
believed to have been achieved through administrative interventions in the electoral 
process (Karim 2005: 305-8). Many of Mujib’s henchmen and relatives were already 
deeply unpopular for their acts of appropriation and their blatant immunity from all 
legal restrictions.  
 
As the opposition National Awami Party put it: ‘Pakistan’s 22 families have become 
Bangladesh’s 2000’ (Karim 2005: 290). They could have added that the rents of the 
2000 were based entirely on expropriation and were not even remotely associated 
with technology acquisition or industrialization. The paramilitary Jatiyo Rakkhi 
Bahini (National Protection Force) or JRB was increasingly used to protect Awami 
Leaguers from attack and also to intimidate voters during elections (Karim 2005: 
273). It was in this context that the introduction of BAKSAL has to be assessed. 
While there was little public demonstration against the constitutional amendment, the 
climate of fear was not appropriate for the free expression of views. In secret, many 
different groups began to plot Mujib’s violent removal (Mascarenhas 1986: 64). 
Mujib himself was aware that the fourth amendment could not represent a permanent 
solution and was at best an emergency response to a situation going out of control: 
‘This one-party arrangement is purely temporary. Once I have saved the country from 
counter-revolution I will restore multi-party democracy’ (quoted in Karim 2005: 258). 
Mujib’s enemies were not only based in other parties and in the army, but within his 
own party. Many ‘rightist’ members of his cabinet and indeed some foreign embassies 
were aware that a strike was being planned against him (Lifschultz 1979; 
Mascarenhas 1986). And so it was that on the 15th of August 1975, less than four 
years after achieving independence, the founding father and president of the new 
country was assassinated.  
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Independently of the secret betrayals and conspiracies, it is also clear that the plan to 
create a one-party state was deeply unpopular with many of the very elites that the 
party hoped to bring together into an authoritarian one-party ruling coalition. The 
viability of an authoritarian ruling coalition is only assured if any significant 
organizers of violence outside the party can be effectively repressed and lower-level 
coalitions within the party are sufficiently satisfied to have no incentive to rebel or 
can be repressed if they do. The more credible the threat of repression becomes the 
less likely it is that repression will have to be exercised. From the perspective of 
credibility, the BAKSAL experiment was demonstrably a failure. The interesting 
question is why the attempt to define the dominant coalition in this way did not find 
broad support amongst the very group that it was trying to incorporate. The likely 
answers to this question have important implications for understanding the 
organizational characteristics of clientelist factions in Bangladesh.  
 
The essential problem with an attempt to impose order on formal and informal rent 
allocation in poor countries using a one-party authoritarian structure is that there is no 
well-defined structure of factions to begin with. Political accumulation in South Asia 
is a dynamic process where sequential layers of political entrepreneurs are 
continuously emerging at all levels. One way of imagining this is to think of a 
multitude of patron-client organizations with conveyor belts in each taking 
enterprising individuals higher up and with individuals at higher levels occasionally 
branching off to construct their own factions. A single authoritarian party is simply a 
coalition of a large number of patron-client organizations which have been brought 
together in a larger coalition. Attempting to define rent allocation in a coherent way in 
this context faces two sorts of problems.  
 
The first problem is to determine the distribution of rents between the different 
factions that are part of the ruling coalition. If each of these organizations was 
generating its own rents and the question was only about protecting existing rents, the 
problem would be a lot simpler and the ruling coalition could collectively provide 
third-party enforcement for its member organizations. This could happen if all 
factions within the ruling coalition were productive organizations or if the patrons of 
each faction were only extracting rents from their own clients. But if a significant part 
of the rents of factions are based on redistribution from elsewhere in society, each 
faction is targeting the same pool of resources for capture. In this case, the distribution 
of rents between factions cannot be guaranteed by the factions themselves. Only a 
strong leader can do the arbitration of rent allocation between factions and that too 
only if the leader has the support of most organizations most of the time.  
 
Part of the crisis in the early 1970s was that the factions within the Awami League 
were beginning to challenge the allocations of rents within it. As a result, the 
dominant party was facing intense internal conflict. As early as 1972 a significant 
section of the ‘left-wing’ of the Awami League left to form the Jatiyo Shomajtantrik 
Dal (the National Socialist Party), JSD on the grounds that the party was no longer 
socialist enough. If the distribution of rents between internal factions depends on the 
decisions of a supreme leader, all factional leaders have to be confident of their access 
to the supreme leader, and the leader has to have sufficient authority to impose 
decisions once taken. Clearly, a number of internal factions were already refusing to 
accept Mujib’s decisions within a year of independence and some had already left to 
oppose and unseat the ruling coalition. Mujib’s decision that a one-party system using 
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the authoritarianism of a constitutional amendment could force all these factions back 
to the fold and force them to accept the rent allocations he offered was a significant 
gamble. It is not at all clear that Mujib had the authority or the physical force to 
ensure that all organizers would come under a single party structure and then accept 
the distribution of rents that he imposed.  
 
The second problem is to define the limits of the ruling coalition. In the South Asian 
context, there is always a large group of political organizers who are currently 
excluded but who believe they have enough disruptive capacity to deserve inclusion 
within the dominant coalition and get a share of rents. But the more organizers the 
ruling coalition accommodates, the smaller the rents for existing organizers. The 
problem for a formal and well-defined dominant coalition like a one-party state is that 
it defines insiders and outsiders clearly and creates strong incentives for outsiders to 
unite against insiders. Successful one-party authoritarian regimes usually have some 
special features that allow them to keep insiders in, outsiders out, and to absorb 
outsiders at a manageable rate. For instance, they could have significant natural 
resource rents that could be used to finance an acceptable distribution of rents for 
major factions and a credible control of violence at the centre. Some oil rich one-party 
states provide examples of this variant. Still, the calibration of the frontiers of the 
party is critical to ensure that the available force is sufficient to deal with potential 
dissent. Of course, the combination of force and rents required to make a one-party 
system of this type viable is not defined in absolute terms, but rather in relation to the 
strength of potential organizations who demand rents by threatening violence.  
 
Another possible variant is a disciplined authoritarian party that does not immediately 
offer significant rents to individuals lower down the organizational chain, but does 
offer credible career paths for organizers to move up the pyramid. The credibility of 
such a party to offer future rents implies that it has a developmental strategy that can 
provide steadily growing rents over time. This may be credible strategy for keeping 
lower-level clients disciplined if the party is well-organized party and has a 
developmental strategy. Contemporary China provides an illustration. Mujib’s party 
had neither natural resource rents nor a disciplined party hierarchy running a credible 
development strategy. Indeed, the party did not even control the army, as Mujib’s 
assassins were dissident young officers who operated with the knowledge of some 
factions within the Awami League.  
 
A further accidental problem for the Awami League was that its one-party state had a 
populist socialist ideology but some of the most powerful individuals within the party 
had already benefited enough from rent and asset capture and now wanted to invest 
some of their wealth for longer term benefit. Pressure from this group had already 
resulted in a revision of the government’s ‘socialist’ industrial policy. They demanded 
the legalization of property rights over their potential investments. They would no 
doubt still prefer to have some types of rents to assist their investments but no longer 
supported the destructive rent capture of other primitive accumulators. Under pressure 
from this group in 1974 the ceiling on private investment was increased from two and 
a half million to thirty million takas. Partnerships with foreign private investors were 
allowed, and the moratorium on nationalization was increased from ten to fifteen 
years. These emerging capitalists were not at all excited at the prospect of a ‘socialist’ 
one-party state which could reverse these changes.  
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The types of rents that political factions in Bangladesh were creating or capturing 
during this period are also relevant. The vulnerability of the economy was both a 
cause and a consequence of the fact that the rents generated by the political process 
were almost entirely value-reducing at this time (Umar 1980b; E. Ahmed 1986: 27). 
Formal institutions had collapsed to the point that informal rent capture was not 
simply sharing the returns created by productive activities but were in many cases 
simply asset capture and the creation of monopoly rents through different types of 
restrictions, over-invoicing opportunities and so on. Faction leaders were involved in 
grabbing abandoned assets, appropriating public resources through the creation of 
excess employment, making excessive margins on construction contracts, import 
contracts, and so on (N. Islam 1979: 225-6). These rents were zero-sum at best and 
had no positive effect on productive investments. In fact, they were mostly value-
reducing. Major targets of appropriation were the assets of departing Pakistanis and of 
groups who could be associated with them, such as the (non-Bengali) Biharis. But 
assets of Bangladeshis were also targeted as were the assets of many Hindus (who had 
never been supporters of Pakistan) (Karim 2005: 283-90).  
 
Significant abandoned assets of Pakistani capitalists like major factories could not be 
immediately privately appropriated but were nationalized by the state resulting in an 
increase in the state’s share in modern industry from 34 to 81 per cent. But even this 
was not enough for the new ruling coalition. The Presidential Order of March 1972 
brought Bengali-owned factories in the jute, cotton and sugar sectors into public 
ownership raising the public sector’s share to 92 per cent with a corresponding 
increase in the rents the state could allocate to its supporters (Sobhan and Ahmad 
1980: Table 10.1; K. A. S. Murshid and Sobhan 1987: 3-4). Employment in the public 
services witnessed a dramatic expansion. At the time of liberation in 1971, there were 
450,000 employees of all grades in the public services, of which only 320 were 
officers at the level of Joint Secretary or above. By 1973 total employment in the 
public services had increased to over 650,000, with officers in the higher grades 
increasing to 660 (World Bank 1984: 109). Some of this growth was due to the 
change in coverage from the inclusion of new industrial units within the public sector 
which brought their administrative staff within the ambit of the public services. But 
the number of white collar staff in Bangladesh’s small industrial sector would only 
account for a fraction of the increase. 
 
Nurul Islam, an economist in the Planning Commission at that time describes some of 
the processes of asset and rent capture: “By 1974 there were a number of factors 
which had contributed to an accumulation of surplus funds in private hands. For one 
thing, high profits were earned in domestic and import trading activities, including 
illegal trade such as trade in contraband goods and in smuggling jute and other 
exportables across the border. Since these transactions were illegal, the risk premium 
was high and hence profits, once realised, were high. In addition, many residential 
buildings and trading or commercial enterprises, abandoned by Pakistanis, were 
illegally occupied by private persons. The ‘caretakers’ of such commercial 
enterprises, hastily appointed by the government in 1972 immediately after 
independence, made large fortunes through the undeclared sale of assets. Moreover, 
there were gains to be obtained from rental or sales proceeds of the abandoned houses 
which were illegally occupied by private persons. Those who had accumulated 
financial resources were pressing the government to commit itself to a more 
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substantial and permanent role for private enterprise in the economy of Bangladesh” 
(N. Islam 1979: 225-6). 
 
The anarchic process of rent capture during this period had the expected negative 
effects on economic performance. An assessment of 1970-1975 is difficult because of 
the very real disruptions caused by the war, and the short life of the regime. 
Productivity in manufacturing was on average less than 50% of the level reached in 
1970 and real wages in manufacturing, around 60% of their 1969/70 level (World 
Bank 1978: Vol. II Annex I.6 p. 173, 1984: Vol. II Table 9.12 p. 118). In addition, in 
1974 Bangladesh suffered from a serious famine that took place without any 
significant decline in aggregate food availability (Sen 1983). The causes were largely 
state failure in managing distribution and ensuring purchasing power in a context of 
hoarding and smuggling. More than a million people died in the famine, which 
according to some estimates was probably more than in the war of liberation (Sen 
1983: 134-41; Karim 2005: 335-40). When finally an attempt was made to rein in the 
unproductive rents through a ‘Second Revolution’ (the one-party state) many factions 
within and outside the dominant party had no faith that this would be in their interest. 
Mujib’s assassination ended this experiment.  
 
Summary  
The dominant party that won freedom in 1971 failed to establish one-party 
authoritarianism even though moves in that direction began in 1975. The conflicts 
within the party were intense and lower-level factions assertive and often openly 
violent. Implementation capabilities for enforcing formal institutions or controlling 
informal activities were correspondingly weak. Excluded factions rapidly increased as 
powerful groups departed the ruling coalition almost immediately after the victory of 
1971. Their resistance from outside reduced time horizons further and strengthened 
lower-level factions within the party. Time horizons were in any case already low as 
most factions were engaged in asset and rent capture in the absence of prior 
productive capabilities in most cases. The power of capitalists had been severely 
curtailed. Bengali capital too was almost fully expropriated. But a new proto-capitalist 
class was rapidly emerging through primitive accumulation. During the lifetime of the 
regime the political settlement was very adverse for growth and the growth-stability 
trade-off was probably entirely below the minimum viability conditions of growth and 
stability. Mujib’s desperate authoritarian one-party state may not have worked as a 
solution but it reflected an awareness of the seriousness of the situation.  
 
10. The Transition Period of Clientelistic Authoritarianism 1975-1990 
Mujib’s assassination brought the military to power through a series of bloody coups 
and counter-coups. But the military leadership knew by now that neither the Pakistani 
authoritarian model based on the exclusion of intermediate class organizers by a small 
military-bureaucratic clique nor the authoritarian one-party model of Mujib would 
work in Bangladesh. General Zia, who formally became president in 1977 was a 
decorated freedom fighter and widely popular. He took care to construct a strong 
constituency of supporters for his rule by constructing a political party that eventually 
became the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It remains one of the two dominant 
parties in contemporary Bangladesh. The new strategy for constructing the ruling 
coalition had a number of important features distinct from the earlier phases.  
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First, the terms on which individual coalition leaders joined the ruling coalition were 
individually bargained. The terms were simple: the national leader wanted to 
incorporate the largest number of the most important organizers at the lowest price in 
terms of the rents that they demanded. A broad ideology of development and 
nationalism defining the new party allowed organizers from the far left to the far right 
to seek terms for entry. The price they could extract in terms of their access to future 
rents depended on their proven organizational capabilities and the significance of their 
departure for undermining their erstwhile parties. As other parties were no longer 
banned, organizers had the chance of proving their abilities outside the BNP before 
negotiating incorporation. Opposition parties were allowed to set up, operate and 
contest elections. The only limitation was that the top job was not up for grabs 
because the dominant party was unlikely to be defeated given its control over the 
administration. This implicit administrative control defined the ruling coalition as 
authoritarian, even though multi-party democracy was formally reintroduced with the 
repeal of the fourth amendment that had created the one-party state.  
 
Secondly, no attempt was made to define ex ante the boundaries of the ruling 
coalition. The regime maintained the right to calibrate the size of the ruling coalition 
through a competitive process of assessment and negotiation. This too ensured that 
excluded elites had an expectation that they may be included on appropriate terms in 
the future if they played according to the rules of the game. The combination of these 
two characteristics ensured that the minimum required rents were competitively 
allocated to the most important political organizers, helping to maintain political 
stability.  
 
Finally, both Zia and Ershad attempted to check the power of established political 
organizers by creating new rural voices through ‘decentralization’. These strategies 
were quite similar to the Basic Democracy strategy of the Pakistani period, but now 
they were a complementary part of a broader strategy and not the exclusive strategy 
for organizing stability. Even so, these strategies, particularly Ershad’s attempt to 
create a new class of political representatives in the newly created ‘upazillas’ (a tier of 
government constituting a small number of villages), was strongly opposed by urban 
political organizers. They had a limited effect in enhancing overall political stability, 
and the attempt to force them through possibly had a negative effect.  
 
This remained a period of considerable instability. Violence continued for a while, 
particularly within the army, where coups were frequently attempted. Nevertheless, 
some signs of a viable political settlement began to emerge and these elements were 
built on in the fourth phase. First, the strategy of ensuring entry to political organizers 
through individual negotiations to determine the ‘price’ that was demanded in terms 
of access to rents proved to be a viable strategy for constructing coalitions. It remains 
the strategy through which competing political parties in the fourth ‘democratic’ 
phase continue to construct coalitions to form governments. By its nature, the ruling 
coalition is turbulent with constant negotiations and infighting. Violence sometimes 
breaks out, both within the ruling coalition and against factions currently out of 
power. But in the absence of a better method of determining the distribution of rents 
for constructing a ruling coalition, this has emerged as the operative default mode. 
After a fashion, the competitive allocation of rents to factions that can demonstrate 
organizational power does work.  
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Second, the openness of the boundaries defining the ruling coalition has proved to be 
extremely useful in managing the perpetual entry of new aspirants into the ruling 
coalition and the orderly departure of those who are dissatisfied. The clientelistic 
military period allowed new entry but not to the top job which was effectively out of 
bounds. This proved to be unsustainable. On the one hand it created strong incentives 
for ambitious officers within the army to try to violently replace the supreme leader. 
There were very frequent coup attempts under Zia who was finally killed in a coup in 
1981. On the other hand, the apparent reservation of the top job for a single individual 
also resulted in strong opposition from ambitious civilian political organizers from 
other parties. The futility of elections to replace the top leader became apparent under 
Ershad and resulted in a growing mobilization against him. As the BNP (Zia’s party) 
was now in opposition, this mobilization brought together the BNP with Mujib’s 
Awami League. Ershad was overthrown in 1990 by a popular uprising when the army 
refused to continue to support him if it meant shooting at thousands of demonstrators. 
However, the return to ‘democracy’ kept intact many features of the system that had 
been established during this period. The major change was that the leadership of the 
dominant coalition now also became contestable in a competitive multi-party system. 
Both the composition of the ruling coalition in terms of its constituent factions and the 
particular coalition that would rule would now be determined through competitive 
demonstrations of relative organizational power. 
 
A number of important economic changes happened during this period. The most 
predatory types of primitive accumulation began to die down after most abandoned 
assets were appropriated. The beneficiaries of the primitive accumulation and the 
older capitalists gradually regrouped during this period and established political 
connections with factions within the ruling parties. As many of the new ‘capitalists’ 
were direct beneficiaries of political accumulation, they were closely networked into 
existing factional structures. However, damaging politically-created rents continued to 
be created as part of political stabilization strategies. These included, for instance, 
rents distributed to supporters of the ruling coalition in government construction 
contracts, or in import contracts for scarce commodities like sugar and cement.  
 
An important change compared to the Pakistan period was that rents were no longer 
seen as having any potentially productive purpose. The state stopped trying to create 
or allocate rents as part of an explicit formal industrial policy. Subsidies were no 
longer justified in terms of industrial policy but began to be justified on welfare 
grounds. Market failure justifications for infant industry protection or technology 
acquisition disappeared. This was partly because of the memory of the political fight 
against statist asset concentration in Pakistan and against the ‘socialism’ of the 
Awami League, and partly because the international climate of economic opinion 
informing policy in Bangladesh had also changed radically in the 1980s. Zia was an 
advocate of privatization for all these reasons. The rents that public sector industries 
and the newly privatized industries continued to receive was because the state was too 
weak to remove these rents from powerful clients, not because the ruling coalition 
believed that this would accelerate the modernization of the economy. Ironically, the 
garment industry takeoff in Bangladesh depended on the presence of a critical set of 
international rents and institutional innovations that Zia undertook to support the 
sector (M. H. Khan 2008b, 2009b). The political settlement allowed the rapid 
introduction of institutional innovations like the back-to-back LC and the bonded 
warehouse system, both vital for the garments industry. 
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Between 1976 and 1983, a total of 217 public sector enterprises were wholly or partly 
sold to the private sector or returned to their former Bengali owners from whom they 
had been nationalized without compensation in the aftermath of liberation. However, 
significant denationalizations only began under the regime of General Ershad. Under 
the New Industrial Policy adopted in 1982, denationalizations of large-scale public 
enterprises were given priority. Privatization faced substantial and growing political 
opposition, particularly from the trade unions of white collar workers where the over-
employment was most significant (Bhaskar and Khan 1995). Nevertheless, the 
government divested 110 large units in little more than a year, including jute mills 
that had previously been owned by Bengalis, after which the programme continued at 
a slower pace (World Bank 1984: 149). The privatizations were supported by 
international agencies, but in effect they had a very limited impact on the economy. 
The large-scale enterprises that had been created under the Pakistani industrial policy 
of the sixties had never achieved full global competitiveness. After they were 
nationalized in the seventies they built up vast additional liabilities because of over-
employment, looting and mismanagement. This did nothing to help their future 
viability when they were gradually privatized in the eighties. The new owners took 
over the liabilities as well, wrongly believing that political arrangements could be 
worked out to sustain subsidies into the future. Some of the privatized firms limped 
on and were lucky to become moderately profitable. Many eventually closed down, 
particularly in the jute and cotton textile sectors.  
 
The net effect of the Pakistani industrial policy as well as the accelerated primitive 
accumulation that happened in the immediate aftermath of independence did not take 
the country to a significantly higher technological level. Rather, the main effect was 
to achieve the creation of a new moneyed class through a process of primitive 
accumulation that began in the fifties. By the mid-1980s, Bangladesh had a potential 
small to medium capitalist class who had accumulated relatively significant blocks of 
capital. There were by now hundreds if not thousands of individuals who could raise 
$100,000 or more of capital in the form of land, liquid capital or collateralized bank 
loans for investment. These individuals began to look around for simple technologies 
to invest in, now as economic entrepreneurs. It was at this stage that a lucky accident 
involving internationally created rents had a significant impact on Bangladesh’s 
prospects. 
 
The MFA and the acquisition of garments technologies 
The growth of the ready-made garments industry in Bangladesh has often been 
presented as a vindication of the success of free market policies combined with the 
virtual absence of labour market protections in Bangladesh. But in fact investment 
even in the simplest of technologies involves significant risks for domestic investors 
when these technologies are new to the economy. The time it will take an investor to 
achieve global competitiveness is not known and entrepreneurs have no idea of what 
production in very specialized globalized production networks entails. Nor is it viable 
for foreign firms to invest in skilling up labour in a poor economy in low-margin, low 
technology industries unless there is some sharing of costs and risks for the foreign 
firm. This is of course why all global production does not rapidly shift to the poorest 
countries. But a combination of factors made this transfer of technology feasible for 
Bangladesh in the early 1980s.  
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An important component was the emergence of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) 
in 1973. This was an arrangement administered by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). MFA set bilaterally negotiated quotas on developing countries for 
textile and clothing exports primarily to satisfy US objections to free trade with 
garment producing countries which threatened its domestic garment and textile 
industry. As a concession to global opinion, the MFA did not put quotas on a number 
of least developed countries like Bangladesh which did not have any garment industry 
at the time and were therefore no threat to the US (Goto 1989). For Bangladesh, it was 
fortuitous that just at that time a potential investor class was emerging. The MFA 
created ‘quota rents’ for these potential investors that allowed the market failures 
constraining technology transfer to be overcome. And finally, the clientelistic military 
rule gave the ruling coalition a good enough growth-stability trade-off curve to enable 
a few critical domestic institutional innovations that were required for the takeoff of 
the garments industry.  
 
The garment sector emerged only because of a concurrence of these favourable 
conditions and provides a good example of why the emergence of productive 
organizations even in low technology sectors is not assured unless significant market 
failures can be overcome. The political settlement in Bangladesh during its 
clientelistic military rule could introduce the required institutional innovations 
because the rents involved were not essential for the ruling coalition and their 
protection and management did not therefore face implementation or enforcement 
resistance from factions within the ruling coalition. Moreover, the quota rents were 
not domestically created and could only be captured by exporters, allowing the 
leadership to manage these rents without their capture by political factions.  
 
The MFA created a serious problem for established producers of garments in 
countries like South Korea who suddenly found themselves quantity-constrained. 
They had a strong incentive to relocate production to countries that did not have 
quotas. But developing countries that did not have a textile and clothing sector were 
clearly relatively poor countries and suffered from market failures affecting 
technology acquisition and learning. To attract investors from more advanced 
countries who wanted to relocate, developing countries had to offer something more 
than just their quota-free status. After all, many poor countries were quota-free but 
only a very few benefited from MFA. Bangladesh was one of them and its success has 
to be explained in terms of specific mechanisms through which these market failures 
were addressed.  
 
By the late 1970s, domestic primitive accumulation had created numerous potential 
investors for a sector like garments where the efficient scale of investment was at 
most in the hundreds of thousands or low millions of dollars. Technology transfer 
came about in Bangladesh through collaboration between a retired Bangladeshi civil 
servant turned entrepreneur, Nurul Quader Khan, and a South Korean multinational, 
Daewoo. The Bangladeshi entrepreneur set up Desh Garments in 1979, providing the 
capital and arranging government support for a potentially risky investment. The 
South Korean multinational provided the training and technology transfer to be paid 
for by a percentage of future exports. The quota rents made it credible that the 
Bangladeshi company would be able to quickly pay back the up-front investment of 
the South Koreans in hosting visiting Bangladeshis at their plant in Pusan and training 
them in modern garment manufacturing processes. Moreover, the fact that a retired 
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civil servant from Bangladesh could sit across the table from a global multinational 
and offer credible equity can only be understood if we remember the political 
accumulation that the country had just gone through. Daewoo’s calculations were 
straightforward. Bangladesh’s access to the US market through MFA was an 
attractive business proposition but they would probably not have been willing to take 
the risk of participating in a Bangladeshi collaboration without a few credible 
commitments from the president.  
 
The equity invested by the Bangladeshi firm provided part of this commitment, but 
perhaps even more important was the explicit support provided by President Ziaur 
Rahman to the project. President Zia’s support appeared credible because he took the 
initiative in linking up Nurul Quader with Kim Woo-Choong, the chairman of 
Daewoo. His support assured the South Koreans that unexpected problems would be 
dealt with or at least addressed. And in fact, political support at the highest level 
ensured that relatively small but critical institutional innovations like the back-to-back 
LC (which allowed Bangladeshi producers to borrow from local banks using export 
orders as collateral) and the bonded warehouse (which allowed complex customs 
duties on imported inputs to be avoided) were quickly introduced. The president had 
sufficient control over the limited number of coalitions required to implement and 
enforce discrete institutional changes like these for them to go through without any 
cost in terms of political stability or contestation. Interestingly, the owner of Desh 
Garments, Nurul Qader Khan was a civil servant who had made his money in the 
previous Awami League regime. Zia’s objective in supporting him was clearly to 
develop the economy, not because he was an obvious client within his own party. 
 
Desh was remarkably successful. Between 1981 and 1987 its export value grew at an 
annual average of 90% (S. Rahman 2004). The learning and transfer of technology 
that was unleashed by this single project was remarkable. By the end of the 1980s, of 
the 130 people who were first trained by Desh in Daewoo’s factories in South Korea, 
115 became entrepreneurs and set up their own garment firms (Rhee 1990: 341). This 
apparently did not do much damage to Desh, whose output continued to grow at close 
to one hundred per cent per annum during this period. The loss the company suffered 
when it lost a manager was made up many times over by the high levels of effort that 
these individuals invested in the first place as a result of this implicit incentive. From 
virtually a zero base in 1980, by 2005 there were around 3500 active firms in the 
garments sector employing upwards of 2 million people (World Bank 2005). 
Primitive accumulation continued to be an important source of entrepreneurial supply. 
In a survey carried out in 1993, 23% of garment factory owners responded that they 
had originally been civil servants or in the army (Quddus and Rashid 2000). We can 
assume that many others had close contacts with politics and had made their initial 
capital through political processes. From a country not much different from the 
typical African country in the 1970s, Bangladesh’s manufacturing output today equals 
that of all of sub-Saharan Africa combined excluding South Africa.  
 
The rapid emergence of Bangladesh as a garment exporting country is shown in Table 
4. Exports grew at double digit rates for more than two decades. By the early 2000s, 
the sector accounted for around 70% of Bangladeshi exports. By 1985, such was the 
success of the Bangladesh garment industry that Ronald Reagan negotiated quotas for 
Bangladesh under the MFA (M. A. Rashid 2006). Bangladesh has continued to 
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benefit from preferential treatment, particularly in European Union markets, but 
effectively, the first five years of quota protection were enough to trigger a major shift 
in the country’s technological capabilities and therefore manufacturing fortune. 
 
Table 4 Bangladesh Garments: Growth Rates of Dollar Exports 1985-2006 
Year Woven Knitwear Total Garments Dollar Export Growth 
Rates 
1985-1990   45.9 
1990-1995   24.1 
1995-2000   14.3 
2000-01   11.7 
2001-02 –7.1 –2.5 –5.7 
2002-03 4.3 13.3 7.2 
2003-04 8.6 29.9 15.8 
2004-05 1.7 31.3 12.9 
2005-06 13.5 35.4 23.1 
Sources: (based on  Mlachila and Yang 2004: Table 1; World Bank 2005: Table 1). 
 
Thus, the MFA worked as a system of ‘learning rents’. It was hugely effective 
because it provided relatively moderate rents that were part of an arrangement that 
was formally recognized as being temporary. Financing an initial period of loss-
making when new technologies are being learnt is one of the important requirements 
for start-ups even in low technology sectors like garments. In principle markets 
should enable the learning to be financed but there are significant market failures 
because uncertain periods of learning expose investors to levels of risk that are often 
too high given the narrow margins in these established sectors (M. H. Khan 2000, 
2009b).  The MFA rents, together with the investments that Bangladeshi investors 
were now willing to make allowed the necessary period of learning to be financed. 
The emergence of the garments industry, together with less dramatic successes in a 
number of other sectors like pharmaceuticals ensured that industry has been steadily 
growing as a share of GDP in Bangladesh, shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 Bangladesh: Sectoral Shares in GDP 1980-2005 
1980 1990 2000 2005
Bangladesh Agriculture 31.6 30.3 25.5 20.1
Industry 20.6 21.5 25.3 27.2
Services 47.8 48.3 49.2 52.6
    Source: (World Bank 2008) 
 
The history of the garments industry has important implications for Bangladesh as it 
attempts to move higher up the value chain. Much of its growth so far has been at the 
lower ends of the value chain, even though there is evidence of growing backward 
linkages and diversification. By 2005, roughly 45% of export value was value added 
in the domestic economy due to growing backward linkages in spinning, weaving, 
dyeing and accessories (Bhattacharya, et al. 2002; World Bank 2005; M. N. Ahmed 
and Hossain 2006). The story of the garment industry’s success tells us that market 
failures in capital and knowledge markets were overcome through very specific policy 
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and governance arrangements. The blocks of capital required for the next stage of 
upgrading are much larger and primitive accumulation cannot be relied upon to 
provide these investments. A survey of the garment sector in 2007 revealed that the 
available terms of financing were an important constraint to technology upgrading in 
the sector (M. H. Khan 2008a). Banks were willing to lend but the fixed return and 
collateral requirements meant that investors were only willing to borrow to invest in 
segments of garments they already knew very well. They were deterred from 
investing in new sectors where they were not sure about the length of time learning 
would take. The sharing of risks and returns across a number of investors could in 
theory address this problem, but organizations could not credibly commit to reveal 
profits or pay dividends in the future, making these market solutions fail.  
 
Our interpretation of the causes behind the rapid growth of the garment industry in 
Bangladesh casts doubts on the argument that Bangladesh’s success was based on 
cheap labour and labour market flexibility. It is true that Bangladesh scores higher 
than India on labour market flexibility (it is easier to fire workers compared to India) 
and indeed both Pakistan and Bangladesh often score higher than India on the overall 
ranking of ‘Doing Business Conditions’ of the World Bank. But the specific 
mechanisms through which the garment industry developed suggests that cheap and 
flexible labour by itself did not help Bangladesh very much before the market failures 
constraining investment in a new sector were overcome. Moreover, the persistence of 
cheap and flexible labour has not helped investment in the next stages of the value 
chain even though wages have remained low. The implication is that movements up 
the value chain will depend on solving specific market failures. The break that was 
provided by the MFA cannot be relied on for other sectors or for moving up the value-
chain in garments and textiles. It is possible to imagine the clientelist political 
organizations in Bangladesh reaching an agreement to develop mechanisms for 
financing risk and cost-sharing for technology upgrading. This type of productive rent 
creation, if it was on a limited scale, would not necessarily compete with the political 
rents that political organizations are primarily concerned with. The institutional and 
political arrangements that would be required to manage such strategies are, however, 
not on the policy radar screen at the moment.  
 
Summary  
The clientelistic authoritarian period provided a political settlement where leaderships 
had sufficiently long time horizons to build relationships with capitalists and support 
them to a limited extent. Technology acquisition could not be properly supported 
under this settlement but the existence of globally generated MFA rents allowed 
technology acquisition and disciplined learning in low technology sectors like 
garments. The political settlement was much more promising for growth than before, 
and for the first time a Bengali capitalist sector began to grow. Growth-stability trade-
offs were favourable for the support and promotion of limited formal institutions 
supporting specific accumulation strategies.  
 
There were some negative changes in economic policies that have implications for the 
future. Unlike the authoritarian military period, clientelistic authoritarianism 
established a new consensus that politics should not concern itself with productive 
rent strategies. There was no attempt to use rents to create more sophisticated 
organizations or to absorb more sophisticated technologies than the ones that already 
existed. Rather, the focus of rent allocation by the dominant coalition became much 
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more about the management of political stability. The emergence of the garments 
industry, itself the product of a fortunate conjuncture of conditions that enabled MFA 
rents to have very productive effects, allowed the political leadership to focus on the 
capture of political rents. The calibration of force and the distribution of rents that 
emerged during this period had features that continued into the next one. But the 
absence of any strategy of productive rent generation is a significant challenge to the 
system, as is the disruption caused by this pattern of political management, which we 
discuss in the next section.  
 
At the level of politics, the clientelistic authoritarian period established that brute 
force could not be used to stay in power. The ruling coalition needed to incorporate 
significant numbers of political organizers. But it could not absorb all potential 
organizers either. In other words, neither the Pakistani nor the BAKSAL strategy was 
feasible in Bangladesh. The actual practice of the clientelistic military rule 
paradoxically established the norm that political stability in Bangladesh has to be 
based on a competitive system of rent allocation to allow the most important 
organizational and violence specialists to be brought into the ruling coalition at the 
cheapest price. The implicit links of the political leader with the army in the 
competitive clientelist settlement meant that the process of bargaining and calibration 
had to always happen under a single leader. Other factions could at best expect some 
of their most important organizers to be bought off. Eventually the major political 
parties united to reject an arrangement that deprived them of access to the most 
significant rent allocation decisions at the apex of the political system. 
 
11. Competitive Clientelism 1990- 
The overthrow of Ershad and the holding of elections under a caretaker government 
converted the authoritarian clientelistic system into full-fledged competitive 
clientelism. The ruling coalition now had all the characteristics of competitive 
clientelism summarized in Figure 4. Capitalists were by now relatively developed, not 
only in the garments and textile sector, but in a range of medium-technology 
manufacturing sectors. Industry overtook agriculture in terms of share of GNP in the 
2000s (Table 5). Some industry groups were by now rather well-organized and 
closely networked with political parties, often keeping good relationships with more 
than one, as parties regularly cycled in and out of power. But while industrial 
capabilities were now much better than in the past, the evolution of the political 
settlement had some adverse implications for industrial policy, infrastructure 
development and the general governance.  
 
Compared to the other variants of a clientelist political settlement, the competitive 
clientelism variant has, ceteris paribus, the most adverse growth-stability trade-off. 
This is both because the permanent presence of significant excluded factions that are 
always building up their oppositional strength serves to reduce the time horizons of 
incumbents and focuses their minds on making quick money to fight the next election. 
In addition, the competitive context increases the power of lower-level factions within 
the ruling coalition and makes policy implementation difficult and the enforcement of 
formal institutions relatively poor. And yet, given a large number of powerful primary 
factions, this may be the only viable type of political settlement in countries like 
Bangladesh. However, competitive clientelism can be made to work better (as 
differences across different parts of India demonstrate). The operation of comparative 
80 
 
clientelism in Bangladesh has some specific problems which make it more vulnerable 
than it need be, and endows it with a much more adverse growth-stability trade-off 
than is necessary.  
 
Bengali versus Bangladeshi Nationalism  
The history of grand coalitions fighting glorious struggles has sunk deep into the 
collective memory of Bangladeshi political organizers. A more sanguine reading of 
history is that it was the chauvinism of earlier dominant coalitions that forced East 
Bengali political organizers into these positions by presenting them with options that 
were untypical in the general context of clientelist mobilizations. The insistence of 
previous dominant coalitions that East Bengalis should have their organizational 
power checked to protect dominant group interests resulted in the legitimate 
formation of grand coalitions that were forced to fight zero sum games. But the 
memory of these grand struggles of ‘us’ against ‘them’ continued to affect the way in 
which political coalitions defined their relationships with each other in independent 
Bangladesh. This created serious problems because it was based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the logic of clientelist competition, even those that resulted in the 
earlier partitions. But in addition, circumstances had fundamentally changed after the 
1971 partition. Zero sum conflicts between different factional coalitions could not 
resolve any problems and could not result in any further partitions. However, these 
conflicts could and did impoverish the broader society because they dramatically 
worsened the growth-stability trade-off compared to what might otherwise have been 
the case.  
 
One illustration of this was the persistent behaviour of both main parties that 
suggested that main object of their politics was to save the nation from the opposition. 
In the 1990s and into the 2000s the zero-sum attitude of the two major parties came to 
be known in the reflective sections of the Bangladeshi media as the ‘battle of the 
begums’, referring to the two ladies who led the rival parties. Sheikh Hasina, daughter 
of the assassinated President Mujib, led the Awami League, while Khaleda Zia, wife 
of the assassinated President Zia led the Bangladesh Nationalist Party or BNP. Their 
implacable opposition to each other was manifested in a range of different ways. The 
two leaders refused to talk to each other and their political strategy in opposition was 
generally to boycott parliament and to repeatedly call for general strikes (hartals) and 
mass political agitation.  Their mutual attitude was that ridding the country of the 
menace posed by the other party would be their most positive contribution to 
development.  
 
To sustain this implacable opposition, new ideological divides hardened, including a 
new division on the meaning of nationalism. The Awami League attempted to define 
itself as the protector of Bengali nationalism, while the BNP emerged as the defender 
of Bangladeshi nationalism. While the parties insisted the conflict between these 
concepts was irresolvable except by the complete capitulation of one side or the other, 
in reality this time the distinctions were so obscure that few people outside the parties 
understood what it meant. Clearly, the logic of clientelist coalition building requires 
ideologies as convenient pegs for structuring coalitions though the ideologies 
themselves are rarely important for their own sake. The definition of two mutually 
exclusive variants of nationalism for the country served to distinguish the two 
coalitions without significantly affecting any policies. But by defining their 
differences as two variants of ‘nationalism’, the parties were invoking past struggles 
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and strategies of no compromise. Connected to these definitions of nationalism was 
the related position of the two parties on secularism and Islam. Here the distinctions 
had a little more bite, as these positions determined the coalition partners of the 
parties in government, but even here they were relatively eclectic in choosing who 
they were allied to depending on circumstances. As the debate between Bengali and 
Bangladeshi nationalism is connected to the debate on secularism, it is important to 
analyse the salience of the debate on secularism in Bangladesh. 
 
Many contemporary ideas about the progressive role of secularism can be traced back 
to the European experience with Reformation and the separation of Church and state. 
The conflict between the Church and secular social forces during the Reformation is 
rightly recognized as one of the defining moments in Europe’s transition to 
modernity. This was because in Europe the Church was blocking the material interests 
of the classes that would eventually lead the industrial revolution. This was a 
fundamental reason why the opposition of the progressive bourgeoisie to the Church 
was implacable until the Church had been significantly reformed (Tawney 1938). The 
specific features of the Reformation differed from country to country in Western 
Europe but some broad features were shared in common. Productive capitalist classes 
were emerging based on long-distance trade, and at the same time, states were being 
constructed that could exercise territorial jurisdictions within which capitalism could 
grow. The declining social forces in Europe were based on landed property, the 
wealth of the Church and the political ambitions of a Church-based empire. The older 
elites constituted a social coalition opposed to many of the changes that merchants 
and capitalists were bringing about because these changes threatened the stability of 
the old order and in particular the dominance of the Church in the ideological sphere. 
As a result, there were relatively sharp economic conflicts between monarchs, the 
Church and emerging capitalists over their material interests that put the Church on 
one side and a collection of progressive economic forces on the other. 
 
An important economic conflict between reforming monarchs and the Church 
concerned the vast amounts of land owned by the Church. These assets not only 
reduced the access of the monarch to revenues but also created a powerful competing 
political force allied to Rome, which could prevent the centralization of political 
authority in local states. Secondly, there was a conflict between merchants and the 
Church over the theological acceptability of income from usury in Christianity. Here 
capitalist accumulation which was driving growth faced obstacles from a pre-
capitalist Church-based system of maintaining social order using notions of justice 
which were no longer appropriate. Finally, there was a conflict between Church and 
state over their respective jurisdictions when it came to appoint officers to lucrative 
administrative and judicial positions. In this case too, territorially defined emerging 
modern states faced competition from a parallel set of jurisdictions organized around 
the Church. Thus the economic interests underlying the ideological conflict between 
Church and secular social forces were based on radically different ways of organizing 
production. This is why religion and secularism represented conflicting social 
interests in Reformation Europe. This in turn ensured that the victory of one side or 
the other would have economic consequences for the mode of organizing production 
in Western Europe over a period of several centuries.  
 
The emerging economic supremacy of the secular interests that challenged the Church 
during the Reformation resulted in stronger local states and accelerated economic 
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growth. These material interests ensured that the relevant political aspects of 
secularism defined as the political separation of Church and state began to be 
reflected in the practice of politics across Western Europe. This is despite the fact that 
in many European countries, including England, the formal constitutional separation 
of Church and state has not emerged to this day. The Western European story is 
important because the theoretical association of secular movements with the liberal 
bourgeoisie and therefore with social progress is based on a reading of this history. 
But the political economy of religion in contemporary developing countries is very 
different and the developmental attitudes of different parties cannot be so readily read 
off from their attitudes towards religion and secularism.  
 
In the Indian subcontinent neither Hinduism nor Islam had an organized church with 
significant land-holdings and incomes along the European pattern either in pre-
colonial or colonial times, or indeed subsequently. Nor has there been any ongoing 
competition between “church” and state over their respective jurisdictions in 
appointing office-holders along the European pattern. The weakness of religious 
control also meant that rules about usury could be ignored altogether, or evaded 
through profit-sharing as in contemporary Pakistan. This meant that the restrictions on 
usury in Islam did not lead to intense conflicts between emerging merchant-financiers 
and the “church”. In independent Pakistan or Bangladesh, the merchant and capitalist 
classes have certainly not felt threatened by the anti-capitalist elements implicit in the 
Islamic ban on usury. Similarly, while some aspects of Hinduism, such as the caste 
system, appear to be anti-capitalist, emerging Hindu traders and capitalists have not 
felt threatened by these and have certainly not been in the forefront of secular 
movements in India. 
 
In the absence of a fundamental cleavage between religion and emerging capitalist 
economic interests, the political use of religion in Bangladesh has reflected very 
different interests. Clientelist coalitions have long used religion, language, caste and 
other long-standing beliefs and identities as pegs around which to establish 
differences between themselves and their opponents or to invite new factions to join. 
As a result, they have been willing to change their positions on religion far more 
readily than if particular religious institutions or practices were fundamentally against 
their interests. This is best illustrated by the dramatic overtures that Mujib made to 
Islamic groups shortly after his uncompromising rejection of Pakistan as an Islamic 
republic to which Bengalis could belong. Moreover, an important religious party, the 
Jamaat-e-Islami, had supported Pakistan and opposed Bangladeshi independence. 
Many of its members, and indeed members of other smaller Islamic parties had even 
fought on the Pakistani side. The break with Pakistan had also been followed by the 
adoption of a secular constitution and the definition of the nation in terms of a secular 
Bengali nationalism. In this context, Mujib’s decision in 1973 to release without trial 
or investigation the 33,000 alleged war criminals who sympathized with, or were 
members of, Islamist parties was significant. Shortly afterwards, in 1974, Mujib 
travelled to Pakistan to attend the Islamic Summit at Lahore and returned home 
proudly proclaiming Bangladesh to be the world’s second largest Islamic nation, 
bigger than Pakistan (B. M. Kabir 1988: 83-4). In the same year a Madrasah 
Education Commission was formed to report on how religious education could be 
improved. And in 1975 the Islamic Foundation was set up to promote Islamic studies 
and to manage mosques (M. G. Kabir 1995: 188-90; T. M. Murshid 1996: 362-3). 
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Even in terms of the narrow definition of secularism in the new constitution, some of 
these moves, at least, were suspect. 
 
It is possible to comprehend these actions if we recognize that for the Awami League 
and other clientelist parties, the practice of Islam or secularism did not have a direct 
material significance. Rather, reaching out to Muslim groups allowed political 
organizers within the party to mobilize groups who were very similar to the classes 
and factions they already mobilized. Religious beliefs are important and clientelist 
organizers and politicians are likely to have their own preferences and prejudices, but 
subject to these, their main concern is to maintain the ruling coalition. The ruling 
coalition is always searching for allies at the lowest cost, though its leadership may 
not articulate its own survival strategy in such an explicit way. This logic can shed 
some light on Mujib’s possible motivations when he made these immediate 
concessions. In the aftermath of independence, it was cheaper for the ruling group to 
acquire potentially powerful organizational allies from amongst the defeated Islamist 
groups rather than from within the left. The left was growing in mobilizing ability, 
and its leaders could and were demanding much bigger payoffs for their allegiance. It 
is not surprising that at the same time that Mujib was making overtures to his old 
enemies in the Islamic movement, he was also increasingly using violence on his old 
allies on the left because their demands were now unsustainable in the eyes of the 
ruling coalition. 
 
Mujib's assassination in 1975 was followed by two decades of governments which 
tried to construct a new political unity around the notion of a Bangladeshi 
nationalism, which was defined as the nationalism of Bengali Muslims, and therefore 
distinguished Bangladesh from West Bengal. In no important respect was the 
understanding of nationalism changed because Bengali nationalism as Mujib had 
understood it was never about attempting the reunification of Bengal on any grounds. 
The military governments, which succeeded Mujib, and the civilian parties they 
created, absorbed many defectors from the Awami League, who saw no contradiction 
in adopting the new Bangladeshi identity, and they also attracted old Maoists like 
Kazi Zafar and JSD socialists like Abdur Rab who argued that the developmental 
agenda of the military was more in tune with socialism. However, constitutional 
changes were introduced which recognized the privileged status of Islam but they 
stopped well short of declaring Bangladesh an Islamic Republic. The secular agenda, 
to the extent that it was ever implemented, was correspondingly attenuated. 
 
By the end of the 1980s the main lines of factional conflict were drawn between the 
Bangladeshi nationalist BNP (the Bangladesh Nationalist Party set up by General Zia) 
and the Bengali nationalist Awami League. While the conflict between the two was 
often implacable they continued to occasionally cooperate. The two joined forces in 
the late eighties in their fight against the ruling Jatiyo Party of Ershad that was 
ideologically indistinguishable from the BNP. In the early nineties, an even more 
unholy alliance emerged between the secular Awami League and the Islamist Jamaat 
against the then-ruling BNP government. Inevitably, over this period the Awami 
League’s secular claims became much more muted. By this stage it had become 
difficult to identify any important issues of concrete political practice affecting 
secularism on which the three major parties actually differed. For instance, BNP and 
Awami League governments were very similar in the 1990s in banning books 
offending Islamic sensibilities.  
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Despite the absence of any significant differences in practice, the conflict between the 
Bengali nationalism of the Awami League and the Bangladeshi nationalism of their 
rivals emerged as a new focus of ideological differentiation and conflict. Bengali 
nationalism is supposed to be the nationalism of the Bengali people, and Bangladeshi 
nationalism of the Bangladeshi people. For nationalisms to differ from each other 
politically, they must each have a different project of state building with different 
borders and definitions of the included and excluded. If Bengali nationalism was truly 
articulating a nationalism of the Bengali people, it must have as its eventual objective 
the reunification of Bengal. This would indeed have made it radically different from 
Bangladeshi nationalism which is clearly a state project of consolidating the current 
borders of Bangladesh. But in fact, the supporters of Bengali nationalism in 
Bangladesh, and in particular the Awami League, have no political intention of 
redrawing the borders of India and Bangladesh.  
  
This should have made the debate between Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalism 
politically redundant. It was as if Chinese nationalists in Taiwan wanted to distinguish 
themselves from Taiwanese nationalists but both sides ruled out unification with 
China as an objective. Even if there were strong differences in the politics and cultural 
preferences of the two camps, we would still not describe them as having different 
nationalist agendas. A definition of nationalism is only substantively different from 
another if it defines a different group of people as the nation or gives the existing 
nation different borders. This is true both from the perspective of a conventional 
understanding of nationalism as a political project of state-building and of 
Bangladesh’s own previous nation-building projects where the politics of Pakistani or 
Bengali nationalisms were related to political projects affecting borders and 
sovereignty. The Bengali nationalism of the 1960s in East Pakistan was about 
autonomy or independence for the part of Bengal that was East Pakistan, not about the 
unification of Bengal. In that sense, it was indistinguishable from what later came to 
be known as Bangladeshi nationalism. The constitutional debate in the 1990s about 
the role of religion was an important debate but it did not in fact put the protagonists 
on different sides of a debate about nationalism since no disagreement about borders 
or target populations was involved.  
 
The misrepresentation of a constitutional issue as an issue about nationalism is 
significant because it is a manifestation of the fact that Bangladesh’s political leaders 
still want to talk in the uncompromising language of decisive battles appropriate to a 
different context. This implies that patron-client politics in Bangladesh has not 
‘matured’ into a sustainable version where factional coalitions cycle in and out of 
power without attempting to block the opposition let alone wipe it out. The 
implacable confrontation between the two uncompromising ladies in the 1990s and 
2000s bears an uncanny resemblance to the titanic battles of the past except that the 
real context was now entirely different. Unfortunately, it seems that the history of the 
dramatic partitions, both a result of clientelist factions coalescing in particular ways 
because of dominant class intransigence has in turn created a tradition of politics that 
is taking time to change. In particular, the logic behind defining and re-defining one’s 
“nationalist” camp seems to stem from a desire to define two implacably opposed 
coalitions locked in a life-or-death battle. While clientelist coalitions do need 
distinguishing characteristics, the particular ways in which the two dominant parties 
in contemporary Bangladesh have sought to define their nationalisms appears to be 
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the result of a misreading of history. This is not just of academic interest because their 
repeated descent into zero-sum games results in collapsing growth-stability trade-offs. 
In particular, their attempts to establish that they have incompatible conceptions of 
nationalism and therefore that only one of these grand coalitions is fit to rule 
Bangladesh is no longer appropriate for achieving a viable competitive clientelism. 
 
The Absence of (Informal) Rules for Live-and-Let-Live Cycling  
The unsustainable intransigence of the two parties during the 2000s appeared most 
directly during elections when it repeatedly threatened the viability of the competitive 
clientelist system. Central to the proper working of a competitive clientelist system is 
the electoral process. A fair election in this context means that the outcome reflects 
the balance of forces on the ground without the interference of bureaucratic or 
military officials. While all interference in the administration of elections cannot be 
ruled out in a developing country, for a viable competitive clientelism, these cannot 
take place to the extent that the electoral outcome fails to reflect the balance of forces 
on the ground. If that happens, the outcome of the election will not be stability but 
more intense contestation and perhaps violence by the losing side. A sustainable 
solution requires that the voting outcome roughly reflects the balance of 
organizational holding power.  
 
The objective of a fair election in competitive clientelism is therefore not to discover 
the true preferences of the electorate, partly because true preferences may not exist 
given the absence of serious differences in the policies that the parties are likely to 
implement. Rather, elections are processes through which the organizational strengths 
of the competing coalitions are revealed and a coalition of factions with significantly 
greater holding power is allowed to form the ruling coalition. Stability is only likely 
to be achieved if a coalition with a credible superiority in organizational strength wins 
the elections. The critical requirement therefore is that no party should be able to 
leverage its strength by using the administrative apparatus to give it an electoral 
advantage that is unrelated to its strength on the ground.  
 
The response of the competing parties to the problem of organizing credible elections 
was to amend the constitution in the mid-1990s to establish a formal rule of law for 
organizing elections. The 13th Amendment set up a permanent institution of the 
Caretaker Government. A neutral government was to be set up at the end of every 
government’s term with the last Chief Justice of the Supreme Court becoming the 
interim head of government. Its sole task would be to organize the elections to 
determine the next ruling coalition. This was a unique institutional experiment to 
create a credible electoral process for selecting a ruling coalition. However, this 
institutional arrangement was clearly not buttressed by a deeper set of political 
agreements. The informal balance of power between the two parties had not 
established in their collective minds the fact that cycling of parties now had to be the 
normal state of affairs. Their subsequent actions suggested that both parties harboured 
a desire for a decisive victory that would establish one of them as the natural party of 
government in Bangladesh. The caretaker government system worked for two 
subsequent elections, despite minor attempts by both parties to interfere.  
 
However, the constitutional arrangements collapsed in the run-up to the 2007 
elections when the incumbent BNP went too far and appeared to interfere with the 
dates of retirement of Supreme Court judges so that its preferred candidate could head 
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the caretaker government. The result was an increasingly violent standoff which 
resulted in a series of general strikes (hartals) and violent street confrontations. In a 
context of increasing uncertainty a group of bureaucrats backed by the military and 
the international donor community took over power on the 11th of January 2007 as a 
new emergency interim government. Under the constitution, the caretaker government 
has to organize an election within two months, but this caretaker government stayed 
in power for two years under emergency powers it gave itself.  
 
The emergency caretaker government turned out to have been a significant wasted 
opportunity. The emerging system of competitive clientelism had clearly not yet 
acquired a set of politically sustainable checks and balances to be fully self-
sustaining. The emergency could have been an opportunity for delivering a political 
shock to the system that may have helped to establish that the army could be deployed 
as third party enforcement by a caretaker government to enforce an implicit rule of 
law governing elections. But instead, the caretaker government headed by an ex-
World Bank bureaucrat and backed by the army took a ‘good governance’ perspective 
on how to solve the problem. Their interpretation (no doubt strongly influenced by 
dominant international policy perceptions) was that the political instability in 
Bangladesh was caused by the involvement of political elites in corruption and by the 
personalization of politics.  
 
The first argument was that the opportunity for political corruption created distorted 
incentives for politicians to interfere with electoral outcomes. This analysis suggested 
that if political corruption could be rooted out and if parties could be made to compete 
on the basis of alternative manifestos of delivering public goods the problem of 
electoral violence and standoffs could be rooted out. The second argument was that 
the monopolization of the leadership of the two parties by the families of the dead 
presidents was damaging and was the source of the implacable hatred between the 
two parties. So they sought to change the leadership of the parties. Both strategies 
dismally failed. 
 
On anti-corruption, the two-year emergency caretaker government took a series of 
radical steps to achieve a large number of convictions for high-level corruption. The 
underlying thinking was that the source of political violence was the engagement of 
political leaders in corruption. Hundreds and possibly thousands of political activists 
were arrested and incarcerated, including the leaders of the two main parties on 
charges of corruption. Hundreds of businessmen were arrested and some of them 
handed over millions of dollars to the new government as ‘ill-gotten gains’ under 
pressure (which later on turned out to include torture). Thousands of cases of 
corruption and extortion were introduced in the courts. The whole exercise was 
deeply flawed not only from the perspective of its flawed understanding of a 
clientelist political settlement but even in terms of the formal legal procedures that 
were followed. In the end, almost all the cases had to be abandoned on the grounds 
that evidence was missing or inadmissible.  
 
More significantly, the caretaker government and its international advisors had failed 
to understand the nature of a clientelist polity. If political leaders running mass 
clientelist coalitions do not have resources from non-formal sources, they will be 
unable to manage the informal distributive arrangements on which a clientelist 
political settlement is based. Effectively, the caretaker government was trying to 
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replace a clientelist political settlement with a Weberian-capitalist one without 
changing the material conditions that have generated clientelist political settlements in 
every developing country. This was a failed enterprise in the way it was set up. Not 
surprisingly, the military caretaker government’s attempt to address this problem 
failed dismally. The two arrested leaders of the main political parties had to be 
released, and one of them was elected prime minister in the 2009 elections.  
 
The strategy to replace the two leaders (the so-called ‘minus-two’ formula) also failed 
and this too represented a failure to understand the nature of clientelist politics. The 
leadership of clientelist parties is not based on a choice between different policy 
positions represented by different leaders. The most appropriate leader of a clientelist 
party is someone who has the best credentials for being able to construct the biggest 
coalition for the party at a distribution of benefits that does not disadvantage any 
particular faction within it. Who is the person that all party factions are likely to trust 
the most? If an internal faction leader became leader of the whole party, their own 
factional supporters would be likely to benefit over all other factions. The promotion 
of such an individual would be strongly resisted by all other factions. But the wife or 
daughter of a dead president could be expected to have the best interests of the legacy 
at heart and be the most fair in adjudicating between factions when disputes broke 
out. If the most important task that the leader of a clientelist party plays is the 
regulation of the rent distribution within factions, ‘the family’ is likely to have an 
advantage over other individuals in gaining the shared trust of all factions. This 
experiment of the interim government also failed and the two ladies retained control 
over their own parties.  
 
Indeed, family control of clientelist parties is the established pattern in both India and 
Pakistan. This does not mean that all developing country parties are of this type. More 
disciplined ideological parties can achieve internal selection that is more rule-
following. But existing clientelist parties are unlikely ever to graduate to this through 
internal evolution because their existing internal factions will strongly resist it 
regardless of the leadership. Communist or Islamist parties in developing countries 
are more disciplined and have activists who are not always bidding for the highest 
rents. These parties are more likely to achieve rule-following elections of party 
officers. But the experience of these parties also shows that such parties have to be set 
up and develop in that way from the outset as they do not evolve out of clientelist 
parties. Disciplined parties like the Communist Parties of China and Viet Nam have 
played significant developmental roles, but the caretaker government did not 
understand that clientelist parties will not convert into such parties if only their 
leadership is changed.  
 
Finally, the caretaker government demonstrated that some significant changes had 
come about in the organization and aspirations of the Bangladesh army. Unlike the 
past when the army may have organized a coup in a context of a political impasse, 
this time it backed a civilian caretaker government though it was clear that it was the 
power behind the scenes. And unlike its previous ideological justifications for 
intervention in terms of economic development, this time the army joined forces with 
civil society champions of good governance. A significant change in the resource base 
of the army could explain some of these changes. It was now closely tied to the 
‘international community’ through its lucrative involvement in international 
peacekeeping missions. It was dependent on these international rents and did not want 
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to jeopardize them with a domestic adventure. Its own history had also taught it the 
limits to what can be achieved by authoritarianism or military clientelism. But the 
experience of uncoordinated arrests of businessmen, their arrest and release by 
different groups acting in the name of the army also suggested that the army too was 
no longer a centralized and coordinated organization. This too is a problematic 
message for clientelist factions as the potential ‘third-party’ mediator who could have 
been relied upon to intervene in the case of a real impasse between clientelist factions 
was itself shown to be potentially fragmented and weak. 
 
The main effect of the two-year experiment was a collapse in investor confidence. 
The two main parties whose intransigence and violence had caused the problem in the 
first place did indeed receive a shock, but the way in which the strategy of anti-
corruption and leadership change failed had a negative effect on the impetus to 
reform. Much more important than corruption, the absence of a credible mechanism 
for organizing elections makes the competitive clientelist system unsustainable and 
therefore unstable. The caretaker government had no conception of how to change the 
political balance of power to make acceptable elections more likely. After its two 
years in office its only positive legacy was the construction of a voter registration 
system and voter identity cards. The overall implications of the caretaker period for 
developmental reform and institutional change are very likely to have been negative.  
 
The lack of credibility that elections will deliver a stable ruling coalition can result in 
even greater short-termism and conflict as elections approach in a competitive 
clientelist system. This can have very negative effects on long-term investments, 
particularly where government contracts are involved. For instance, it has proved to 
be very difficult to get private investors to invest in the power sector. This is an area 
where future income streams depend on governments honouring contracts made by 
previous governments. But if the opposition is always challenging the legitimacy of 
the incumbent government, investors are likely to be wary that the opposition may 
challenge the legality of contracts if they come to power. Thus, vulnerable 
competitive clientelism can create high transaction costs for some types of contracts 
and some investments may not be possible at all. Since infrastructure and power 
sector investments do require government guarantees for future payments, a vital set 
of investments are adversely affected on which other investments ultimately depend. 
Governments have had to try and attract investors in sectors like power with 
excessively large tariffs and other incentives, with obvious efficiency and growth 
implications for the broader economy.  
 
Competitive clientelism also describes an adverse political settlement for institutional 
and governance improvements that can build on the successes of the garments and 
textile industries to develop new sectors. The garment industry developed as a result 
of a fortunate conjuncture of MFA rents, domestic political support at the highest 
level, the availability of domestic investible resources that were appropriate for 
driving these investments and strong incentives for foreign technology providers to 
transfer the appropriate technologies to Bangladesh. The lesson that emerges is that 
the extension of this success to new sectors requires developing critical governance 
capabilities to recreate these conditions in new sectors. The essential condition is that 
the gap between initial domestic competitiveness and the international price for 
particular qualities of products has to be met by some form of temporary financing. In 
the garments case this was provided by a combination of MFA protection and 
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domestic financing. This is unlikely to emerge by coincidence again, so agencies and 
institutions that can provide well-targeted financing for building competitiveness are 
essential if Bangladesh is to move up the value chain.  
 
These agencies and institutions could take a variety of forms ranging from direct 
government policies of support to critical sectors to the development of a new 
generation of industrial banks. But the critical point is that these initiatives are 
unlikely to work unless the package comes with specific governance capabilities to 
ensure that support is not captured by politically connected but inefficient 
entrepreneurs. Neither the ambitious industrial policies of the East Asian countries nor 
the ‘good governance’ agenda set by western development partners provides a 
feasible set of governance reform targets for countries like Bangladesh. But even a 
limited and very specific set of governance targets that are aimed at building 
competitiveness in progressively more sophisticated sectors faces an adverse growth-
stability trade-off as the political settlement becomes more fragmented in the direction 
of competitive clientelism. The challenge for Bangladesh is for the productive sector 
and political entrepreneurs to come up with a reform agenda that would allow 
incremental progress along this governance agenda within the limits of competitive 
clientelism. In the longer run, the fractious nature of competitive clientelism in 
Bangladesh may itself be the subject of political discussion as some types of reforms 
of party structures and party discipline may improve the capacity of the competing 
parties to think long-term and support institutional changes from which they would all 
sequentially benefit. 
 
Summary 
The competitive clientelist period after 1990 has had a mixed record. Analytically, we 
expect this configuration of holding power to result in the most adverse growth-
stability trade-offs. Paradoxically, in Bangladesh, even political stability has not been 
assured through the operation of competitive clientelism. The difficulty of ensuring 
credible rules for the removal of the ruling coalition has created periods of intense 
conflict and instability. It has also raised the transaction costs facing some types of 
vital long-term investments in particular in the power and infrastructure sectors to the 
detriment of growth. On the other hand, economic activities in other sectors where 
institutions for enforcing valuable contracts over time are not required are not so 
constrained. The challenges of technology upgrading and industrial policy have not 
gone away, but have simply become more difficult to respond to. The immediate 
challenge for sustaining competitive clientelism is to achieve more credible and less 
violent methods of ensuring the replacement of the ruling coalition. If this can be 
achieved, the longer term challenge is to transform the organization of coalitions 
sufficiently (for instance through constructing more disciplined parties) to enable 
more favourable growth-stability trade-offs to emerge.  
 
12. India, its Fence and its Transit Demand 
The history of clientelist politics and confrontations that resulted in the two partitions 
and multiple nationalist movements has not only left legacies for Bangladesh’s 
internal politics, but also potentially much more difficult problems for both India and 
Bangladesh as a result of the way in which the borders were drawn. The partition of 
Bengal in 1947 is the relevant partition for India-Bangladesh relations as the borders 
90 
 
drawn then remain on the ground today. Two consequences followed from that first 
religious partition of Bengal with great relevance for the politics of the present. 
 
First, the partition cut across historic migration routes, river flows and trade routes. 
The river flows adversely affect Bangladesh because as upstream India dams rivers or 
diverts them for agricultural use within India, the loss inflicted on downstream 
Bangladesh is never taken into account. This has resulted in growing public anger 
with India, particularly in agrarian areas where the decline in water flows is very 
noticeable over time. This is a long-term problem for Bangladesh, which has limited 
bargaining power over India to achieve any significant change in Indian policies. 
However, Bangladesh is in any case unlikely to enjoy an agrarian transition because 
of its own problems with land structure and fragmentation. Agriculture represents a 
steadily declining share of GDP, though the decline in agricultural employment has 
been less dramatic. The long-term challenge for Bangladesh is in any case to reduce 
its dependence on agriculture through industrialization and manufacturing growth. 
Nevertheless, in the short to medium term there is likely to be growing hardship in 
agrarian areas that can be attributed to a more severe pace of adjustment than if East 
Bengal had retained political representation within India.  
 
More significantly, historic migration patterns from the nineteenth century onwards 
have been of plains people from the Bengal delta moving north to Assam and beyond 
and this pattern of historic migration did not entirely stop with the borders of 1947. 
Some migration continued but at a generally reduced pace. The result of these long-
term migrations is that neighbouring states like Assam have significant Bengali 
Muslim populations who have migrated over the last century and a half at least. The 
Indian perception is that the high percentage of Muslims in the states of Assam and 
West Bengal are due to infiltration from Bangladesh and Indian politics in the region 
has been about stopping the Bangladeshi ‘cross-border infiltration’. Both India and 
Bangladesh have in the past provided havens for insurgents from each other’s 
territories. In recent years India has taken much more aggressive action against its 
insurgents operating from Bangladesh and it has claimed that Pakistan-sponsored 
Islamic terrorists were also operating from Bangladesh. But underlying these security 
concerns, which would be relatively easy to address if these were the only problems, 
there is a much deeper concern about the growing share of Muslims in some of 
India’s eastern states.  
 
The result of these concerns was the construction by India of the longest fence in the 
world. Work on the fence started in 1987 and initially the decision was only to fence 
some vulnerable locations. Since then successive governments in India have decided 
to fence the entire Indo-Bangladesh international border. By 2010, roughly 3000 of 
3783 kilometres have been fenced (Figure 7). The Indian Border Security Forces (the 
BSF) also engages in a trigger happy policing of the fence sometimes killing twenty 
or more people in a month. The dead include both Indians and Bangladeshis who are 
crossing the border for a variety of reasons including trade (often illegal), farming (as 
the border and the fence did not respect land ownership) as well as continuing 
migration. Terrorists, of course, manage never to be shot at the border. 
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Source: BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4622317.stm 
Channel 4 News http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid1184614595?bctid=30479039001  
 
As India has built the fence on its side of the border, Bangladesh has little option but 
to accept it as a reality, even though the border deaths are very unpopular. Bangladesh 
was one of the top ten countries in the world in terms of remittance income in 2008, 
earning almost 9 billion dollars. India was number one earning 30 billion dollars. 
These figures are steadily growing. If migrants to India were any significant part of 
Bangladeshi remittance incomes, India’s fence would have concerned the political 
class in Bangladesh much more. But almost all official remittances come from 
Bangladeshis going to the Arabian Gulf, South-East Asia and beyond. The migrants to 
India are the poorest and least skilled and their remittances are negligible. The fence 
is therefore not an economic issue for the political class though it is a political issue 
they have to deal with particularly in the border areas.  
 
The political tension between India and Bangladesh may rapidly escalate in the future 
as a result of another aspect of India’s regional policy which is to demand ‘transit’ 
rights through Bangladesh. The Indian problem can be seen with reference to a map 
of its troubled North-East (Figure 8). To the east of Bangladesh are seven Indian 
states (known as the seven sisters) that are tenuously connected to India through the 
Shiliguri corridor. The corridor itself is often blocked by regional insurgents and the 
roads run through hilly and difficult terrain. To make matters worse, the North-East 
has some of the longest lasting insurgencies in India. In addition, a significant chunk 
of Arunachal Pradesh has been claimed by China with some historical justification 
and has already been included in Chinese maps as ‘Southern Tibet’. Any increase in 
Sino-Indian regional competition is likely to result in increased Chinese activity in 
this area and an increase in its support for separatist insurgencies. The region is a 
potential flash point and Bangladesh may unwittingly become embroiled. 
 
The most feasible route for shifting significant amounts of material and resources into 
the North-East and accelerating its integration into the rest of India is to use 
Bangladeshi ports and road and rail networks. If these networks are established, this 
obviously has the danger of involving Bangladesh in any future conflict between India 
and China in this region. But long before that happens, there is likely to be serious 
opposition in Bangladesh to India’s transit demand if it ever gets implemented. The 
problem is that the ability of Bangladeshis to use the proposed networks on the same 
conditions as Indians appears to be precluded by India’s concerns about the 
movements of Bangladeshis that have resulted in the construction of the fence. As a 
result, the political pressure from India has been for ‘transit’ rather than 
Figure 7 The Longest Fence in the World 
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‘connectivity’. The implication is that India should be granted the right to move its 
material through Bangladesh without having to grant reciprocal rights to Bangladeshis 
to travel through India because there is no Bangladesh on the other side that 
Bangladeshis can claim to be transiting to. For this privilege India has offered to pay 
tolls to use the roads, and to lend money (at market rates of interest) to construct the 
required infrastructure. While this may appear to be reasonable from an Indian 
perspective, a Bangladeshi government that accepts India’s fence and strict border 
controls for Bangladeshis and then grants its trucks and material the right to move 
freely through Bangladeshi territory is likely to be perceived as having sold 
Bangladeshi dignity down the river.  
 
 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:India-locator-map-NE.svg 
Figure 8 India's North-East and its Demand for Transit 
 
The history of clientelist politics suggests what the outcome is likely to be. Any 
Bangladeshi ruling coalition that is forced or persuaded to concede to such an 
agreement will provide opposition coalitions with the easiest of targets to mobilize 
against it. Indian trucks moving through Bangladesh while Bangladeshis face strict 
border controls even for legitimate trips can only be a potent symbol of external 
control and loss of dignity. Dignity has been a powerful mobilizing force in 
Bangladesh throughout the last century, and political organizers have always managed 
to mobilize protests against unequal legal or constitutional arrangements. Indian 
transit rights without equivalent rights for Bangladeshis to travel through India will 
demonstrate an inequality that is unlikely to remain politically unchallenged in 
Bangladesh. History should give Indian and Bangladeshi political leaders pause for 
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thought if they want to avoid yet another confrontation between nationalisms. If India 
is unwilling to move towards a system of reciprocal rights of movement into and out 
of each other’s territory, its best strategy will be to achieve its transportation goals 
with its North-East in some other way. The combination of transit rights for one side 
and strict border controls for the other is guaranteed to result in a new nationalist 
backlash in Bangladesh which neither country needs.  
 
As a second-order problem, Bangladeshi policy-makers need to understand that while 
Bangladesh is competitive with India in a few sectors, in most sectors Indian industry 
is more advanced both technologically and in entrepreneurial capabilities. An opening 
up which does not match this with a parallel set of strategies for developing and 
supporting new Bangladeshi sectors may result in Bangladesh’s specialization in a 
few sectors like garments and jute becoming even more difficult to break out of. This 
is not an Indian problem but an opening up that is badly designed and executed under 
a competitive clientelist political settlement can eventually result in seriously adverse 
economic outcomes. For instance, if Bangladesh’s global competitiveness in garments 
and textiles declines as a result of the entry of other low-wage countries, and 
Bangladesh has by then already fully opened up to Indian capital and trade, it may be 
very difficult to support Bangladeshi entrepreneurs to catch up. Nor can Bangladesh 
then rely on Indian capital to set up manufacturing in Bangladesh because that would 
be subject to Indian economic policies at that time, and moreover, such a reliance is 
also likely to result in significant political tensions in the long-run that are not in the 
interests of either India or Bangladesh.  
 
13. Conclusions 
The framework of a clientelist political settlement allows us to make sense of a long 
history of political mobilization in Bangladesh and the construction of a variety of 
different nationalist coalitions. The construction of different variants of nationalism in 
Bangladesh cannot be explained by any pre-existing national movements that wanted 
to construct the specific nations that actually emerged. Rather, it makes more 
historical sense to link the emergent nationalisms with an analysis of the general 
characteristics of patron-client politics and their operation in eastern Bengal in 
particular. The analysis of patron-client politics tells us that the specific nationalist 
agendas that emerged were not pre-ordained, but were instead contingent but entirely 
legitimate responses of factional political organizers in eastern Bengal when they 
were faced with exclusionary strategies of previous dominant elites. While at one 
level these mobilizations had all the characteristics of clientelism, factions in East 
Bengal always managed to react rapidly and with great determination to join forces 
whenever there was an unjust attempt to constrain their activities.  
 
This perspective has the prospect of addressing in a better way some of the major 
fissures that exist in Bangladeshi society regarding the interpretation of recent history. 
By moving away from an assertion of a primordial national identity that some groups 
either supported or betrayed, a richer and historically more accurate account can be 
retrieved that shows that particular nationalist outcomes were themselves the result of 
complex and changing bargaining games between emerging political entrepreneurs 
organizing new groups in Bengal and pre-existing elites with formal rights.  
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Our analytical perspective also allows us to integrate a history of nationalism with the 
problems of state-building and institutional development in independent Bangladesh. 
The intense competition between clientelist factions that had driven conflicts with 
pre-existing elites became more intense when those conflicts resulted in partitions and 
the loss of capital and assets that could have been more fairly used. Partition and 
freedom did not result in greater stability but rather the reverse. The result after 1971 
in particular was more intense conflicts and sustained violence. It was only in the 
1980s that Bangladesh begins to emerge from fifty years of turbulence. The 
emergence of minimal stability had to await the creation of a potential capitalist class 
through the activities of clientelist accumulation. This together with a lucky break in 
the garment industry and the presence of minimal governance and enforcement 
capabilities allowed growth in a few sectors to take off. 
 
The number and fragmentation of factions in Bangladesh, as across most of South 
Asia, is such that the only feasible version of a clientelist political settlement is 
competitive clientelism. Attempts at authoritarianism and attempts to construct or 
preserve a dominant party ruling coalition failed. This too provides a better 
understanding of the challenges of governance in countries like Bangladesh that face 
competitive clientelism as the default version of the clientelist political settlement. In 
Bangladesh, the history of patron-client factions coalescing and fighting all-out battles 
against intransigent and uncompromising dominant elites unfortunately created an 
expectation amongst its political leaders that the no-compromise style of politics was 
both normal and could continue to deliver. Many of the problems of electoral 
breakdown can be traced to this zero-sum attitude amongst the leadership. This 
analysis contrasts with the ‘good governance’ analysis that motivated the failed 
attempt to reform the political system in Bangladesh during the two-year emergency 
caretaker government of 2007-9. 
 
It is likely that the political leaderships of the major factional parties in Bangladesh 
will eventually move beyond the unviable positions of no compromise with the 
opposition that they adopted in the past. But this cannot be taken for granted. Even if 
a viable competitive clientelism emerges based on the possibility of a regular cycling 
of factions based on their organizational power, serious problems will remain that 
need to be addressed. Competitive clientelism in Bangladesh and elsewhere faces the 
most adverse growth-stability trade-off of all clientelist political settlements. Time 
horizons of the ruling coalition are short and their implementation capabilities are 
weak. Yet, the most important challenges facing developing countries such as the 
adoption of new technologies, the construction of critical infrastructure and so on 
require strong governance capabilities in a few sectors at least and a somewhat longer 
time horizon. The medium term challenge for countries like Bangladesh is therefore 
also to focus on these problems and to work within competitive clientelism to develop 
capabilities in one or two agencies to govern some of the most important 
interventions. These capabilities are most likely to be developed if the formal and 
informal arrangements required to make them work are as aligned as possible with the 
distributive goals of important coalitions affected by these strategies. 
 
The most ambitious strategy for countries with competitive clientelism is to attempt to 
change the distribution of power through purposive political activity so that more 
favourable growth-stability trade-offs can be achieved. A developmental dominant 
party is the most likely route that could be explored by political entrepreneurs in 
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countries like Bangladesh. The experience of the Communist Party Marxist (the 
CPM) in West Bengal, which had some characteristics of a developmental dominant 
party, suggests that in the longer run the construction of a dominant developmental 
party is not necessarily precluded in Bangladesh. Short of a single dominant party, the 
construction of more disciplined competitive clientelist parties will also significantly 
improve the growth-statistic trade-off by allowing greater party discipline and thereby 
improving implementation capabilities. 
 
Finally, our analysis discusses the likely responses of clientelist politics in Bangladesh 
to the Indian responses to insurgencies in the North-East and India’s competition with 
China in this region. Bangladesh has been under considerable pressure to grant India 
transit rights to move men and material over Bangladeshi territory and through 
Bangladeshi ports. At the same time India’s concern, and in Bangladeshi eyes over-
reaction to growing Muslim populations in some of its eastern states, in particular in 
Assam, has led India to construct a comprehensive fence round Bangladesh. In that 
context, India is unlikely to allow Bangladeshis much laxer immigration controls 
compared to the current extremely time-consuming and strict arrangements for legal 
cross-border movements. Yet transit implies a special category of travel rights solely 
for India, so that its trucks and people can move across much faster than they already 
can under existing immigration and customs rules. Given the history of how 
nationalist responses have been constructed in Bangladesh against unequal rights, we 
would expect such an asymmetry to be rapidly used by excluded factions to construct 
nationalist umbrella coalitions against those who were responsible. The likely 
nationalist reaction to this agenda if it was pushed ahead would be damaging for both 
India and Bangladesh.  
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